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Profile: Laurence Goldstein (University of Kent at Canterbury)
  1. Laurence Goldstein, Fun Stuff.
    I was commissioned by Barry Smith, Editor of The Monist , to act as Advisory Editor for issue 88.1, January 2005 on the topic Humor, and we drafted the appended description. The deadline for submissions is January 31, 2004, and you are welcome to submit an article to me for consideration (word limit 7,500 words, including footnotes). What the Editor and I are, hoping for, is some serious and seriously good philosophical writing on this topic.
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  2. Laurence Goldstein (ed.) (forthcoming). Brevity. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Laurence Goldstein (2013). To Let: Unsuccessful Stipulation, Bad Proof, and Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):93.
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated (...)
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  4. Laurence Goldstein (2012). Reasoning Without Contradiction. The Reasoner 6 (12):183-184.
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  5. Laurence Goldstein (2010). Review of Béla Szabados, Ludwig Wittgenstein on Race, Gender and Cultural Identity. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (8).
  6. Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
    Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
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  7. Laurence Goldstein (2009). Drawing Hands. The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45):79-79.
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  8. Laurence Goldstein (2009). Pierre and Circumspection in Belief-Formation. Analysis 69 (4):653-655.
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  9. Laurence Goldstein (2009). Stephen Clark, the Laws of Logic and the Sorites. Philosophy 84 (1):135-143.
    A standard method for refuting a set of claims is to show that it implies a contradiction. Stephen Clark questions this method on the grounds that the Law of Non-Contradiction, together with the other fundamental laws of logic do not accord with everyday reality. He accounts for vagueness by suggesting that, for any vague predicate 'F', an ordinary object is typically to some extent both F and not-F, and that objects do not change abruptly from being F to being not-F. (...)
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  10. Laurence Goldstein (2009). Wittgenstein and Situation Comedy. Philosophia 37 (4):605-627.
    Wittgenstein discusses speakers exploiting context to inject meaning into the sentences that they use. One facet of situation comedy is context-injected ambiguity, where scriptwriters artfully construct situations such that, because of conflicting contextual clues, a character, though uttering a sentence that contains neither ambiguous words nor amphibolous contruction may plausibly be interpreted in at least two distinct ways. This highlights an important distinction between the (concise) sentence that a speaker uses and what the speaker means, the disclosure of which may (...)
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  11. Laurence Goldstein (2008). Infinitistic and Non-Infinitistic Cures for Nagging Hangovers. The Reasoner 2 (7):5-6.
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  12. Laurence Goldstein (2008). Translating Utterances, Reporting Beliefs. The Reasoner 2 (3):3-4.
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  13. Laurence Goldstein & Peter Cave (2008). A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, the Surprise Examination, and Newcomb's Puzzle. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):365 - 376.
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  14. Laurence Goldstein (2007). Kripke, Pierre and Constantinescu. The Reasoner 1 (5):4-5.
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  15. Laurence Goldstein (2007). Why the Substitution of Co-Referential Expressions in a Statement May Result in Change of Truth-Value (Concluding Part). The Reasoner 1 (2):6-7.
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  16. Laurence Goldstein (2006). A Non-Theistic Cosmology and Natural History. Analysis 66 (291):256–260.
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  17. Laurence Goldstein (2006). Fibonacci, Yablo, and the Cassationist Approach to Paradox. Mind 115 (460):867-890.
    A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here (...)
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  18. Laurence Goldstein (2005). Introduction. The Monist 88 (1):3-10.
    This paper builds on work done by Graham Priest (1994, 1995, 1998b, 2000) but does not presuppose knowledge of that work. Priest established that many paradoxes, which had been traditionally divided into different families, have a structure in common – which he calls the Inclosure Schema – and, correlatively, that these paradoxes demand a uniform solution. The uniform solution favoured by Priest is a Dialetheist one. I show that, with minor modification, the Inclosure Schema becomes sufficiently embracing to exhibit the (...)
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  19. Laurence Goldstein (2005). 'S Introduction. The Monist 88 (1).
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  20. Laurence Goldstein (2004). On Failing to Assert: Reply to David Sherry. Philosophia 31 (3-4):579-588.
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  21. Laurence Goldstein (2004). Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):656 – 658.
    Book Information Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution Nicholas Rescher , Chicago and La Salle : Open Court , 2001 , xxiii + 293 , US$24.95 ( paper ). By Nicholas Rescher. Open Court. Chicago and La Salle. Pp. xxiii + 293. US$24.95 (paper:).
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  22. Laurence Goldstein (2004). The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction and More: A Defence of a Wittgensteinian Conception of Contradiction. In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction: new philosophical essays. Oxford University Press. 295--313.
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
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  23. Laurence Goldstein (2004). The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and More. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press.
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  24. Laurence Goldstein (2004). Wittgenstein as Soil. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge.
     
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  25. David Sherry & Laurence Goldstein (2004). On Failing to Assert: Reply To. Philosophia 31 (3-4):579.
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  26. Laurence Goldstein (2003). Examining Boxing and Toxin. Analysis 63 (3):242–244.
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  27. Laurence Goldstein (2003). Farewell to Grelling. Analysis 63 (1):31–32.
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  28. Laurence Goldstein (2003). Happiness, Death and the Remainder of Life. Philosophy Now 42:26-27.
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  29. Laurence Goldstein (2002). How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? Philosophy 77 (3):421-446.
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe (...)
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  30. Laurence Goldstein (2002). Refuse Disposal. Analysis 62 (3):236–241.
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  31. Laurence Goldstein (2002). The Indefinability of “One”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):29 - 42.
    Logicism is one of the great reductionist projects. Numbers and the relationships in which they stand may seem to possess suspect ontological credentials - to be entia non grata - and, further, to be beyond the reach of knowledge. In seeking to reduce mathematics to a small set of principles that form the logical basis of all reasoning, logicism holds out the prospect of ontological economy and epistemological security. This paper attempts to show that a fundamental logicist project, that of (...)
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  32. Laurence Goldstein (2002). The Indefinability of €œOne”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):29-42.
    Logicism is one of the great reductionist projects. Numbers and the relationships in which they stand may seem to possess suspect ontological credentials – to be entia non grata – and, further, to be beyond the reach of knowledge. In seeking to reduce mathematics to a small set of principles that form the logical basis of all reasoning, logicism holds out the prospect of ontological economy and epistemological security. This paper attempts to show that a fundamental logicist project, that of (...)
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  33. Laurence Goldstein (2001). Only Joking? Philosophy Now 34:25-26.
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  34. Laurence Goldstein (2001). Truth-Bearers and the Liar – a Reply to Alan Weir. Analysis 61 (2):115–126.
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  35. Laurence Goldstein (2001). The Later Wittgenstein. Nursing Philosophy 2 (1):87–89.
  36. Laurence Goldstein (2000). A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):53–74.
    The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cure consists of seeking and destroying (...)
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  37. Laurence Goldstein (2000). How to Boil a Live Frog. Analysis 60 (2):170–178.
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  38. Laurence Goldstein (1999). Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought. Duckworth.
    Laurence Goldstein gives a straightforward and lively account of some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's writings on meaning, mind, and mathematics.
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  39. Laurence Goldstein (1999). Circular Queue Paradoxes – the Missing Link. Analysis 59 (264):284–290.
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  40. Laurence Goldstein (1999). Wittgenstein's Ph.D Viva—a Re-Creation. Philosophy 74 (4):499-513.
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  41. Laurence Goldstein & Hartley Slater (1998). Wittgenstein, Semantics and Connectionism. Philosophical Investigations 21 (4):293–314.
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  42. Laurence Goldstein (1995). Dying Quickly but Painfully. Analysis 55 (3):221 - 222.
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  43. Laurence Goldstein (1995). Fallacious Reasoning. Teaching Philosophy 18 (2):139-146.
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  44. Laurence Goldstein (1995). Mind, Machine, and Metaphor: An Essay on Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning. Philosophical Books 36 (2):134-136.
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  45. Laurence Goldstein (1994). A Yabloesque Paradox in Set Theory. Analysis 54 (4):223-227.
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  46. Laurence Goldstein (1993). Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions. Analysis 53 (2):93 - 99.
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  47. Laurence Goldstein (1993). The Fallacy of the Simple Question. Analysis 53 (3):178 - 181.
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  48. Laurence Goldstein (1993). Wittgenstein and Legal Theory. Philosophical Books 34 (4):242-244.
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  49. Laurence Goldstein (1992). A Buridanian Discussion of Desire, Murder and Democracy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):405 – 414.
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