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Larry Hauser [25]L. Hauser [4]Linus Hauser [1]
  1. Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    John Searle's 1980a) thought experiment and associated 1984a) argument is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (roughly, someday will) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't suffice_ _for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not merely a (...)
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  2. Larry Hauser, Philosophical Glossary.
    Accident: A property or attribute that a (type of) thing or substance can either have or lack while still remaining the same (type of) thing or substance. For instance, I can either be sitting or standing, shod or unshod, and still be me (i.e., one and the same human being). Contrast: essence.
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  3. Larry Hauser, Realism, Model Theory, and Linguistic Semantics.
    George Lakoff (in his book Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987) and the paper "Cognitive semantics" (1988)) champions some radical foundational views. Strikingly, Lakoff opposes realism as a metaphysical position, favoring instead some supposedly mild form of idealism such as that recently espoused by Hilary Putnam, going under the name internal realism." For what he takes to be connected reasons, Lakoff also rejects truth conditional model-theoretic semantics for natural language.
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  4. Larry Hauser, Revenge of the Zombies.
    Zombies recently conjured by Searle and others threaten civilized (i.e., materialistic) philosophy of mind and scientific psychology as we know it. Humanoid beings that behave like us and may share our functional organizations and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeups without qualetative conscious experiences, zombies seem to meet every materialist condition for thought on offer and yet -- the wonted intuitions go -- are still disqualefied (disqualified for lack of qualia) from being thinking things. I have a plan. Other zombies -- (...)
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  5. Larry Hauser, Artificial Intelligence. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  6. Larry Hauser (2006). Review of Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6).
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  7. Larry Hauser (2003). Nixin' Goes to China. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 123--143.
    The intelligent-seeming deeds of computers are what occasion philosophical debate about artificial intelligence (AI) in the first place. Since evidence of AI is not bad, arguments against seem called for. John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (1980a, 1984, 1990, 1994) is among the most famous and long-running would-be answers to the call. Surprisingly, both the original thought experiment (1980a) and Searle's later would-be formalizations of the embedding argument (1984, 1990) are quite unavailing against AI proper (claims that computers do or someday (...)
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  8. Larry Hauser, Behaviorism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  9. Larry Hauser (2002). Don't Go There: Reply to Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):223-232.
     
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  10. Larry Hauser, Chinese Room Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong AI, Searle (...)
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  11. Larry Hauser (2001). Look Who's Moving the Goal Posts Now. Minds and Machines 11 (1):41-51.
    The abject failure of Turing's first prediction (of computer success in playing the Imitation Game) confirms the aptness of the Imitation Game test as a test of human level intelligence. It especially belies fears that the test is too easy. At the same time, this failure disconfirms expectations that human level artificial intelligence will be forthcoming any time soon. On the other hand, the success of Turing's second prediction (that acknowledgment of computer thought processes would become commonplace) in practice amply (...)
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  12. Larry Hauser, The Chinese Room Argument.
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the (...)
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  13. Larry Hauser (2000). Ordinary Devices: Reply to Bringsjord's Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117.
    What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema".
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  14. Larry Hauser (1999). Samuel Guttenplan, Ed., a Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Minds and Machines 9 (2):300-303.
  15. Larry Hauser (1997). Selmer Bringsjord, What Robots Can and Can't Be, Studies in Cognitive Systems. Minds and Machines 7 (3):433-438.
  16. Larry Hauser (1997). Selmer, Bringsjord, What Robots Can and Can't Be. Minds and Machines 7:433-438.
  17. Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal (...)
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  18. B. Abbott & L. Hauser, Realism, Model Theory, and Linguistic Semantics.
    George Lakoff (in his book Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things(1987) and the paper "Cognitive semantics" (1988)) champions some radical foundational views. Strikingly, Lakoff opposes realism as a metaphysical position, favoring instead some supposedly mild form of idealism such as that recently espoused by Hilary Putnam, going under the name "internal realism." For what he takes to be connected reasons, Lakoff also rejects truth conditional model-theoretic semantics for natural language. This paper examines an argument, given by Lakoff, against realism and MTS. (...)
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  19. Larry Hauser (1995). Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior And Philosophy 23 (2):42-47.
    Hauser defends the proposition that public languages are our languages of thought. One argument for this proposition is coincidence of productive (i.e., novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another is phenomenological experience. A third is Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle.".
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  20. Larry Hauser (1995). Natural Language and Thought: Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):41-47.
    Hauser defends the proposition that our languages of thought are public languages. One group of arguments points to the coincidence of clearly productive (novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another group relies on phenomenological experience. A third group cites practical and methodological considerations: Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle" (other things being equal, look under the lamp) that motivate looking for instantiations of outer languages in thought first.
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  21. L. Hauser (1994). Acting, Intending, and Artificial Intelligence. Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):22-28.
    Hauser considers John Searle's attempt to distinguish acts from movements. On Searle's account, the difference between me raising my arm and my arm's just going up (e.g., if you forcibly raise it), is the causal involvement of my intention to raise my arm in the former, but not the latter, case. Yet, we distinguish a similar difference between a robot's raising its arm and its robot arm just going up (e.g., if you manually raise it). Either robots are rightly credited (...)
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  22. Larry Hauser (1994). Action Minus Movement: Wittgenstein's Question. Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):23 - 28.
    In connection with John Searle's denial that computers genuinely act, Hauser considers Searle's attempt to distinguish full-blooded acts of agents (e.g., my raising my arm) from mere physical movements (my arm going up) on the basis of intent. The difference between me raising my arm and my arm's just going up (e.g., if you forcibly raise it), on Searle's account, is the causal involvement of my intention to raise my arm in the former, but not the latter, case. Yet, (...)
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  23. Larry Hauser (1994). Propositional Actitudes: Reply to Gunderson. Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):35 - 40.
    Hauser replies that performances in question provide prima facie warrant for attributions of mental properties that appeals to (lack of) consciousness are empirically too vexed and theoretically too ill connected to override.
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  24. L. Hauser (1993). Reaping the Whirlwind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-237.
    Harnad's proposed "robotic upgrade" of Turing's Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguistic and sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is "no evidence" [p.45] of consciousness besides "private experience" [p.52]. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from "as (...)
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  25. Larry Hauser (1993). Reaping the Whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.
    Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (...)
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  26. Larry Hauser (1993). Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  27. Larry Hauser (1993). The Sense of Thinking. Minds and Machines 3 (1):21-29.
    It will be found that the great majority, given the premiss that thought is not distinct from corporeal motion, take a much more rational line and maintain that thought is the same in the brutes as in us, since they observe all sorts of corporeal motions in them, just as in us. And they will add that the difference, which is merely one of degree, does not imply any essential difference; from this they will be quite justified in concluding that, (...)
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  28. Larry Hauser (1993). Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing? Minds and Machines 3 (1):3-10.
    My pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion -- Cal thinks -- most would deny. I consider several ways to avoid this conclusion, and find them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; or the standards -- (...)
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  29. L. Hauser (1992). Act, Aim, and Unscientific Explanation. Philosophical Investigations 15 (4):313-323.
    Against the claim that folk psychology is a theory, I contend thatfolk psychology is not empirically vulnerable in the same way theories are, and has evaluative functions that make it irreplaceable by a scientific theory. It is neither would-be nor has-been science.
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  30. Linus Hauser (1988). Gnade als Achtung und Hingabe Gottes. Philosophy and Theology 2 (3):258-276.
    [Grace as God’s Self-giving and Respect] Employing the methods of formal and transcendental analysis, the topic is introduced by departing from the experience of love between human beings. Love proves itself to be a unity of self-giving and respect. Both of these related elements of the notion of love are then put to the test in the light of that mode of divine loving called ‘grace’. By studying the history of dogma, this notion of grace is brought to a full (...)
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