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Profile: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (University of Kent at Canterbury)
  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference. Episteme.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
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  2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). People Listen to People Who Listen: Instilling Virtues of Deference. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Character Project: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. Oxford University Press.
    We often fail to defer to sources who know what they’re talking about. When doing so consistently, we fail to manifest a virtue of deference. This is because epistemic virtues are dispositions that promote epistemic goals, and knowledge is an epistemic goal. The present paper makes two points about how to instill this virtue. First, virtues of deference can be instilled by promoting compliance with requests on the part of good sources to be listened to, since listening is conducive to (...)
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  3. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). Review of Robert B. Talisse's Democracy and Moral Conflict. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  4. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (forthcoming). A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown (...)
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  5. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Information Markets.
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  6. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, The Applied Epistemology of Information Markets.
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  7. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, The Epistemic Benefits of Democracy: A Critical Perspective.
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  8. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, The Social Virtue of Blind Deference.
    Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit (...)
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  9. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Klemens Kappel (2014). Rational Trust. Synthese 191 (9):1953-1955.
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  10. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. Palgrave Macmillan.
    We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to (...)
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  11. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for (...)
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  12. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny (...)
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  13. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
    The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic (...)
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  14. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Review of Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions (OUP 2012). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):821-823.
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  15. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm (2013). Getting It Right. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347.
    Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...)
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  16. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Klemens Kappel & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2013). The Epistemology of Inclusiveness. Synthese 190 (7):1185-1188.
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  17. Jamie T. Kelly & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Epistemic Perfectionism and Liberal Democracy. Social Philosophy Today 29:49-58.
    Robert Talisse’s recent attempt to justify liberal democracy in epistemic terms is in many ways a breath of fresh air. However, in the present paper we argue that his defense faces two inter-related problems. The first problem pertains to his defense of liberalism, and owes to the fact that a commitment to the folk-epistemological norms in terms of which he makes his case does not commit one to partaking in liberal institutions. Consequently, our (alleged) commitment to the relevant epistemic norms (...)
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  18. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). Review of Frank Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford UP, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):190-192.
    The review argues that Lovett’s theory of domination suffers from a problem. Lovett is aware of the problem and bites a fairly large bullet in response to it. What he does not seem aware of is that the problem can be avoided by opting for an account of welfare that he unfortunately ignores, despite the fact that it would serve his purposes well.
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  19. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). Review of Colin McGinn, Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy (OUP 2012). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  20. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). Why Deliberative Democracy is (Still) Untenable. Public Affairs Quarterly 26 (3):199-220.
    A common objection to deliberative democracy is that available evidence on public ignorance makes it unlikely that social deliberation among the public is a process likely to yield accurate outputs. The present paper considers—and ultimately rejects—two responses to this objection. The first response is that the correct conclusion to draw from the evidence is simply that we must work harder to ensure that the deliberative process improves the deliberators’ epistemic situation. The main problem for this response is that there are (...)
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  21. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). What's so Good About a Wise and Knowledgeable Public? Acta Analytica 27 (2):199-216.
    Political philosophers have been concerned for some time with the epistemic caliber of the general public, qua the body that is, ultimately, tasked with political decision-making in democratic societies. Unfortunately, the empirical data paints a pretty dismal picture here, indicating that the public tends to be largely ignorant on the issues relevant to governance. To make matters worse, social psychological research on how ignorance tends to breed overconfidence gives us reason to believe that the public will not only lack knowledge (...)
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  22. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2011). Review of Robert B. Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge UP, 2009). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):666-668.
    The review argues that Talisse's epistemic defense of democracy in his "Democracy and Moral Conflict," albeit novel and interesting, falls prey to an epistemic analogue of the problem of reasonable moral pluralism that Rawls famously posed for moral justifications of democracy.
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  23. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Magkänslans Anatomi (The Anatomy of Gut Feelings).
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