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Laura W. Ekstrom [8]Laura Waddell Ekstrom [8]
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Profile: Laura Ekstrom
  1. Laura W. Ekstrom (2013). Rational Abilities and Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):459-466.
    For a symposium on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.
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  2. Laura W. Ekstrom (2010). Ambivalence and Authentic Agency. Ratio 23 (4):374-392.
    It is common to believe that some of our concerns are deeper concerns of ours than are others and that some of our attitudes are central rather than peripheral to our psychological identity. What is the best approach to characterizing depth or centrality to the self? This paper addresses the matter of the depth and authenticity of attitudes and the relation of this matter to the autonomy of action. It defends a conception of the real self in terms of preferences (...)
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  3. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2005). Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):45–67.
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  4. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2005). Autonomy and Personal Integration. In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  5. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (2004). Inviting Sex. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (3):187-204.
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  6. Laura W. Ekstrom (2003). Free Will, Chance, and Mystery. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.
    This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for (...)
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  7. Laura W. Ekstrom (2002). Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  8. Laura W. Ekstrom (ed.) (2001). Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview.
    A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study , this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section (...)
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  9. Laura W. Ekstrom (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview.
    In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to agent causation only in a (...)
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  10. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1999). Keystone Preferences and Autonomy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1057-1063.
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  11. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1999). Review: Keystone Preferences and Autonomy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1057 - 1063.
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  12. Laura W. Ekstrom (1998). Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
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  13. Laura W. Ekstrom (1998). Protecting Incompatibilist Free Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):281-91.
     
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  14. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1998). Protecting Incompatibilist Freedom. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):281-291.
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  15. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1995). Causes and Nested Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):574 – 578.
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  16. Laura Waddell Ekstrom (1993). A Coherence Theory of Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):599-616.
    This paper presents a conception of the self partially in terms of a particular notion of preference. It develops a coherentist account of when one's preferences are "authorized", or sanctioned as one's own, and presents a coherence theory of autonomous action. The view presented solves certain problems with hierarchical accounts of freedom, such as Harry Frankfurt's.
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