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Profile: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan - Flint)
  1.  33
    L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.) (1994). The New Theory of Time. Yale Up.
    The Preface and the General Introduction to the book set the debate within the wider philosophical context and show why the subject of temporal becoming is a perennial concern of science, religion, language, logic, and the philosophy of ...
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  2. L. Nathan Oaklander (2004). The Ontology of Time. Prometheus Books.
     
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  3. L. Nathan Oaklander (2010). Mctaggart's Paradox and Crisp's Presentism. Philosophia 38 (2):229-241.
    In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis (...)
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  4. L. Nathan Oaklander (1990). The New Tenseless Theory of Time: A Reply to Smith. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):287 - 292.
    Quentin Smith has argued (Philosophical Studies, 1987, pp. 371-392) that the token-reflexive and the date versions of the new tenseless theory of time are open to insurmountable difficulties. I argue that Smith's central arguments are irrelevant since they rest upon methodological assumptions accepted by the old tenseless theory, but rejected by the new tenseless theory.
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  5. L. Nathan Oaklander & Silvano Miracchi (1980). Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology. Philosophy of Science 47 (3):434-455.
    Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true (...)
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  6.  22
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2001). The Importance of Time (Philosophical Studies Series). In Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
    The Importance of Time is a unique work that reveals the central role of the philosophy of time in major areas of philosophy. The first part of the book consists of symposia on two of the most important works in the philosophy of time over the past decade: Michael Tooley's Time, Tense, and Causation and D.H. Mellor's Real Time II. What characterizes these essays, and those that follow, are the interchanges between original papers, with original (...)
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  7. L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Temporal Passage and Temporal Parts. Noûs 26 (1):79-84.
  8.  36
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1991). A Defence of the New Tenseless Theory of Time. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):26-38.
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  9.  75
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1999). Craig on Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 59 (264):314–318.
  10.  83
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1996). Mctaggart's Paradox and Smith's Tensed Theory of Time. Synthese 107 (2):205 - 221.
    Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and futurity, and those (...)
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  11.  48
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2002). Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.
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  12.  38
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1993). On the Experience of Tenseless Time. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:159-166.
    Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H . Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.
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  13.  73
    L. Nathan Oaklander & V. Alan White (2007). B-Time: A Reply to Tallant. Analysis 67 (4):332–340.
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  14.  76
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2001). Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul. Philo 4 (2):185-194.
    The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death.
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  15.  11
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1977). The Inherence Interpretation of Berkeley. Modern Schoolman 54 (3):261-269.
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  16.  1
    L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (1995). Time, Change and Freedom. Routledge.
    Time,. change. and. freedom. This is no ordinary introduction to metaphysics. Written for the most part in an engaging dialogue style, it covers metaphysical topics from a student's perspective and introduces key concepts through a process of ...
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  17.  4
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming: A Defense of a Russellian Theory of Time. Noûs 21 (1):75-77.
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  18.  9
    L. Nathan Oaklander & Alicia Rothstein (2000). Loux on Particulars: Bare and Concrete. Modern Schoolman 78 (1):97-102.
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  19.  41
    Francesco Orilia & L. Nathan Oaklander (2013). Do We Really Need a New B-Theory of Time? Topoi 34 (1):1-14.
    It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy of (...)
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  20.  10
    L. Nathan Oaklander & Alicia Rothstein (2000). Loux on Particulars: Bare and Concrete. Modern Schoolman 78 (1):97-102.
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  21.  62
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2001). Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time? Journal of Philosophical Research 26:23-36.
    Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams’s thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with (...)
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  22. L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Time. Routledge.
    What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the (...)
     
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  23.  33
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2004). Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage. Philo 7 (1):36-46.
    In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of “absolute becoming” as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams’ notion of “literal passage,” as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional space-time manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that some might think it preposterous to maintain that (...)
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  24.  50
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Parfit, Circularity, and the Unity of Consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.
    In his recent book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit propounds a version of the psychological criterion of personal identity.1 According to the variant he adopts, the numerical identity through time of persons consists in non-branching psychological continuity no matter how it is caused. One traditional objection to a view of this sort is that it is circular, since psychological continuity presupposes personal identity. Although Parfit frequently denies the importance of personal identity, he considers his own psychological account of identity important (...)
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  25.  39
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1994). Bigelow, Possible Worlds and the Passage of Time. Analysis 54 (4):244 - 248.
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  26. L. Nathan Oaklander (1998). Freedom and the New Theory of Time. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford University Press 185--205.
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  27.  22
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1982). Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism? Modern Schoolman 59 (3):206-212.
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  28.  7
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1981). Book Reviews and Critical Studies. [REVIEW] Philosophia 9 (3-4):445-453.
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  29.  14
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1982). Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism? Modern Schoolman 59 (3):206-212.
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  30.  23
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Thank Goodness It's Over. Philosophy 67 (260):256 - 258.
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  31.  28
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to Smith. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):425-431.
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  32.  1
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Thank Goodness It's Over. Philosophy 67 (260):256.
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  33.  13
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2003). Personal Identity, Responsibility and Time. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers 161--178.
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  34.  26
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1983). Mctaggart, Schlesinger, and the Two-Dimensional Time Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):391-397.
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  35.  39
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1988). Shoemaker on the Duplication Argument, Survival, and What Matters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (June):234-239.
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  36.  11
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). McTaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):425-431.
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  37.  3
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2014). Temporal Realism and the R-Theory. In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter 123-140.
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  38.  4
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1977). The Inherence Interpretation of Berkeley. Modern Schoolman 54 (3):261-269.
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  39.  27
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1983). The Russellian Theory of Time. Philosophia 12 (3-4):363-392.
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  40.  25
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1982). A Note on Chisholm on Tense. Philosophical Studies 42 (2):283 - 285.
  41.  16
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1995). Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski. Religious Studies 31 (1):101 - 103.
    One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge," Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a four-dimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge (...)
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  42.  3
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1992). Zeilicovici on Temporal Becoming. Philosophia 21 (3-4):329-334.
  43.  4
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2003). Time and Space. Mind 112 (447):509-513.
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  44.  12
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1978). The Bundle Theory of Substance. New Scholasticism 52 (1):91-96.
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  45.  12
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Delams Lewis on Persons and Responsibility. Philosophy Research Archives 13:181-187.
    Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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  46.  11
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1994). The Disappearance of Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):737-740.
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  47.  14
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2008). Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):156–163.
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  48.  17
    Rudolf Haller, Stewart Shapiro, L. Nathan Oaklander, George N. Schlesinger, Richard Shusterman & L. E. Goodman (1984). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 14 (1-2):225-250.
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  49.  18
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1984). Perry, Personal Identity and the Characteristic Way. Metaphilosophy 15 (January):35-44.
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  50.  15
    L. Nathan Oaklander (1977). The "Timelessness" of Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):228-233.
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