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Profile: L. A. Paul (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
  1.  23
    L. A. Paul (2014). Transformative Experience. OUP Oxford.
    How should we make choices when we know so little about our futures? L. A. Paul argues that we must view life decisions as choices to make discoveries about the nature of experience. Her account of transformative experience holds that part of the value of living authentically is to experience our lives and preferences in whatever ways they evolve.
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  2. L. A. Paul (2015). What You Can't Expect When You 'Re Expecting'. Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
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  3. L. A. Paul (2012). Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden's Tale. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
    Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the (...)
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  4. L. A. Paul (2010). Temporal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
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  5. L. A. Paul & Ned Hall (2013). Causation: A User's Guide. Oxford.
    Causation is at once familiar and mysterious--we can detect its presence in the world, but we cannot agree on the metaphysics of the causal relation. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, and develop a broad and sophisticated understanding of the issues under debate.
     
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  6.  31
    Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.) (2004). Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    A collection of important recent work on the counterfactual analysis of causation.
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  7. L. A. Paul (2012). Building the World From its Fundamental Constituents. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):221-256.
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  8. L. A. Paul (2002). Logical Parts. Noûs 36 (4):578–596.
    I argue for a property mereology and for mereological bundle theory. I then apply this theory to the one over many problem (universals) and puzzles concerning persistence and material constitution.
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  9.  17
    L. A. Paul (2015). Transformative Experience: Replies to Pettigrew, Barnes and Campbell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):794-813.
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  10. L. A. Paul, E. J. Hall & J. Collins (eds.) (2004). Causation and Counterfactuals. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  11. L. A. Paul (2006). Coincidence as Overlap. Noûs 40 (4):623–659.
    I discuss puzzles involving coinciding material objects (such as statues and their constitutive lumps of clay) and propose solutions.
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  12. L. A. Paul (2010). A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):461-476.
    Recent work in philosophy could benefit from paying greater attention to empirical results from cognitive science involving judgments about the nature of our ordinary experience. This paper describes the way that experimental and theoretical results about the nature of ordinary judgments could—and should—inform certain sorts of enquiries in contemporary philosophy, using metaphysics as an exemplar, and hence defines a new way for experimental philosophy and cognitive science to contribute to traditional philosophical debates.
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  13.  4
    L. A. Paul (2015). Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies. Res Philosophica 92 (2):473-545.
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  14.  84
    L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235-256.
    While skiing, Suzy falls and breaks her right wrist. The next day, she writes a philosophy paper. Her right wrist is broken, so she writes her paper using her left hand. (Assume, as seems plausible, that she isn’t dexterous enough to write it any other way, e.g., with her right foot.) She writes the paper, sends it off to a journal, and it is subsequently published. Is Suzy’s accident a cause of the publication of the paper?2 Of course not. Below, (...)
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  15. L. A. Paul (2010). The Puzzles of Material Constitution. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.
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  16.  21
    L. A. Paul (2000). Aspect Causation. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235 - 256.
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  17. L. A. Paul (forthcoming). Mereological Bundle Theory. In Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt & Guido Imaguire (eds.), Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag
    Bundle theory takes objects to be bundles of properties. Some bundle theorists take objects to be bundles of instantiated universals, and some take objects to be bundles of tropes. Tropes are instances of properties: some take instantiated universals to be tropes, while others deny the existence of universals and take tropes to be ontologically fundamental. Historically, the bundling relation has been taken to be a primitive relation, not analyzable in terms of or ontologically reducible to some other relation, and has (...)
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  18. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (2013). Metaphysically Reductive Causation. Erkenntnis 78 (1):9-41.
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  19. John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (2004). Counterfactuals and Causation: History, Problems, and Prospects. In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. The MIT Press 1--57.
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  20.  56
    L. A. Paul (2013). Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):89-113.
    I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
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  21.  83
    L. A. Paul (2004). The Context of Essence. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):170-184.
    I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal (...)
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  22. L. A. Paul (2002). Limited Realism: Cartwright on Natures and Laws. Philosophical Books:xx-yy.
    A leaf falls to the ground, wafting lazily on the afternoon breeze. Clouds move across the sky, and birds sing. Are these events governed by universal laws of nature, laws that apply everywhere without exception, subsuming events such as the falling of the leaf, the movement of the clouds and the singing of the birds? Are such laws part of a small set of fundamental laws, or descended from such a set, which govern everything there is in the world?
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  23.  48
    L. A. Paul (2013). Realism About Structure and Kinds. In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford University Press
  24. L. A. Paul (2006). In Defense of Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):333–372.
    If an object has a property essentially, it has that property in every possible world according to which it exists.2 If an object has a property accidentally, it does not have that property in every possible world according to which it exists. Claims about an object’s essential or accidental properties are de re modal claims, and essential and accidental properties are de re modal properties. Take an object’s modal profile to specify its essential properties and the range of its accidental (...)
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  25.  55
    L. A. Paul (1997). Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. Against Smith, this paper (...)
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  26.  83
    L. A. Paul (2004). The Context of Essence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):170 – 184.
    I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defense of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal (...)
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  27.  11
    L. A. Paul (2015). Précis of Transformative Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):760-765.
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  28.  95
    L. A. Paul (2007). 13 Constitutive Overdetermination. In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press 4--265.
  29. L. A. Paul (1998). Keeping Track of the Time: Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):191–198.
    Counterfactual analyses of causation can provide elegant analyses of many cases of causation. However, they fail to give intuitively correct analyses of cases involving a commonplace variety of late preemptive causation. I argue that a small emendation can solve the problem.
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  30. L. A. Paul (1998). Problems with Late Preemption. Analysis 58 (1):48–53.
    In response to counterexamples involving late preemption, David Lewis (1986) revised his original (1973) counterfactual analysis of causation to include the notion of quasi-dependence. Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof and Murali Ramachandran (1998) argue that their ‘PCA*-analysis’ of causation solves the problem of late preemption and is superior to Lewis’s analysis. I show that neither quasi-dependence nor the PCA*-analysis solves the problem of late preemption.
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  31.  4
    L. A. Paul (1998). Problems with Late Preemption. Analysis 58 (1):48-53.
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  32.  10
    L. A. Paul, Is Our Ordinary Way of Choosing to Have Children Rational?
    This paper argues that if you choose to have a child by consulting your preferences, where your preferences are based upon projections about what it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. The problem is not a problem for decision theory, for decision theory has the resources to handle the problem if we change the mode of decision-making. The problem is rather a problem for our ordinary conception of major life-changing decisions as rational (...)
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  33.  4
    L. A. Paul (1998). Keeping Track of the Time: Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):191-198.
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  34.  43
    L. A. Paul (2009). The Worm at the Root of the Passions: Poetry and Sympathy in Mill's Utilitarianism. Utilitas 10 (1):83.
    This paper explores J.S. Mill's theory of poetry and experience and its relation to his utilitarianism.
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  35.  2
    John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.) (2004). Causation and Counterfactuals. A Bradford Book.
    One philosophical approach to causation sees counterfactual dependence as the key to the explanation of causal facts: for example, events c and e both occur, but had c not occurred, e would not have occurred either. The counterfactual analysis of causation became a focus of philosophical debate after the 1973 publication of the late David Lewis's groundbreaking paper, "Causation," which argues against the previously accepted "regularity" analysis and in favor of what he called the "promising alternative" of the counterfactual analysis. (...)
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  36. L. A. Paul & Ned Hall (2013). Causation: A User's Guide. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Neither common sense nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation, or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing but vital landscape. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples (...)
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