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  1. Kristina Rolin (2012). A Feminist Approach to Values in Science. Perspectives on Science 20 (3):320-330.
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  2. Kristina Rolin (2012). Feminist Philosophy of Economics. In Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard & John Woods (eds.), Philosophy of Economics. North Holland. 199.
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  3. Kristian Klockars, Ilkka Niiniluoto & Kristina Rolin (eds.) (2010). Oikeus. University of Helsinki.
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  4. Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
    An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...)
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  5. Kristina Rolin (2009). Scientific Knowledge : A Stakeholder Theory. In Jeroen Van Bouwel (ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. 62--80.
     
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  6. Kristina Rolin (2009). Standpoint Theory as a Methodology for the Study of Power Relations. Hypatia 24 (4):218 - 226.
  7. Kristina Rolin (2008). Gender and Physics: Feminist Philosophy and Science Education. Science and Education 17 (10):1111-1125.
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  8. Kristina Rolin (2006). The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. Episteme 3 (1-2):125-136.
    Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...)
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  9. Kristina Rolin (2004). Three Decades of Feminism in Science: From "Liberal Feminism" and "Difference Feminism" to Gender Analysis of Science. [REVIEW] Hypatia 19 (1):292 - 296.
  10. Kristina Rolin (2004). Why Gender is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):880-891.
    In recent years, feminist philosophy of science has been subjected to criticism. The debate has focused on the implications of the underdetermination thesis for accounts of the role of social values in scientific reasoning. My aim here is to offer a different approach. I suggest that feminist philosophers of science contribute to our understanding of science by (1) producing gender‐sensitive analyses of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry and (2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative issues in philosophy (...)
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  11. Kristina Rolin (2003). Philosophies of Science/Feminist Theories. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (2):139-141.
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  12. Kristina Rolin (2002). Gender and Trust in Science. Hypatia 17 (4):95-118.
    : It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.
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  13. Kristina Rolin (2002). Is 'Science as Social' a Feminist Insight? Social Epistemology 16 (3):233 – 249.
  14. Kristina Rolin (1999). Can Gender Ideologies Influence the Practice of the Physical Sciences? Perspectives on Science 7 (4):510-533.
    : As a response to the critics of feminist science studies I argue that it is possible to formulate empirical hypotheses about gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences without (1) reinforcing stereotypes about women and mathematical sciences or (2) assuming at the outset that the area of physics under investigation is methodologically suspect. I will then critically evaluate two case studies of gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences. The case studies fail to show that (...)
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