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  1. Ksenija Puškarić (2012). Cartesian Idea of God as the Infinite. Filozofia 67 (4):282.
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  2. Nancy J. Nersessian, Dunja Jutronic, Ksenija Puskaric, Nenad Miscevic, Andreas K. A. Georgiou & James Robert Brown (2007). James Robert Brown: Thought Experiments and Platonism. Part Two. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (20):125-268.
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  3. Ksenija Puškarić (2007). Brown and Berkeley. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):177-180.
    For J. Brown the essential feature of thought experiments is that they mobilize our intuition; the way they teach positive lessons to cognizers is by means of the intuition mobilized. The paper presents a problem for Brown with the help of a famous TE as counterexample. It argues that Berkeley’s master argument is a philosophical thought experiment that lacks a feature typical of platonic thought experiments -- intuitive grasp. If Berkeley’s argument is a thought experiment,as I’ve attempted to show, then (...)
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  4. Ksenija Puškarić (2007). Critical Notice. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):103-112.
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  5. Ksenija Puškarić (2007). Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19:103-112.
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  6. Ksenija Puškarić (2005). Rey and the Projectivist Account. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):441-445.
    The paper discusses Rey’s projectivism. It offers an argument against it and in favor of the reliability of introspection. In short, if it is fallible, then at least sometimes it has to be veridical. Therefore, introspection can’t be systematically deceptive. But then, some introspective beliefs are true and at least some phenomenal conscious states exist.
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  7. Ksenija Puškarić (2004). Crane on Intentionality and Consciousness. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):219-222.
    The paper concentrates on issues of intentionality subdivided into four particular sub-issues. First, is there an intentional object of depression and of states like depression? Second, according to the strong intentionalist view defended by T. Crane, what it is like to be in a mental state is fixed by the mental state’s mode and its content; but mode is not sufficiently well-defined in his analysis. Third, how can the intentionalist explain phenomenological richness of conscious mental states? Crane appeals to non-conceptual (...)
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  8. Ksenija Puskaric (2004). Crane on Intentionality and Consciousness: A Few Questions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):219-222.
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