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Laura J. Snyder [11]Laura Joy Snyder [1]Laura J. Snyder [1]
  1. Laura J. Snyder (2012). Experience and Necessity: The Mill-Whewell Debate. In James R. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. Continuum Books. 10.
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  2. Laura J. Snyder, William Whewell. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  3. Laura J. Snyder (2007). 'Lord Only of the Ruffians and Fiends'? William Whewell and the Plurality of Worlds Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):584-592.
    By the middle of the nineteenth century, the opinion of science, as well as of philosophy and even religion, was, at least in Britain, firmly in the camp of the plurality of worlds, the view that intelligent life exists on other celestial bodies. William Whewell, considered an expert on science, philosophy and religion , would have been expected to support this position. Yet he surprised everyone in 1853 by publishing a work arguing strongly against the plurality view. This was even (...)
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  4. Laura J. Snyder & Thomas P. Weber (2007). Introduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):567-569.
    The question of the existence of intelligent life on other worlds has never been a purely scientific one. Philosophical, religious and literary issues have been intertwined with scientific ones throughout the history of the “plurality of worlds” debate. This collection of papers in –Studies in History and Philosophy of Science– explores the interrelation of science, philosophy, religion and literature in debates about extraterrestrial life.
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  5. Laura J. Snyder (2006). Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society. University of Chicago Press.
    A philosophically and historically sensitive account of the engagement of the major protagonists of Victorian British philosophy, Reforming Philosophy considers the controversies between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill on the topics of science, morality, politics, and economics. By situating their debate within the larger context of Victorian society and its concerns, Laura Snyder shows how two very different men—Whewell, an educator, Anglican priest, and critic of science; and Mill, a philosopher, political economist, and parliamentarian—reacted to the challenges of their (...)
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  6. Laura J. Snyder (2005). Consilience, Confirmation, and Realism. In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 129--149.
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  7. Laura J. Snyder (2005). Confirmation for a Modest Realism. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):839-849.
    William Whewell was clearly wrong to claim that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor. I argue here, however, that even when consilience gives evidence for a theory that turns out to be false, there is an important sense in which consilience shows that the theory has gotten something right. Consilience is a sign that a theory has uncovered something about the natural-kind structure of the physical world. Because of this, Whewell was correct to claim that consilience provides a (...)
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  8. Laura J. Snyder (2005). Confirmation for a Modest Realism. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):839-849.
    In the nineteenth century, William Whewell claimed that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor: we could, he believed, be certain that a consilient theory was true. Since that time Whewell has been much ridiculed for this claim by critics such as J. S. Mill and Bas van Fraassen. I have argued elsewhere that, while Whewell's claim that consilience can guarantee the truth of a theory is clearly wrong, consilience is indeed quite useful as a confirmation criterion (Snyder 2005). (...)
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  9. Laura J. Snyder (1997). Discoverers' Induction. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):580-604.
    In this paper I demonstrate that, contrary to the standard interpretations, William Whewell's view of scientific method is neither that of the hypothetico-deductivist nor that of the retroductivist. Rather, he offers a unique inductive methodology, which he calls "discoverers' induction." After explicating this methodology, I show that Kepler's discovery of his first law of planetary motion conforms to it, as Whewell claims it does. In explaining Whewell's famous phrase about "happy guesses" in science, I suggest that Whewell intended a distinction (...)
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  10. Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.) (1994). Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Pub. Co..
  11. Laura J. Snyder (1994). It's All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (5):785-807.
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  12. Laura J. Snyder (1994). Is Evidence Historical? In Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.), Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Pub. Co.. 95--117.
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