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Profile: Laszlo E. Szabo (Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences)
  1. László E. Szabó & Márton Gömöri, How to Move an Electromagnetic Field?
    As a first principle, it is the basic assumption of the standard relativistic formulation of classical electrodynamics (ED) that the physical laws describing the electromagnetic phenomena satisfy the relativity principle (RP). According to the standard view, this assumption is absolutely unproblematic, and its correctness is well confirmed, at least in a hypothetico-deductive sense, by means of the empirical confirmation of the consequences derived from it. In this paper, we will challenge this customary view as being somewhat simplistic. In the majority (...)
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  2. Marton Gomori & Laszlo E. Szabo, Is the Relativity Principle Consistent with Electrodynamics? Towards a Logico-Empiricist Reconstruction of a Physical Theory.
    It is common in the literature on electrodynamics and relativity theory that the transformation rules for the basic electrodynamical quantities are derived from the hypothesis that the relativity principle (RP) applies for Maxwell's electrodynamics. As it will turn out from our analysis, these derivations raise several problems, and certain steps are logically questionable. This is, however, not our main concern in this paper. Even if these derivations were completely correct, they leave open the following questions: (1) Is (RP) a true (...)
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  3. László E. Szabó, Does Special Relativity Theory Tell Us Anything New About Space and Time?
    It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in (...)
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  4. László E. Szabó, Lorentz's Theory and Special Relativity Are Completely Identical.
    Withdrawn by the author! The main content of this paper has been moved into "Szabó, László E., Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time? (ID Code:1321)".
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  5. Laszlo E. Szabo (forthcoming). Lorentzian Theories Vs. Einsteinian Special Relativity - a Logico-Empiricist Reconstruction. In A. Maté, M. Rédei & F. Stadler (eds.), Vienna Circle and Hungary -- Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis. Springer.
    It is widely believed that the principal difference between Einstein's special relativity and its contemporary rival Lorentz-type theories was that while the Lorentz-type theories were also capable of “explaining away” the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment and other experimental findings by means of the distortions of moving measuring-rods and moving clocks, special relativity revealed more fundamental new facts about the geometry of space-time behind these phenomena. I shall argue that special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of (...)
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  6. Márton Gömöri & László E. Szabó (2013). Formal Statement of the Special Principle of Relativity. Synthese:1-24.
    While there is a longstanding discussion about the interpretation of the extended, general principle of relativity, there seems to be a consensus that the special principle of relativity is absolutely clear and unproblematic. However, a closer look at the literature on relativistic physics reveals a more confusing picture. There is a huge variety of, sometimes metaphoric, formulations of the relativity principle, and there are different, sometimes controversial, views on its actual content. The aim of this paper is to develop a (...)
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  7. László E. Szabó (2010). Empirical Foundation of Space and Time. In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer. 251--266.
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  8. Laszlo E. Szabo, How Can Physics Account for Mathematical Truth?
    If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. In this paper, I will sketch the first steps of a physicalist philosophy of mathematics; that is, how physicalism can account for logical and mathematical facts. We will proceed as follows. First we will clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are. Then, we will discuss how (...)
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  9. Laszlo E. Szabo (2010). What Remains of Probability? In F. Stadler (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. 373--379.
    This paper offers some reflections on the concepts of objective and subjective probability and Lewis' Principal Principle.
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  10. Laszlo E. Szabo (2009). Empirical Foundation of Space and Time. In M. Suárez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (eds.), EPSA07: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer.
    I will sketch a possible way of empirical/operational definition of space and time tags of physical events, without logical or operational circularities and with a minimal number of conventional elements. As it turns out, the task is not trivial; and the analysis of the problem leads to a few surprising conclusions.
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  11. László E. Szabó, The Einstein--Podolsky--Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called a “Reality Criterion” imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. They concluded that there must be a more complete description of physical reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs in the world in (...)
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  12. László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
    I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a (...)
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  13. László E. Szabó (2004). On the Meaning of Lorentz Covariance. Foundations Of Physics Letters 17:479-496.
    In classical mechanics, the Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In relativistic physics, on the contrary, the situation is much more complex: It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually holds only for the equilibrium quantities characterizing the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that (...)
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  14. László E. Szabó (2003). Formal Systems as Physical Objects: A Physicalist Account of Mathematical Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):117 – 125.
    This article is a brief formulation of a radical thesis. We start with the formalist doctrine that mathematical objects have no meanings; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That's all. Then I go further by arguing that the signs of a formal system of mathematics should be considered as physical objects, and the formal operations as physical processes. The rules of the formal operations are or can be expressed in terms of the laws of (...)
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  15. Gabor Hofer-Szabo, Miklos Redei & Laszlo E. Szabo (2002). Common-Causes Are Not Common Common-Causes. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):623-636.
    A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...)
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  16. Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Miklós Rédei & László E. Szabó (2002). Common-Causes Are Not Common Common-Causes. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):623-636.
    A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...)
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  17. László E. Szabó (2002). On Fine's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: GHZ Experiment. In T. Placek & J. Butterfield (eds.), Non-Locality and Modality. Kluwer. 153--161.
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  18. László E. Szabó (2000). On Fine's Resolution of the EPR-Bell Problem. Foundations of Physics 30 (11):1891-1909.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to Fine's interpretation of quantum mechanics and to show how it can solve the EPR-Bell problem. In the real spin-correlation experiments the detection/emission inefficiency is usually ascribed to independent random detection errors, and treated by the “enhancement hypothesis.” In Fine's interpretation the detection inefficiency is an effect not only of the random errors in the analyzer + detector equipment, but is also the manifestation of a pre-settled (hidden) property of the (...)
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  19. Nuel Belnap & László E. Szabó (1996). Branching Space-Time Analysis of the GHZ Theorem. Foundations of Physics 26 (8):989-1002.
    Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible (...)
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