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Lars Bo Gundersen [9]Lars Gundersen [4]
  1. Lars Bo Gundersen (forthcoming). Knowledge and Conditionals. Mind.
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  2. Lars Bo Gundersen (forthcoming). Tracking and Conditionals-A Reply to Smith. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy.
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  3. Lars Bo Gundersen (forthcoming). The Problem of Transworld Identity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy.
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  4. Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3):353 - 364.
    According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p , and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p . In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent of (...)
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  5. Lars Bo Gundersen (2009). Contextualism, Disjunctivism and the Sceptical Aporia. Synthese 141:387-397.
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
     
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  6. Lars Bo Gundersen (2009). Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia. Synthese 171 (3):387 - 397.
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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  7. Lars Bo Gundersen (2005). Counterfactuals and Tracking – A Reply to Smith. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):172-186.
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  8. Lars Bo Gundersen (2004). Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):1–20.
  9. Lars Gundersen (2003). The Master Argument and Branching Time. Logic and Logical Philosophy 5:49-60.
    It is argued that reconstructions of the so-called ‘Master Argument’ of Dideros Cronos to the effect that possibility should be understood as present or future truth, essentially relies on two axioms: i) that every true proposition concerning the past is necessary, and ii) that it follows necessarily from a proposition being true that it always has been the case that it would be true. It is furthermore argued that these two axioms are inconsistent in the sense that any tense/modal semantics (...)
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  10. Lars Gundersen (2002). In Defence of the Conditional Account of Dispositions. Synthese 130 (3):389-411.
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  11. Lars Gundersen (2002). Necessity, Identity and Time. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 37:37.
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  12. Lars Bo Gundersen (2000). Bird on Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):227-229.
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  13. Lars Bo Gundersen (2000). Goodman's Gruesome Modal Fallacy. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76:447-462.
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