Search results for 'Larry Williamson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Larry Williamson & Eric Pierson (2003). The Rhetoric of Hate on the Internet: Hateporn's Challenge to Modern Media Ethics. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 18 (3 & 4):250 – 267.score: 240.0
    This article groups the rhetoric of hate on the Internet into five generic categories. Although continuous with its ancestral form, we argue that in its discontinuity this cyberspace variant is uniquely harmful to children because of its diffuse textuality, anonymity, and potential for immersive, user-interactivity. This unique postmodern grammar compels us to confront the sacrosanct premises of our paradoxical ethic of tolerance. We conclude that a postmodern ethic that features accountability can be derived by augmenting our conception of critical praxis.
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  2. Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 210.0
    16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today.
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  3. Timothy Williamson (2009). The Philosophy of Philosophy • by Timothy Williamson • Blackwell, 2007. X + 332 Pp. £ 15.99 Paper: Summary. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (1):99-100.score: 180.0
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  4. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.score: 180.0
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  5. Timothy Williamson, B. O. Chen & Koji Nakatogawa (2009). Thinking Deeply, Contributing Originally: An Interview with Timothy Williamson (Special Contribution). Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:57-87.score: 180.0
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  6. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.score: 180.0
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  7. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2012). EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims. Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.score: 120.0
    According to Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1(1):47–69, 2011b), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘C is a cause of E’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend to (...)
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  8. Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.score: 60.0
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a (...)
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  9. Timothy Williamson (1999). Logic and Existence. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):181–203.score: 60.0
    [Ian Rumfitt] Frege's logicism in the philosophy of arithmetic consisted, au fond, in the claim that in justifying basic arithmetical axioms a thinker need appeal only to methods and principles which he already needs to appeal in order to justify paradigmatically logical truths and paradigmatically logical forms of inference. Using ideas of Gentzen to spell out what these methods and principles might include, I sketch a strategy for vindicating this logicist claim for the special case of the arithmetic of the (...)
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  10. Jon Williamson, From Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic.score: 60.0
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (...)
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  11. Timothy Williamson (2005). Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):468–491.score: 60.0
    The core of Tony Brueckner’s critique in ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism according to Williamson’ is his claim in section 5 that my account of perceptual knowledge has an unacceptable consequence. My reply will concentrate on that claim and largely ignore the rest of Brueckner’s interesting discussion, for it is easy to check that the claim is essential to Brueckner’s argument against my analysis of skepticism and evidence.
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  12. George Darby & Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 60.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms or (...)
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  13. Timothy Williamson (1997). Reply to Commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):945-953.score: 60.0
    The core of Tony Brueckner’s critique in ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism according to Williamson’ is his claim in section 5 that my account of perceptual knowledge has an unacceptable consequence. My reply will concentrate on that claim and largely ignore the rest of Brueckner’s interesting discussion, for it is easy to check that the claim is essential to Brueckner’s argument against my analysis of skepticism and evidence. The alleged consequence at issue concerns a case in which Brueckner knows by (...)
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  14. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). In Memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus 1921-2012. Association for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.score: 60.0
    Timothy Williamson The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 123-126, March 2013.
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  15. Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 60.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms or (...)
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  16. Rosanna Keefe & Timothy Williamson (1995). Vagueness. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392.score: 60.0
    If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal (...)
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  17. Timothy Williamson (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.score: 60.0
    [Paul Boghossian] The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ’blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible. (...)
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  18. Jon Williamson, Special Issue on Combining Probability and Logic Introduction.score: 60.0
    This volume arose out of an international, interdisciplinary academic network on Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks involving four of us (Haenni, Romeijn, Wheeler and Williamson), called Progicnet and funded by the Leverhulme Trust from 2006–8. Many of the papers in this volume were presented at an associated conference, the Third Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic (Progic 2007), held at the University of Kent on 5–7 September 2007. The papers in this volume concern either the special focus on the (...)
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  19. Timothy Williamson (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
    Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.
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  20. George Hunt Williamson (1953/1965). Other Tongues--Other Flesh. London, Spearman.score: 60.0
    ABOUT THE AUTHOR George Hunt Williamson served with the Army Air Corps during World War II as Radio Director for the Army Air Forces Technical Training ...
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  21. Ronald Williamson (1989). Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo. Cambridge University Press.score: 60.0
    An extremely important Jewish writer and thinker of the first century AD, Philo of Alexandria exercised through his ideas and language a lasting influence on the development and growth of Christianity in the New Testament period and later. This book provides an introduction to the major themes and ideas in the religious and philosophical thinking of Philo and outlines the importance of his thought by means of introductory treatments and sections of freshly translated text and commentary. Dr Williamson illustrates (...)
     
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  22. Timothy Williamson (2009). Replies to Critics. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 279--384.score: 60.0
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  23. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reponses to Critics. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
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  24. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reply to Goldman. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 305--312.score: 60.0
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..score: 60.0
    The second volume in the Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.
     
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  26. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.score: 30.0
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  27. Jon Williamson, Maximising Entropy Efficiently.score: 30.0
    Recommended citation: . . Link¨ oping Electronic Articles in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 7(2002): nr 0. http://www.ep.liu.se/ea/cis/2002/00/. September 18, 2002. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILMEE">No categories</div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILMEE&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kent.ac.uk%2Fsecl%2Fphilosophy%2Fjw%2F2002%2Fmaxenteffic.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILMEE'>3 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILMEE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILMEE','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILMEE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILMEE')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILMEE"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILE' onclick="ee('click','WILE')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILE')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILE')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILE"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2003). <span class='articleTitle'>Everything.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Philosophical Perspectives</em> 17 (1):415–465.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">On reading the last sentence, did you interpret me as saying falsely that everything — everything in the entire universe — was packed into my carry-on baggage? Probably not. In ordinary language, ‘everything’ and other quantifiers (‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘every dog’, ...) often carry a tacit restriction to a domain of contextually relevant objects, such as the things that I need to take with me on my journey. Thus a sentence of the form ‘Everything Fs’ is true as uttered in a<span id="WILE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILE-abstract2").show();$("WILE-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILE-abstract2" style="display:none"> context C if and only if everything that is relevant in C satisfies the predicate ‘F’; ‘everything’ ranges just over the contextually relevant things. Such generality is restricted in a context-relative way. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILE-abstract2").hide();$("WILE-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILE"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/metaontology' rel='section'>Metaontology</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/quantifiers' rel='section'>Quantifiers</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILE&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1520-8583.2003.00017.x%2Fabstract" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILE'>7 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILE','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILE')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILE"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILEAC-2' onclick="ee('click','WILEAC-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILEAC-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILEAC-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILEAC-2"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2000). <span class='articleTitle'>Existence and Contingency.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em> 100 (1):117–139.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILEAC-2">No categories</div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILEAC-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2F1467-9264.00069" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILEAC-2'>2 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILEAC-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILEAC-2','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILEAC-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILEAC-2')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILEAC-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILNE' onclick="ee('click','WILNE')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILNE')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILNE')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILNE"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2002). <span class='articleTitle'>Necessary Existents.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In A. O'Hear (ed.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/OHELTA">Logic, Thought, and Language</a></em>. Cambridge University Press. 269-87.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my<span id="WILNE-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILNE-abstract2").show();$("WILNE-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILNE-abstract2" style="display:none"> necessary existence, a proof that generalizes to everything whatsoever. I will explain the proof and discuss what to make of it. A first reaction is that a ‘proof’ of such an outrageous conclusion must contain some dreadful fallacy. Yet the proof does not collapse under scrutiny. Further reflection suggests that, suitably interpreted, it may be sound. So interpreted, the conclusion is not outrageous, although it may not be the view you first thought of. 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What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it<span id="WILPIA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILPIA-2-abstract2").show();$("WILPIA-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILPIA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> rests on bad epistemology: specifically, on an impossible ideal of unproblematically identifiable evidence. 3. Our resistance to scepticism about judgement is not simply epistemic conservativism, for we resist it on behalf of others as well as ourselves. A reason is needed for thinking that beliefs tend to be true. 4. Evolutionary explanations of the tendency assume what they should explain. Explanations that appeal to constraints on the determination of reference are more promising. Davidson’s truth-maximizing principle of charity is examined but rejected. 5. An alternative principle is defended on which the nature of reference is to maximize knowledge rather than truth. It is related to an externalist conception of mind on which knowing is the central mental state. 6. The knowledge-maximizing principle of charity explains why scenarios for scepticism about judgement do not warrant such scepticism, although it does not explain how we know in any particular case. We should face the fact that evidence is always liable to be contested in philosophy, and stop using talk of intuition to disguise this unpleasant truth from ourselves. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILPIA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILPIA-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILPIA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemology-of-intuition' rel='section'>Epistemology of Intuition</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/evidence-and-knowledge' rel='section'>Evidence and Knowledge</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/metaphilosophical-skepticism' rel='section'>Metaphilosophical Skepticism</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphilosophy' rel='section'>Metaphilosophy</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-nature-of-intuition' rel='section'>The Nature of Intuition</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILPIA-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0008%2F1313%2Fintuit3.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILPIA-2'>11 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILPIA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILPIA-2','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILPIA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILPIA-2')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILPIA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILAPM' onclick="ee('click','WILAPM')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILAPM')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILAPM')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILAPM"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2005). <span class='articleTitle'>I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em> 105 (1):1-23.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity<span id="WILAPM-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILAPM-abstract2").show();$("WILAPM-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILAPM-abstract2" style="display:none"> to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not exclusively a priori and is not usefully conceived as a form of rational intuition. It is explained how questions of metaphysical possibility and necessity are equivalent to questions about counterfactuals, and the epistemology of the former (in particular, the role of conceiving or imagining) is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. A non-imaginary Gettier case is presented in order to show how little difference it makes. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILAPM-abstract2").hide();$("WILAPM-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILAPM"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/counterfactuals-and-modal-epistemology' rel='section'>Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/thought-experiments' rel='section'>Thought Experiments</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphilosophy' rel='section'>Metaphilosophy</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILAPM&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0004%2F1300%2FAristotle.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILAPM'>9 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILAPM" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILAPM','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILAPM" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILAPM')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILAPM"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILMDB' onclick="ee('click','WILMDB')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILMDB')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILMDB')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILMDB"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2006). <span class='articleTitle'>Must Do Better.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WIL-3">Truth and Realism</a></em>. Oxford University Press. 278--92.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Imagine a philosophy conference in Presocratic Greece. The hot question is: what are things made of? Followers of Thales say that everything is made of water, followers of Anaximenes that everything is made of air, and followers of Heraclitus that everything is made of fire. Nobody is quite clear what these claims mean, and some question whether the founders of the respective schools ever made them. But amongst the groupies there is a buzz about all the recent exciting progress. The<span id="WILMDB-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILMDB-abstract2").show();$("WILMDB-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILMDB-abstract2" style="display:none"> mockers and doubters make plenty of noise too. They point out that no resolution of the dispute between the schools is in sight. They diagnose Thales, Anaximenes and Heraclitus as suffering from a tendency to overgeneralize. We can intelligibly ask what bread is made of, or what houses are made of, but to ask what things in general are made of is senseless, some suggest, because the question is posed without any conception of how to verify an answer; language has gone on holiday. Paleo-pragmatists invite everyone to relax, forget their futile pseudo-inquiries and do something useful instead. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILMDB-abstract2").hide();$("WILMDB-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILMDB"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/classics' rel='section'>Classics</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/arts-and-humanities' rel='section'>Arts and Humanities</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/philosophical-methods-misc' rel='section'>Philosophical Methods, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphilosophy' rel='section'>Metaphilosophy</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/pre-socratic-philosophy-misc' rel='section'>Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/ancient-greek-and-roman-philosophy' rel='section'>Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/realism-and-anti-realism-misc' rel='section'>Realism and Anti-Realism, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILMDB&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0012%2F1317%2FMust_Do_Better.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILMDB'>2 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILMDB" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILMDB','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILMDB" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILMDB')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILMDB"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILPKA-2' onclick="ee('click','WILPKA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILPKA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILPKA-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILPKA-2"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2007). <span class='articleTitle'>Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Grazer Philosophische Studien</em> 74 (1):89-123.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched. Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals. The account is used to question the<span id="WILPKA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILPKA-2-abstract2").show();$("WILPKA-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILPKA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> significance of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILPKA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILPKA-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILPKA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/counterfactuals-and-modal-epistemology' rel='section'>Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/modal-skepticism' rel='section'>Modal Skepticism</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILPKA-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ingentaconnect.com%2Fcontent%2Frodopi%2Fgps%2F2007%2F00000074%2F00000001%2Fart00006" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILPKA-2'>3 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILPKA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILPKA-2','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILPKA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILPKA-2')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILPKA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILCSI-2' onclick="ee('click','WILCSI-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILCSI-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILCSI-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILCSI-2"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2005). <span class='articleTitle'>Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Philosophical Quarterly</em> 55 (219):213–235.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">§I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of<span id="WILCSI-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCSI-2-abstract2").show();$("WILCSI-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILCSI-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> psychological bias caused by salience effects. §IV suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of scepticism have such consequences. §V argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCSI-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILCSI-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILCSI-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/contextualist-replies-to-skepticism' rel='section'>Contextualist Replies to Skepticism</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemic-contextualism-and-invariantism' rel='section'>Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/evidence-and-knowledge' rel='section'>Evidence and Knowledge</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/safety-and-sensitivity' rel='section'>Safety and Sensitivity</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILCSI-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0007%2F1330%2FStirlingdraft.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILCSI-2'>8 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILCSI-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILCSI-2','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILCSI-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILCSI-2')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILCSI-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILCT' onclick="ee('click','WILCT')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILCT')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILCT')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILCT"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2006). <span class='articleTitle'>Conceptual Truth.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</em> 80 (1):1–41.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper criticizes epistemological conceptions of analytic or conceptual truth, on which assent to such truths is a necessary condition of understanding them. The critique involves no Quinean scepticism about meaning. Rather, even granted that a paradigmatic candidate for analyticity is synonymy with a logical truth, both the former and the latter can be intelligibly doubted by linguistically competent deviant logicians, who, although mistaken, still constitute counterexamples to the claim that assent is necessary for understanding. There are no analytic or<span id="WILCT-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCT-abstract2").show();$("WILCT-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILCT-abstract2" style="display:none"> conceptual truths in the epistemological sense. The critique is extended to purportedly analytic inference rules. An alternative account is sketched on which understanding a word is a matter of participation in a linguistic practice, while synonymy and concept identity consist in sameness of truth-conditional semantic properties. Although there are philosophical questions about concepts, the idea that philosophical questions in general are conceptual questions generates only an illusion of insight into philosophical methodology. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCT-abstract2").hide();$("WILCT-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILCT"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-analytic-synthetic-distinction' rel='section'>The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILCT&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1467-8349.2006.00136.x" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILCT'>9 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILCT" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILCT','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILCT" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILCT')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILCT"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eFARCAA' onclick="ee('click','FARCAA')" onmouseover="ee('over','FARCAA')" onmouseout="ee('out','FARCAA')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/FARCAA"><span class='name'>Michael Fara</span> & <span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2005). <span class='articleTitle'>Counterparts and Actuality.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Mind</em> 114 (453):1-30.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue<span id="FARCAA-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("FARCAA-abstract2").show();$("FARCAA-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="FARCAA-abstract2" style="display:none"> that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("FARCAA-abstract2").hide();$("FARCAA-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-FARCAA"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/counterpart-theory' rel='section'>Counterpart Theory</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=FARCAA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0009%2F1305%2Fcounterparts.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/FARCAA'>10 more</a>)  <div id="ml-FARCAA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('FARCAA','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-FARCAA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('FARCAA')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-FARCAA"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILBR' onclick="ee('click','WILBR')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILBR')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILBR')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILBR"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2003). <span class='articleTitle'>Understanding and Inference.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume</em> 77 (1):249–293.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined<span id="WILBR-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILBR-abstract2").show();$("WILBR-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILBR-abstract2" style="display:none"> and rejected. It is suggested that epistemological questions cannot be reduced to questions in the theory of thought and meaning. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILBR-abstract2").hide();$("WILBR-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILBR"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/deductive-reasoning' rel='section'>Deductive Reasoning</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemology-of-logic' rel='section'>Epistemology of Logic</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/logic-and-philosophy-of-logic' rel='section'>Logic and Philosophy of Logic</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inference' rel='section'>Inference</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inferentialist-accounts-of-meaning-and-content' rel='section'>Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/transmission-of-warrant' rel='section'>Transmission of Warrant</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILBR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww3.interscience.wiley.com%2Fcgi-bin%2Ffulltext%2F118883644%2FPDFSTART" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILBR'>5 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILBR" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILBR','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILBR" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILBR')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILBR"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILKAA' onclick="ee('click','WILKAA')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILKAA')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILKAA')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILKAA"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (1996). <span class='articleTitle'>Knowing and Asserting.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Philosophical Review</em> 105 (4):489.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILKAA"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/norms-of-assertion' rel='section'>Norms of Assertion</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILKAA&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fsici%3Fsici%3D0031-8108(199610)105%3A4%3C489%3AKAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILKAA'>6 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILKAA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILKAA','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILKAA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILKAA')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILKAA"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILIVS' onclick="ee('click','WILIVS')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILIVS')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILIVS')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILIVS"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2006). <span class='articleTitle'>Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Philosophical Issues</em> 16 (1):310–333.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">§0. A familiar if obscure idea: an indicative conditional presents its consequent as holding in the actual world on the supposition that its antecedent so holds, whereas a subjunctive conditional merely presents its consequent as holding in a world, typically counterfactual, in which its antecedent holds. Consider this pair. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILIVS"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/indicative-vs-subjunctive-conditionals' rel='section'>Indicative vs Subjunctive Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/logic-of-conditionals' rel='section'>Logic of Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/truth-conditional-accounts-of-indicative-conditionals' rel='section'>Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILIVS&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.1533-6077.2006.00116.x%2Fabstract" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILIVS'>7 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILIVS" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILIVS','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILIVS" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILIVS')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILIVS"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILKAI' onclick="ee('click','WILKAI')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILKAI')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILKAI')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILKAI"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2000). <span class='pub_name'><span class='articleTitle'>Knowledge and its Limits.</span></span></a><span class='pubInfo'> Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are<span id="WILKAI-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILKAI-abstract2").show();$("WILKAI-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILKAI-abstract2" style="display:none"> illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILKAI-abstract2").hide();$("WILKAI-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILKAI"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/conditionalization' rel='section'>Conditionalization</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/evidence-and-knowledge' rel='section'>Evidence and Knowledge</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/knowability' rel='section'>Knowability</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/metaphilosophical-skepticism' rel='section'>Metaphilosophical Skepticism</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphilosophy' rel='section'>Metaphilosophy</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/norms-of-assertion' rel='section'>Norms of Assertion</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/primitivism-about-knowledge' rel='section'>Primitivism about Knowledge</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/prior-probabilities' rel='section'>Prior Probabilities</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-problem-of-old-evidence' rel='section'>The Problem of Old Evidence</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/the-reflection-principle' rel='section'>The Reflection Principle</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/updating-principles' rel='section'>Updating Principles</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019925656X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019925656X&condition=used">$19.96 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new bargain'><a class='price_new bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019925656X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019925656X&condition=new">$28.37 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon bargain'><a class='price_amazon bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Its-Limits-Timothy-Williamson/dp/019925656X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=019925656X">$33.37 direct from Amazon</a></span>   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Its-Limits-Timothy-Williamson/dp/019925656X%3FSubscriptionId%3D1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2%26tag%3Dphilp-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D019925656X">Amazon page</a></div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILKAI&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DtMDqMUTg6gYC%26printsec%3Dfront_cover" target='_blank' >Direct download</a>  <div id="ml-WILKAI" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILKAI','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILKAI" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILKAI')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILKAI"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILIKN' onclick="ee('click','WILIKN')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILIKN')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILIKN')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILIKN"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2011). <span class='articleTitle'>Improbable Knowing.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In T. Dougherty (ed.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/DOUEAI-2">Evidentialism and its Discontents</a></em>. Oxford University Press.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know<span id="WILIKN-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILIKN-abstract2").show();$("WILIKN-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILIKN-abstract2" style="display:none"> that P (we can’t strengthen ¬KKp to K¬Kp)! If we can construct such cases, we may be able to use them to understand some puzzling epistemic phenomena. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILIKN-abstract2").hide();$("WILIKN-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILIKN"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/epistemology' rel='section'>Epistemology</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_new'><a class='price_new' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0199563500?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0199563500&condition=new">$67.32 new</a></span>   <span class='price_used'><a class='price_used' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0199563500?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=0199563500&condition=used">$73.43 used</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Evidentialism-its-Discontents-Trent-Dougherty/dp/0199563500?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=0199563500">$76.50 direct from Amazon</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Evidentialism-its-Discontents-Trent-Dougherty/dp/0199563500%3FSubscriptionId%3D1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2%26tag%3Dphilp-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D0199563500">Amazon page</a></div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILIKN&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0014%2F1319%2FOrielho.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a>  <div id="ml-WILIKN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILIKN','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILIKN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILIKN')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILIKN"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILOBJ' onclick="ee('click','WILOBJ')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILOBJ')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILOBJ')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILOBJ"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2007). <span class='articleTitle'>On Being Justified in Ones Head.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILRAT-9">Rationality and the Good</a></em>. Oxford University Press. 106--122.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Audi explains what he means by ‘normative’ in the case of belief: cognitive (epistemic) normativity is a matter of what ought to be believed, where the force of the “ought” is in part to attribute liability to criticism and negative (disapproving) attitudes toward the person(s) in question. </div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILOBJ">No categories</div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILOBJ&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0010%2F1315%2FJustified.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a>  <div id="ml-WILOBJ" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILOBJ','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILOBJ" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILOBJ')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILOBJ"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILRIA-2' onclick="ee('click','WILRIA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILRIA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILRIA-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILRIA-2"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2009). <span class='articleTitle'>Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), <em><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/ALMTPO-3">The Philosophy of David Kaplan</a></em>. Oxford University Press. 137--159.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of ‘referentialism’ and ‘inferentialism’ respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives<span id="WILRIA-2-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILRIA-2-abstract2").show();$("WILRIA-2-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILRIA-2-abstract2" style="display:none"> centre stage to the inference rules for the language, which are then used to explain its referential semantics, perhaps as the semantics on which the rules preserve truth. On pain of circularity, we cannot combine both directions of explanation. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILRIA-2-abstract2").hide();$("WILRIA-2-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILRIA-2"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/inferentialist-accounts-of-meaning-and-content' rel='section'>Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-mind' rel='section'>Philosophy of Mind</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/specific-expressions' rel='section'>Specific Expressions</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><div class='affiliateLinks'><span class='price_used bargain'><a class='price_used bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019536788X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019536788X&condition=used">$13.88 used</a></span>   <span class='price_new bargain'><a class='price_new bargain' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/019536788X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=386001&creativeASIN=019536788X&condition=new">$29.92 new</a></span>   <span class='price_amazon'><a class='price_amazon' target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-David-Kaplan-Joseph-Almog/dp/019536788X?SubscriptionId=1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2&tag=philp-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=019536788X">$91.22 direct from Amazon</a></span>   (collection)   <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-David-Kaplan-Joseph-Almog/dp/019536788X%3FSubscriptionId%3D1CYYSXRPEAM0Q99H1WR2%26tag%3Dphilp-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D019536788X">Amazon page</a></div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILRIA-2&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0011%2F1325%2FReference.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILRIA-2'>3 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILRIA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILRIA-2','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILRIA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILRIA-2')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILRIA-2"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eDOUGTL' onclick="ee('click','DOUGTL')" onmouseover="ee('over','DOUGTL')" onmouseout="ee('out','DOUGTL')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/DOUGTL"><span class='name'>Igor Douven</span> & <span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2006). <span class='articleTitle'>Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em> 57 (4):755-779.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The<span id="DOUGTL-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("DOUGTL-abstract2").show();$("DOUGTL-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="DOUGTL-abstract2" style="display:none"> argument generalized Some variations Adding modalities Anticipated objections. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("DOUGTL-abstract2").hide();$("DOUGTL-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-DOUGTL"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/bayesian-reasoning-misc' rel='section'>Bayesian Reasoning, Misc</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-probability' rel='section'>Philosophy of Probability</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=DOUGTL&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fbjps.oxfordjournals.org%2Fcgi%2Freprint%2F57%2F4%2F755" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/DOUGTL'>9 more</a>)  <div id="ml-DOUGTL" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('DOUGTL','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-DOUGTL" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('DOUGTL')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-DOUGTL"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILCAA-5' onclick="ee('click','WILCAA-5')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILCAA-5')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILCAA-5')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILCAA-5"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2009). <span class='articleTitle'>Conditionals and Actuality.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Erkenntnis</em> 70 (2):135 - 150.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve<span id="WILCAA-5-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCAA-5-abstract2").show();$("WILCAA-5-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="WILCAA-5-abstract2" style="display:none"> material equivalence). For a subjunctive conditional, the natural conclusion to draw is that it is non-congruential. It is much harder to defend the claim that an indicative conditional is non-congruential. The pressure to treat the indicative conditional as truth-functional is correspondingly greater. The implications of these results for attempts to interpret the indicative conditional as an epistemic or doxastic operator are assessed. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("WILCAA-5-abstract2").hide();$("WILCAA-5-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILCAA-5"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/indicative-vs-subjunctive-conditionals' rel='section'>Indicative vs Subjunctive Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/logic-of-conditionals' rel='section'>Logic of Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> <div><a class='catName' href='/browse/truth-conditional-accounts-of-indicative-conditionals' rel='section'>Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative Conditionals</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/philosophy-of-language' rel='section'>Philosophy of Language</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILCAA-5&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.philosophy.ox.ac.uk%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fpdf_file%2F0016%2F2482%2FKonstanz.pdf" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILCAA-5'>7 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILCAA-5" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILCAA-5','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILCAA-5" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILCAA-5')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILCAA-5"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILBP' onclick="ee('click','WILBP')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILBP')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILBP')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILBP"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (1998). <span class='articleTitle'>Bare Possibilia.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Erkenntnis</em> 48 (2/3):257--73.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILBP">No categories</div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILBP&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1023%2FA%3A1005331819843" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILBP'>6 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILBP" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILBP','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILBP" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILBP')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILBP"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILTAT-4' onclick="ee('click','WILTAT-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILTAT-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILTAT-4')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILTAT-4"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (1999). <span class='articleTitle'>Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Dialectica</em> 53 (3-4):253–270.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILTAT-4"><div><a class='catName' href='/browse/truthmakers' rel='section'>Truthmakers</a><span class='catIn'> in </span><a class='catArea' href='/browse/metaphysics' rel='section'>Metaphysics</a></div> </div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" href="http://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=WILTAT-4&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1746-8361.1999.tb00186.x" target='_blank' >Direct download</a> (<a href='/rec/WILTAT-4'>6 more</a>)  <div id="ml-WILTAT-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/places/folder.png"><span title="File in your personal bibliography" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILTAT-4','')">My bibliography<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <div id="la-WILTAT-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/document-save.png"><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILTAT-4')">Export citation<img src="/philpapers/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILTAT-4"></span></div></div></li> <li id='eWILRTK' onclick="ee('click','WILRTK')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILRTK')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILRTK')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="http://philpapers.org/rec/WILRTK"><span class='name'>Timothy <span class='Hi'>Williamson</span></span> (2009). <span class='articleTitle'>Replies to Kornblith, Jackson and Moore.</span></a><span class='pubInfo'> <em class='pubName'>Analysis</em> 69 (1):125-135.</span></span><span class="relevance">score: 30.0</span><div class="extras"><div class="catsCon" id="ecats-con-WILRTK">No categories</div><div class="options"><img class="texticon" src="/assets/raw/icons/tango-full/16x16/actions/go-down.png"><a rel="nofollow" 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