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Profile: Laurence Goldstein (University of Kent at Canterbury)
  1.  53
    Laurence Goldstein (2006). Fibonacci, Yablo, and the Cassationist Approach to Paradox. Mind 115 (460):867-890.
    A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here (...)
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  2. Laurence Goldstein (2004). The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction and More: A Defence of a Wittgensteinian Conception of Contradiction. In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction: new philosophical essays. Oxford University Press 295--313.
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
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  3.  62
    Laurence Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115–126.
  4. Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
    Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
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  5.  75
    Goldstein Laurence (2005). Introduction. The Monist 88 (1):3-10.
    This paper builds on work done by Graham Priest (1994, 1995, 1998b, 2000) but does not presuppose knowledge of that work. Priest established that many paradoxes, which had been traditionally divided into different families, have a structure in common – which he calls the Inclosure Schema – and, correlatively, that these paradoxes demand a uniform solution. The uniform solution favoured by Priest is a Dialetheist one. I show that, with minor modification, the Inclosure Schema becomes sufficiently embracing to exhibit the (...)
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  6.  37
    Laurence Goldstein (1992). `This Statement is Not True' is Not True. Analysis 52 (1):1-5.
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  7.  13
    Laurence Goldstein (1999). Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought. Duckworth.
    Laurence Goldstein gives a straightforward and lively account of some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's writings on meaning, mind, and mathematics.
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  8.  38
    Laurence Goldstein (1985). The Paradox of The Liar -- A Case of Mistaken Identity. Analysis 45 (1):9-13.
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  9.  50
    Laurence Goldstein (2003). Farewell to Grelling. Analysis 63 (1):31–32.
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  10.  73
    Laurence Goldstein (1986). False Stipulation and Semantical Paradox. Analysis 46 (4):192-195.
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  11.  24
    Laurence Goldstein (2000). A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):53–74.
    The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cure consists of seeking and destroying (...)
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  12.  51
    Laurence Goldstein (1986). Epimenides and Curry. Analysis 46 (3):117 - 121.
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  13.  30
    Laurence Goldstein & Peter Cave (2008). A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, the Surprise Examination, and Newcomb's Puzzle. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):365 - 376.
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  14.  26
    Laurence Goldstein (1984). Quotation of Types and Other Types of Quotation. Analysis 44 (1):1 - 6.
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  15.  12
    Laurence Goldstein (1993). The Fallacy of the Simple Question. Analysis 53 (3):178 - 181.
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  16.  69
    Laurence Goldstein (1999). Wittgenstein's Ph.D Viva—a Re-Creation. Philosophy 74 (4):499-513.
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  17.  47
    Laurence Goldstein (1985). The Title of This Paper Is 'Quotation'. Analysis 45 (3):137 - 140.
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  18.  12
    Laurence Goldstein (1993). Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions. Analysis 53 (2):93 - 99.
  19.  26
    Laurence Goldstein (2007). Why the Substitution of Co-Referential Expressions in a Statement May Result in Change of Truth-Value (Concluding Part). The Reasoner 1 (2):6-7.
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  20.  21
    Laurence Goldstein (1983). Pure Categorial Principles. The Monist 66 (3):410-421.
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  21.  65
    Laurence Goldstein (2003). Examining Boxing and Toxin. Analysis 63 (3):242–244.
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  22.  14
    Laurence Goldstein & Paul Mannick (1978). The Form of The Third Man Argument. Apeiron 12 (2):6 - 13.
    Our interpretation of the "parmenides" 132a1 - 132b2 has the following features. (i) it stresses that the third man argument is an infinite regress and (ii) notes its epistemological thrust. (iii) a faithful translation of the last line of the argument reads "and no longer will each of the forms be for you one but each is infinite in multitude." parmenides' point is that each form, which socrates believed to be complete (one), turns out to be an unbounded, incompletable series (...)
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  23.  34
    Laurence Goldstein (1988). Wittgenstein's Late Views on Belief, Paradox and Contradiction. Philosophical Investigations 11 (1):49-73.
  24. Laurence Goldstein (2004). The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and More. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
  25.  23
    Laurence Goldstein (1984). The Micro-Computer as Logic Tutor. Teaching Philosophy 7 (2):109-114.
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  26.  56
    Laurence Goldstein (1994). A Yabloesque Paradox in Set Theory. Analysis 54 (4):223-227.
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  27.  22
    Laurence Goldstein (2007). Kripke, Pierre and Constantinescu. The Reasoner 1 (5):4-5.
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  28. Laurence Goldstein (1995). Humor and Harm. Sorites 3:27-42.
    For familiar reasons, stereotyping is believed to be irresponsible and offensive. Yet the use of stereotypes in humor is widespread. Particularly offensive are thought to be sexual and racial stereotypes, yet it is just these that figure particularly prominently in jokes. In certain circumstances it is unquestionably wrong to make jokes that employ such stereotypes. Some writers have made the much stronger claim that in all circumstances it is wrong to find such jokes funny; in other words that people who (...)
     
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  29.  39
    Laurence Goldstein (1986). The Development of Wittgenstein's Views on Contradiction. History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (1):43-56.
    The views on contradiction and consistency that Wittgenstein expressed in his later writings have met with misunderstanding and almost uniform hositility. In this paper, I trace the roots of these views by attempting to show that, in his early writings, Wittgenstein accorded a ?unique status? to tautologies and contradictions, marking them off logically from genuine propositions. This is integral both to his Tractatus project of furnishing a theory of inference, and to the enterprise of explaining the nature of the Satz (...)
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  30.  48
    Laurence Goldstein (2002). How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? Philosophy 77 (3):421-446.
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe (...)
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  31.  50
    Laurence Goldstein (1999). Circular Queue Paradoxes – the Missing Link. Analysis 59 (264):284–290.
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  32.  20
    Laurence Goldstein (1995). Fallacious Reasoning. Teaching Philosophy 18 (2):139-146.
    The author recommends an involved study of logical fallacies in order to provide a database of testable hypotheses for error reasoning. The purpose of the study is to make the study of logical fallacies accessible to a wider audience. Following a recent study conducted by Ludwig Schlecht, the author presents a diagnostic method to illustrate how an argument can be fallacious from the breach of particular rational principles. The diagnosis method also serves as investigation into other forms of argumentative fallacies (...)
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  33.  87
    Laurence Goldstein (2000). How to Boil a Live Frog. Analysis 60 (2):170–178.
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  34.  78
    Laurence Goldstein (2002). Refuse Disposal. Analysis 62 (3):236–241.
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  35.  17
    Laurence Goldstein & Leonard Goddard (1980). Strengthened Paradoxes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):211 – 221.
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  36.  17
    Laurence Goldstein (1992). A Buridanian Discussion of Desire, Murder and Democracy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):405 – 414.
  37.  50
    Laurence Goldstein (2002). The Indefinability of “One”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):29 - 42.
    Logicism is one of the great reductionist projects. Numbers and the relationships in which they stand may seem to possess suspect ontological credentials - to be entia non grata - and, further, to be beyond the reach of knowledge. In seeking to reduce mathematics to a small set of principles that form the logical basis of all reasoning, logicism holds out the prospect of ontological economy and epistemological security. This paper attempts to show that a fundamental logicist project, that of (...)
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  38.  44
    Laurence Goldstein (1982). The Adverbial Theory of Conceptual Thought. The Monist 65 (July):379-392.
  39.  51
    Laurence Goldstein (1995). Dying Quickly but Painfully. Analysis 55 (3):221 - 222.
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  40.  22
    Laurence Goldstein (2008). Translating Utterances, Reporting Beliefs. The Reasoner 2 (3):3-4.
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  41.  68
    Laurence Goldstein (2006). A Non-Theistic Cosmology and Natural History. Analysis 66 (291):256–260.
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  42. Laurence Goldstein (2005). Russell, Edward Lear, Plato, Zeno, Grelling, Eubulides. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
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  43.  64
    Laurence Goldstein (2009). Wittgenstein and Situation Comedy. Philosophia 37 (4):605-627.
    Wittgenstein discusses speakers exploiting context to inject meaning into the sentences that they use. One facet of situation comedy is context-injected ambiguity, where scriptwriters artfully construct situations such that, because of conflicting contextual clues, a character, though uttering a sentence that contains neither ambiguous words nor amphibolous contruction may plausibly be interpreted in at least two distinct ways. This highlights an important distinction between the (concise) sentence that a speaker uses and what the speaker means, the disclosure of which may (...)
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  44.  64
    Laurence Goldstein (1980). The Reasons of a Materialist. Philosophy 55 (April):249-252.
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  45. Laurence Goldstein (2004). Wittgenstein as Soil. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge
     
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  46.  39
    Laurence Goldstein (2009). Drawing Hands. The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45):79-79.
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  47.  5
    Laurence Goldstein & Cora Diamond (1977). Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):370.
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  48.  18
    Laurence Goldstein (2013). To Let: Unsuccessful Stipulation, Bad Proof, and Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):93.
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated (...)
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  49.  8
    Laurence Goldstein (2015). Wittgenstein’s Most Important Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 3-20.
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  50. Laurence Goldstein (1990). The Philosopher's Habitat: An Introduction to Investigations in, and Applications of, Modern Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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