16 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Lara Buchak (University of California, Berkeley)
  1. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Advice-Giving and Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.
    Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Separability Assumptions in Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.
    - In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Decision Theory. In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hajek (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  4. Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Risk and Tradeoffs. Erkenntnis:1-27.
    The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the subjective probability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Groupthink. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-book arguments that apply to individual decision-makers recommends that group credences should be updated by conditionalization. This imposes a constraint on what aggregation rules can be like. Taking conditionalization as a basic constraint, we gather (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Lara Buchak (2014). Learning Not to Be Naïve: A Comment on the Exchange Between Perrine/Wykstra and Draper. In Trent Dougherty & Justin McBrayer (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Does postulating skeptical theism undermine the claim that evil strongly confirms atheism over theism? According to Perrine and Wykstra, it does undermine the claim, because evil is no more likely on atheism than on skeptical theism. According to Draper, it does not undermine the claim, because evil is much more likely on atheism than on theism in general. I show that the probability facts alone do not resolve their disagreement, which ultimately rests on which updating procedure – conditionalizing or updating (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lara Buchak (2014). Rational Faith and Justified Belief. In Timothy O'Connor & Laura Frances Callahan (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press. 49-73.
    In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lara Buchak (2013). Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
    The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first claim for (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Lara Buchak (2013). Risk and Rationality. Oup Oxford.
    Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view (expected utility theory) is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Lara Buchak (2012). Robert Audi: Rationality and Religious Commitment. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):139-144.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Charles H. Pence & Lara Buchak (2012). Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom. Evolution Education and Outreach 5 (3):467-476.
    Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” directly determine contribution (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lara Buchak (2010). Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
  15. Lara Buchak (2009). Review of José Luis Bermúdez, Decision Theory and Rationality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation