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Profile: Lars Bergström (Stockholm University)
  1. Lars Bergström (2014). Gary Kemp Quine Versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 191 Pp. Isbn 978‐0‐19‐969562‐1. [REVIEW] Theoria 80 (3):283-287.
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  2. Lars Bergström (2013). Death and Eternal Recurrence. In Feldman Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford U P.
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  3. Lars Bergström (2013). W. V. Quine Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, Ed. Dagfinn Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008. 482 Pp. Isbn 978‐0‐674‐03084‐8. [REVIEW] Theoria 79 (2):172-179.
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  4. James W. McAllister, Lars Bergström, James Robert Brown, Martin Carrier, Nancy Cartwright, Jiwei Ci, David Davies, Catherine Elgin, Márta Fehér & Michel Ghins (2010). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4).
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  5. Lars Bergstrőm (2009). Thomas Nagel - Recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, 2008. Theoria 75 (2):76-78.
  6. Lars Bergström (2008). A Defense of Quinean Naturalism. In Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
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  7. Lars Bergström (2006). Quine's Relativism. Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
  8. Lars Bergström (2004). Underdetermination of Physical Theory. In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge University Press. 91--114.
  9. Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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  10. Lars Bergström (2000). Quine, Empiricism, and Truth. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. 63--79.
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  11. Lars Bergström (1998). Prawitz's Version of Verificationism. Theoria 64 (2-3):139-156.
  12. Lars Bergström (1996). Reflections on Consequentialism. Theoria 62 (1-2):74-94.
  13. Lars Bergström (1996). Scientific Value. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):189-202.
    Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.
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  14. Lars Bergstrom, John Forge, Louis Marinoff, John Leslie & Sami Pihlstrom (1996). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Isps 10:187.
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  15. Lars Bergström (1994). Notes on the Value of Science. In D. Prawitz, B. Skyrms & D. Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX. Elsevier Science B. V..
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  16. Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421 – 435.
    W. V. Quine has made statements about truth which are not obviously compatible, and his statements have been interpreted in more than one way. For example, Donald Davidson claims that Quine has an epistemic theory of truth, but Quine himself often says that truth is just disquotational. This paper argues that Quine should recognize two different notions of truth. One of these is disquotational, the other is empiricist. There is nothing wrong with recognizing two different notions of truth. Both may (...)
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  17. Lars Bergström & Dagfinn Føllesdal (1994). Interview with Donald Davidson in November 1993. Theoria 60 (3):207-225.
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  18. Lars Bergström & Dagfinn Føllesdal (1994). Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993. Theoria 60 (3):193-206.
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  19. Lars Bergström (1993). Quine, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):331-358.
  20. Lars Bergström (1990). Explanation and Interpretation of Action. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):3-15.
    Abstract Contrary to what is usually taken for granted, the traditional positivistic and hermeneutic accounts of explanations of human actions do not really contradict one another. There is no logical or epistemological difference between explanations in this area and explanations in the natural sciences. However, if W. V. Quine and D. Davidson are right, there may be an ontological difference between the explanation of natural events and the interpretation of actions.
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  21. Lars Bergström (1990). Quine on Underdetermination. In Barret And Gibson (ed.), Perspectives on Quine. 38--52.
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  22. Lars Bergström (1987). On the Value of Scientific Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:53-63.
    Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. (...)
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  23. Lars Bergström (1984). Underdetermination and Realism. Erkenntnis 21 (3):349 - 365.
  24. Lars Bergström (1982). Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Grazer Philosophische Studien 16:283-312.
    Utilitarianism, as well as many other political and moral doctrines, presupposes that the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons can be solved. Otto Neurath gave a comparatively early (1912) and explicit statement of this problem, and he suggested that it cannot be solved. This may still be the dominant view. It is argued that recent attempts to solve the problem (by e.g. Schick, Rescher, Harsanyi, Brandt, Jeffrey, Arrow, and Hare) are unsatisfactory, but that the oldest suggestion - i.e. the method of (...)
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  25. Lars Bergström (1981). Outline for an Argument for Moral Realism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:215-225.
    Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a (...)
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  26. Lars Bergström (1977). Utilitarianism and Future Mistakes. Theoria 43 (2):84-102.
  27. Lars Bergström (1976). On the Formulation and Application of Utilitarianism. Noûs 10 (2):121-144.
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  28. Lars Bergström (1975). Reply to Professor Hintikka. Theoria 41 (2):84-84.
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  29. Lars Bergstrom (1974). Hintikka on "Prima Facie" Obligations. Theoria 40:163-165.
    In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation.
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  30. Lars Bergström (1973). On the Coherence of Act-Utilitarianism. Analysis 33 (3):98 - 102.
    The article is a reply to professor castaneda's criticism of a recursive formulation of act-utilitarianism which i have suggested in an earlier paper (analysis 29.2) and which was intended to satisfy the deontic principle that 'ought' is distributable over conjunctions. i argue that castaneda's arguments against my formulation are inconclusive.
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  31. Lars Bergström (1972). Meaning and Morals. In R. E. Olson & A. M. Paul (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia. Johns Hopkins Press.
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  32. Lars Bergström (1971). Utilitarianism and Alternative Actions. Noûs 5 (3):237-252.
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  33. Lars Bergström (1970). Imperatives and Contradiction. Mind 79 (315):421-424.
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  34. Lars Bergstrom (1970). Imperatives and Contradiction. Mind 79 (315):421 - 424.
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  35. Lars Bergström (1968). Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic. Analysis 29 (2):43 - 44.
    The purpose of this note is to discredit a certain argument, which has been presented by h.n. castaneda (analysis, vol. 28), to the effect that utilitarian principles cannot provide necessary conditions of obligatoriness. it is argued that the problem noted by castaneda - as well as certain related problems - can be dissolved if the phrase alternative action is given a more reasonable interpretation than that presupposed by castaneda. finally, a utilitarian principle is formulated which does provide a necessary and (...)
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  36. Lars Bergström (1966). The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions. Göteborg [Etc.]Almqvist & Wiksell.
     
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  37. Harald Ofstad & Lars Bergström (1965). A Note on John R. Searle's Derivation of 'Ought' From 'Is'. Inquiry 8 (1-4):309-314.
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  38. Lars Bergström (1962). Comments on Castañeda's Semantics of Prescriptive Discourse. Theoria 28 (1):70-72.
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