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  1. Larry Wright (2014). Explanation, Contrast, and the Primacy of Practice. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):82-95.
    : The common practice of giving (comparing, rejecting and inferring) explanations of phenomena is at the root of articulate learning, including the enterprises we collect under the noun ‘science’. The way that practice privileges a single item from the myriad relevant to any phenomenon tells us something about articulateness itself.
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  2. Dale Turner & Larry Wright (2005). Revisiting Deep Disagreement. Informal Logic 25 (1).
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  3. Larry Wright (2002). Reasoning and Explaining. Argumentation 16 (1):33-46.
    When regimented in a certain natural way, the concepts of explanation and justification manifest a pattern of interrelations connected more or less systematically to their object. Besides its intrinsic interest, this pattern may give us some insight into the nature, source, and limits of the concept of argument.
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  4. Larry Wright (2001). Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Extensively classroom-tested, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning provides a non-technical vocabulary and analytic apparatus that guide students in identifying and articulating the central patterns found in reasoning and in expository writing more generally. Understanding these patterns of reasoning helps students to better analyze, evaluate, and construct arguments and to more easily comprehend the full range of everyday arguments found in ordinary journalism. Critical Thinking distinguishes itself from other texts in the field by emphasizing analytical reading as (...)
     
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  5. Larry Wright (2001). Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument. Argumentation 15 (1):97-104.
    In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.
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  6. Larry Wright (1999). Reasons and the Deductive Ideal. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):197–206.
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  7. Larry Wright (1995). Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding. Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):565-585.
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  8. Andrew Woodfield & Larry Wright (1978). Teleological Explanations. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):86.
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  9. Larry Wright (1978). I. The Ins and Outs of Teleology: A Critical Examination of Woodfield∗. Inquiry 21 (1-4):223-237.
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  10. Larry Wright (1977). Rejoinder to Utz. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):321-325.
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  11. Larry Wright (1977). Teleology. International Studies in Philosophy 9:187-189.
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  12. Larry Wright (1976). Reply to Grim. Analysis 36 (3):156 - 157.
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  13. Larry Wright (1974). Emergency Behavior. Inquiry 17 (1-4):43 – 47.
    There is a class of actions — reflex actions — which seem not to spring from any intention, but for which we nevertheless wish to take responsibility. It is suggested that these actions are appropriately said to be done intentionally, in spite of our never having an intention to do them. And this grammatical anomaly indicates that the behavior in question requires a special kind of account; one which might be characterized as derivative: parasitic on the more paradigmatic sort of (...)
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  14. Larry Wright (1974). Mechanisms and Purposive Behavior III. Philosophy of Science 41 (4):345-360.
    It is commonly thought that the dispositional view of purposiveness is itself incompatible with the programmatic claims of neurophysiologists. In this paper, various versions of four arguments for this incompatibility are examined, and rejected as unsound. Central to the argument is a rough sketch of a "mechanistic" position which seems clearly compatible with a dispositional view of purposiveness.
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  15. Larry Wright (1973/1994). Functions. Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.
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  16. Larry Wright (1973). The Astronomy of Eudoxus: Geometry or Physics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 4 (2):165-172.
  17. Larry Wright (1972). A Comment on Ruse's Analysis of Function Statements. Philosophy of Science 39 (4):512-514.
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  18. Larry Wright (1972). Explanation and Teleology. Philosophy of Science 39 (2):204-218.
    This paper develops and draws the consequences of an etiological analysis of goal-directedness modeled on one that functions centrally in Charles Taylor's work on action. The author first presents, criticizes, and modifies Taylor's formulation, and then shows his modified formulation accounts easily for much of the fine-structure of teleological concepts and conceptualizations. Throughout, the author is at pains to show that teleological explanations are orthodox from an empiricist's point of view: they require nothing novel methodologically.
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  19. Larry Wright (1968). The Case Against Teleological Reductionism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):211-223.
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