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Lisa Bortolotti [71]L. Bortolotti [3]
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Profile: Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)
  1. Lisa Bortolotti (forthcoming). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematised Delusions in Schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    In this paper I ask whether elaborated and systematised delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. I define epistemic innocence as the status of those cognitions that have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time; and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that (...)
     
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  2. Lisa Bortolotti (forthcoming). Rationality and Sanity. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
  3. Lisa Bortolotti & Magdalena Antrobus (forthcoming). Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry.
    Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving (...)
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  4. Lisa Bortolotti (2014). Irrationality. Polity Press.
    We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept (...)
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  5. Lisa Bortolotti (2014). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness and Cognition.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
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  6. Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett (2014). Nikolaj Nottelmann (Ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, Xii + 258 Pp., GBP 55 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137026514. [REVIEW] Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
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  7. Jillian Craigie & Lisa Bortolotti, Rationality, Diagnosis and Patient Autonomy. Oxford Handbook Psychiatric Ethics.
    In this chapter, our focus is the role played by notions of rationality in the diagnosis of mental disorders, and in the practice of overriding patient autonomy in psychiatry. We describe and evaluate different hypotheses concerning the relationship between rationality and diagnosis, raising questions about what features underpin psychiatric categories. These questions reinforce widely held concerns about the use of diagnosis as a justification for overriding autonomy, which have motivated a shift to mental incapacity as an alternative justification. However, this (...)
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  8. Bill Fulford, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2014). Taking the Long View: An Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2):110-117.
    Understood in their historical context, current debates about psychiatric classification, prompted by the publication of the DSM-5, open up new opportunities for improved translational research in psychiatry. In this paper, we draw lessons for translational research from three time slices of 20th century psychiatry. From the first time slice, 1913 and the publication of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, the lesson is that translational research in psychiatry requires a pluralistic approach encompassing equally the sciences of mind (including the social sciences) and of (...)
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  9. Lisa Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity: The Role of Rationality Judgments in Understanding Psychiatric Disorders. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. 480.
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew R. Broome & Matteo Mameli (2013). Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights From the Breivik Case. Neuroethics 7 (3):377-382.
    What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient (...)
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  11. Lisa Bortolotti (2012). Rationality and Sanity. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Lisa Bortolotti (2012). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
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  13. Lisa Bortolotti (2012). The Relative Importance of Undesirable Truths. Medicine Healthcare and Philosophy (4):683-690.
    The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic (...)
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  14. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2012). Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on (...)
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  15. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
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  16. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112.
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a certain (...)
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  17. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) offer an explanation of the truly (...)
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  18. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Does Reflection Lead to Wise Choices? Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313.
    Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of wisdom with the results (...)
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  19. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  20. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1):1-4.
    Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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  21. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy Psychiatry Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
    In this paper, I articulate the thesis that most delusional beliefs are continuous with other irrational beliefs. Any interpreter with some knowledge about the cognitive and affective life of subjects with delusions can at least partially understand their reports, and explain and predict their behavior in intentional terms. I identify similarities and differences between this approach to the nature of delusions and the approach adopted by Rhodes and Gipps, who have recently defended the view that people with delusions do not (...)
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  22. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). The Concept of Scientific Research. In Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los Nuevos Horizontes de la Investigacion Genetica. Comares.
  23. Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
    Clinical delusions are difficult to investigate in the laboratory because they co-occur with other symptoms and with intellectual impairment. Partly for these reasons, researchers have recently begun to use hypnosis with neurologically intact people in order to model clinical delusions. In this paper we describe striking analogies between the behavior of patients with a clinical delusion of mirrored self misidentification, and the behavior of highly hypnotizable subjects who receive a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger when they look in the (...)
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  24. Lisa Bortolotti & Heather Widdows (2011). The Right Not to Know: The Case of Psychiatric Disorders. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (11):673-676.
    This paper will consider the right not to know in the context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about the results of genetic testing for conditions such as breast cancer and Huntington’s disease, and examine whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric disorders such as depression and Alzheimer’s disease. The right not to know will also be examined in the context of the diagnosis of psychiatric (...)
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  25. Lisa Bortolotti & Andrew Wright (2011). Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.
     
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  26. Alessandro Blasimme & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Intentionality and the Welfare of Minded Non-Humans. Teorema 29 (2):83-96.
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  27. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life. The Monist 93 (1):38-56.
    Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many (...)
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  28. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Can the Subject-of-a-Life Criterion Help Grant Rights to Non-Persons? In Matti Häyry (ed.), Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics. Rodopi.
    In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".
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  29. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Double Bookkeeping in Delusions: Explaining the Gap Between Saying and Doing. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 237--256.
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  30. Lisa Bortolotti & Luca Malatesti (2010). Conceptual Challenges in the Characterisation and Explanation of Psychiatric Phenomena. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):5-10.
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  31. Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). What's Wrong with 'Mental' Disorders? Psychological Medicine.
    Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
     
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  32. Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2010). Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (19):179-187.
    It is far too early to say what global impact the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences will have on our intuitions about moral responsibility. And it is far too early to say whether the notion of moral responsibility will survive this impact (and if so, in what form). But it is certainly worth starting to think about the local impact that these sciences can or should have on some of our distinctions and criteria. It might be possible to use some of (...)
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  33. Daniela Cutas & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Natural Versus Assisted Reproduction. In Search of Fairness. Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4 (1).
    Whilst the choice of becoming a parent in the natural way is unregulated all over Europe (and proposals of regulation raise vehement objections), most European countries have (either legal or professional) regulations imposing criteria that people must satisfy if they wish to gain access to assisted reproduction and parenting. These criteria may include relationship status, age, sexual orientation, financial stability, health, and willingness to attend parenting classes. The existence of regulations in this area is largely accepted, and the objections raised (...)
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  34. L. Bortolotti (2009). Review: Rachel Cooper: Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):163-166.
  35. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.
    There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or (...)
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  36. Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on Delusions.
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  37. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  38. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Do We Have an Obligation to Make Smarter Babies? In T. Takala, P. Herrisone-Kelly & S. Holm (eds.), Cutting Through the Surface. Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics. Rodopi.
    In this paper I consider some issues concerning cognitive enhancements and the ethics of enhancing in reproduction and parenting. I argue that there are moral reasons to enhance the cognitive capacities of the children one has, or of the children one is going to have, and that these enhancements should not be seen as an alternative to pursuing important changes in society that might also improve one’s own and one’s children’s life. It has been argued that an emphasis on enhancing (...)
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  39. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Neurophilosophy at Work • by Paul Churchland. Analysis 69 (1):176-178.
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  40. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
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  41. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Review of Evnine, Simon J.,Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. Viii + 176, £32.50 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):349-352.
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  42. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  43. Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle Cox (2009). Faultless Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965.
    There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient (...)
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  44. Lisa Bortolotti & Daniela Cutas (2009). Reproductive and Parental Autonomy: An Argument for Compulsory Parental Education. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 19 (ethics suppl.):5-14.
    In this paper we argue that society should make available reliable information about parenting to everybody from an early age. The reason why parental education is important (when offered in a comprehensive and systematic way) is that it can help young people understand better the responsibilities associated with reproduction, and the skills required for parenting. This would allow them to make more informed life-choices about reproduction and parenting, and exercise their autonomy with respect to these choices. We do not believe (...)
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  45. Lisa Bortolotti & Yujin Nagasawa (2009). Immortality Without Boredom. Ratio 22 (3):261-277.
    In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1.
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  46. Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Mental Illness as Mental: A Defence of Psychological Realism. Humana.Mente 11:25-44.
    This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether psychiatric (...)
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  47. Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.) (2009). Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry. Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience is a philosophical analysis of the role of neuroscience in the study of psychopathology. The book examines (...)
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  48. Lisa Bortolotti (2008). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Polity.
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science provides a lively and accessible introduction to current key issues and debates in this area. The classic philosophical questions about methodology, progress, rationality and reality are addressed by reference to examples from the full range of natural and social sciences. Lisa Bortolotti uses a historically-informed perspective on the evolution of science and includes a thorough discussion of the ethical implications of scientific research. Special attention is paid to the complex relationship between the advancement (...)
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  49. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
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