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Kristin Andrews [41]Kristin A. Andrews [1]
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Profile: Kristin Andrews (York University)
  1. Kristin Andrews, Ape Autonomy? Social Norms and Moral Agency in Other Species.
    Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships.
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  2. Kristin Andrews, Vol. 6, No.
    The question of whether humans have free will, like the question of the meaning of life, is one whose answer depends on how the question itself is interpreted. In his recent book Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy, Henrik Walter examines whether free will is possible in a deterministic natural world, and he concludes that the answer is "It depends" (xi). He rejects a libertarian account of free will as internally inconsistent, but argues (...)
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  3. Kristin Andrews, Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
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  4. Kristin Andrews, On Attributing "Anthropomorphic" Properties to Animals.
    In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an a (...)
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  5. Kristin Andrews, The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds.
    A defense of equality for great apes must begin with an understanding of the opposition and an acknowledgement of the most basic point of disagreement. For great apes to gain status as persons in our community, we must begin by determining what the multitude of different definitions of "person" have in common. Finding that great apes fulfill the requirements of any one specific theory of personhood is insufficient, for these theories are highly controversial, and a critique of the theory will (...)
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  6. Kristin Andrews, Why Bush Should Explain 11 September.
    There were various initial reactions to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and among those reactions were some contradictions. There were those who demanded an explanation for the attacks, and others who condemned attempts to explain as immoral or unpatriotic. Though President George W. Bush did make some rhetorical remarks that, I believe, masqueraded as explanatory, it appears that he agrees with the latter set.
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  7. Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss (forthcoming). Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis. Biology and Philosophy:1-19.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals (Sober in Thinking with animals: new perspectives on anthropomorphism. Columbia University Press, New York, pp 85–99, 2005; de Waal in Philos Top 27:225–280, 1999). This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while (...)
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  8. Joshua Alexander, Mark Alicke, Holly Andersen, Michael Anderson, Kristin Andrews, István Aranyosi, Adam Arico, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi & Andrew Bailey (2012). Philosophical Psychology Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Kenneth Aizawa. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):161-163.
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  9. Kristin Andrews (2012). Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology. The Mit Press.
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  10. Kristin Andrews (2011). Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals. In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. 469--494.
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  11. Kristin Andrews, Animal Cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Kenneth Aizawa, Liliana Albertazzi, Keith Allen, Sarah Allred, Marc Alspector-Kelly, Kristin Andrews, André Ariew, Valtteri Arstila, Anthony Atkinson & Edward Averill (2009). We Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Jonathan Adler. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):817-818.
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  13. Kristin Andrews (2009). Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):51-63.
    Biology and Philosophy, forthcoming. Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are unable (...)
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  14. Kristin Andrews (2009). Telling Stories Without Words. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    I will argue here that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One reason for thinking that language must be implicated in FP explanations arises from the history of theorizing about the nature of (...)
     
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  15. Kristin Andrews (2009). Telling Tales. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):227-235.
    In the twenty-five or so years since Paul Churchland (1981) proposed its elimination, defenders of folk psychology have argued for the ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution in human social cognition. If we didn’t understand others in terms of their beliefs and desires, we would see others as ‘‘baffling ciphers’’ (Dennett, 1991, p. 29) and it would be ‘‘the end of the world’’ (Fodor, 1990, p. 156). Because the world continues, and we seem to predict and explain what others do (...)
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  16. Kristin Andrews (2009). Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind. Inquiry 52 (5):433-448.
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  17. Ken Aizawa, Anna Alexandrova, Sophie Allen, Michael Anderson, Holly Anderson, Kristin Andrews, Adam Arico, Andre Ariew, Edward Averill & Andrew Bailey (2008). We Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Rebecca Abraham Fred Adams. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):859-860.
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  18. Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
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  19. Kristin Andrews (2008). Interpreting the Baboon. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):5-6.
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  20. Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology. In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer.
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  21. Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. 191--209.
  22. Kristin Andrews, The Need to Explain Behavior: Predicting, Explaining, and the Social Function of Mental State Attribution.
    According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal (...)
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  23. Kristin Andrews, Anne Russon, Brian Huss, Kristin Andrews, Anne Russon & Brian Huss (2007). Innovation and the Grain Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):422-423.
    Ramsey, Bastian, and van Schaik (RBS) have made a valiant effort to identify innovations in nature. As their theoretical perspective on innovation as a product largely conforms to Reader & Laland (2003), their novel contribution is epistemological. They may well have considered as much information as possible on the ecological, individual, and historical factors that suggest innovations in nature. However, their method does not..
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  24. Anne Russon, Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss (2007). Innovation and the Grain Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):422-423.
    Our concern is with Ramsey et al.'s method for identifying innovation. We show that either it yields false positives or the authors offer insufficient guidance for its application. To avoid these results, the authors need to modify the key or offer better guidelines for delineating input. Either choice requires addressing the processes that generate a behavior.
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  25. Kristin Andrews (2006). Explaining Terrorism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:167-171.
    The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty with (...)
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  26. Kristin Andrews (2006). Scott Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (4):291-293.
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  27. Kristin Andrews, The Functions of Folk Psychology.
    The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as --œour commonsense conception of psychological phenomena--� (Churchland 1981, p. 67), there have been implicit assumptions regarding the nature of that commonsense conception. It has been assumed that folk psychology involves two practices, the prediction and explanation of behavior. And it has been assumed that one cognitive mechanism (...)
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  28. Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic (2006). Speaking Without Interpreting: A Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):663 – 678.
    We clarify some points previously made by Andrews, and defend the claim that Davidson's account of belief can be and is challenged by the existence of some people with autism. We argue that both Bouma and Andrews (Philosophical Psychology, 15) blurred the subtle distinctions between the psychological concepts of theory of mind and joint attention and the Davidsonian concepts of interpretation and triangulation. And we accept that appeal to control group studies is not the appropriate place to look for an (...)
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  29. S. Majerus, H. Gill-Thwaites, Kristin Andrews & Steven Laureys (2006). Behavioral Evaluation of Consciousness in Severe Brain Damage. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  30. Kristin Andrews (2005). Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places? Mind and Language 20 (5):521-536.
    I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk’s theoretical commitments should lead them to accept (...)
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  31. Kristin Andrews (2004). How to Learn From Our Mistakes. Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):247 – 263.
    A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. (...)
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  32. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  33. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.
  34. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.
  35. Kristin Andrews (2003). Walter's Neurophilosophy of Free Will: A Review. Philo 6:166.
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  36. Kristin Andrews (2002). Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.
    Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one (...)
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  37. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  38. Kristin A. Andrews (1999). Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, and George Lauder, Eds., Nature's Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design in Biology Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 19 (3):157-158.
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  39. Kristin Andrews, On Predicting Behavior.
    I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory (attributing beliefs and desires to predict behavior) and simulation theory (imagining what one would do in similar circumstances in order to predict behavior). I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy.
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