Conflicts of interest are common and exist in academia, government, and many industries, including pharmaceutical development. Medical journal editors and others have recently criticized “the pharmaceutical industry,” citing concerns over investigator access to data, approaches to analysis of clinical trial data, and publication practices. Merck & Co., Inc. is a global, research-driven pharmaceutical company that discovers, develops, manufactures, and markets a broad range of human and animal health products, directly and through its joint ventures. Although part of its mission is (...) to provide a superior rate of return to its investors, Merck does not believe this creates an irreconcilable conflict of interest, particularly in activities concerning clinical drug development. We employ rigorous scientific methods to design, conduct, analyze, and report results of clinical trials in the development of innovative drugs and vaccines, with a focus on meeting unmet medical needs and with an ethic that puts the interests of the patient first. This article describes Merck’s approaches to potential conflicts of interest in drug development, particularly with regard to clinical trials. We believe that proprietary interests of the Company can be respected while observing objectivity and transparency in communicating clinical research results. The standards for the review of manuscripts reporting such trials for peer-reviewed publication should be the same, whether they are from Merck or elsewhere. (shrink)
The theory of the previous paper is applied to the case of stacking faults in close packed lattices. Electron optical experiments on thin foils of stainless steel are described, the results of which are in good agreement with theory.
The dynamical theory of electron diffraction is applied to the case of a plate-like crystal containing a stacking fault. The effect of the fault is to produce a phase difference in the electron waves diffracted by the two parts of the faulted crystal. Expressions for the wave functions and for the corresponding intensities, predicting interference fringes in the region of overlap of the two parts are derived. It is shown that the problem is one of the interference of three coherent (...) waves, in contrast to the case of the wedge crystal where only two waves are involved. At the Bragg reflecting position the spacing of the fringes is half that corresponding to the extinction distance in the crystal. At large deviations from the Bragg position the predictions of the dynamical theory are asymptotic to those of the kinematical theory. The case of two or more stacking faults on neighbouring atomic planes is also considered. (shrink)
The application of neuroimaging technology to the study of the injured brain has transformed how neuroscientists understand disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, and deepened our understanding of mechanisms of recovery. This scientific progress, and its potential clinical translation, provides an opportunity for ethical reflection. It was against this scientific backdrop that we convened a conference of leading investigators in neuroimaging, disorders of consciousness and neuroethics. Our goal was to develop an ethical frame to move (...) these investigative techniques into mature clinical tools. This paper presents the recommendations and analysis of a Working Meeting on Ethics, Neuroimaging and Limited States of Consciousness held at Stanford University during June 2007. It represents an interdisciplinary approach to the challenges posed by the emerging use of neuroimaging technologies to describe and characterize disorders of consciousness. (shrink)
Distribution and densities of dislocations, determined by electron transmission microscopy, flow stress and stored energy measurements (by microcalorimetry) on cold-worked polycrystalline silver are correlated with each other, The dislocations are arranged in dense networks forming the boundaries of an otherwise relatively dislocation-free cell structure. The flow stress is explained quantitatively in terms of the forest intersection mechanism at the boundaries. The stored energy after recovery is of the same order as the total self-energy of the dislocation arrangement, so that the (...) long-range stresses must be largely relaxed. The considerable energy release during the recovery stage produces no observable change in dislocation distribution. This recovery stage is thought to be due to the relief of long-range stresses or to the removal of point defects. While the values of flow stress and stored energy can be accounted for in terms of the observed non-uniform distribution of dislocations (cell structure), they are not compatible with each other on a model based on a uniform distribution of pile-ups; nor are pile-ups observed on the electron micrographs. (shrink)
This paper presents annular dark-field scanning transmission electron microscope image simulations of a screw dislocation viewed end-on in a thin single crystal of Mo, taking into account surface relaxation (the Eshelby twist). The image contrast can be understood in terms of the effects of the displacements normal to the dislocation arising from the Eshelby twist on the channelling behaviour and interband scattering of the incident beam. With the beam focussed at the entrance surface, the image peak positions reflect the positions (...) of the atoms at the entrance surface. For atomic columns at distances from the core less than the foil thickness, the image peak positions are predicted to lie between the perfect crystal and actual surface atom positions. The predicted intensity distribution of the image is qualitatively similar to that of a published experimental image of a screw dislocation in GaN [Phys. Rev. Lett. 91 (2003) p. 165501]. An assessment is made of the possibility of imaging core displacements by focussing near the foil centre, where surface relaxation effects should be minimised. (shrink)
This paper addresses the question as to whether the core structure of screw dislocations in Mo in the bulk can be obtained from high-resolution electron microscopy (HREM) images of such dislocations viewed end-on in a thin foil. Atomistic simulations of the core structure of screw dislocations in elastically anisotropic Mo were carried out using bond order potentials. These simulations take account automatically of the effects of the surface relaxation displacements (anisotropic Eshelby twist). They show that the differential displacements of the (...) atoms at the surface are different with components perpendicular to the Burgers vector about five times larger than those in the middle of the foil, the latter being characteristic of the bulk. Nye tensor plots show that the surface relaxation stresses strongly affect the incompatible distortions. HREM simulations of the computed structure reflect the displacements at the exit surface, modified by interband scattering and the microscope transfer function. Nye tensor plots obtained from the HREM images show that interband scattering also affects the incompatible distortions. It is concluded that it would be very difficult to obtain information on the core structure of screw dislocations in the bulk Mo from HREM images, even under ideal experimental conditions, and that quantitative comparisons between experimental and simulated images from assumed model structures would be essential. (shrink)
Electron optical experiments on Al foils have revealed individual dislocations in the interior of the metal. The arrangement and movement of individual dislocations have been observed. Most of the dislocations occur in the boundaries of a substructure, the diameter of the subrains being of the order of 1?? or more. Tilt-boundaries, networks and disloca- tion nodes have been resolved. The results apply to aluminium recovered at 350°C after heavy deformation by beating; the dislocation density is 1010/cm2. The dislocations can be (...) seen to move along traces of (111) slip planes; the motion of the dislocations can be either rapid or slow and jerky. Cross-slip by the screw dislocation mechanism has been observed frequently. ?Communicated by the Authors. (shrink)
Electron optical experiments on Al foils have revealed individual dislocations in the interior of the metal. The arrangement and movement of individual dislocations have been observed. Most of the dislocations occur in the boundaries of a substructure, the diameter of the subrains being of the order of 1 ?, or more. Tilt-boundaries, networks and dislocation nodes have been resolved. The results apply to aluminium recovered at 350°c after heavy deformation by beating; the dislocation density is 1010/cm2. The dislocations can be (...) seen to move along traces of (111) slip planes; the motion of the dislocations can be either rapid or slow and jerky. Cross-slip by the screw dislocation mechanism has been observed frequently. (shrink)
This introductory paper to the special conference marking the retirement of Professor David Cockayne gives a brief outline of his career. It highlights some of his many seminal contributions in research, and also refers briefly to his outstanding contributions to the promotion, dissemination and teaching of electron microscopy not covered in the scientific programme of the conference.
Magnesium single crystals were deformed at room temperature. Dislocation distributions were determined by transmission electron microscopy of sections of crystals deformed by various amounts. In stage A the dislocations are mainly in the form of edge dipole bands. No dislocations with non-basal Burgers vectors were found. The density of dislocations varies linearly with strain and (stress)2. Slip line studies were carried out using the replica technique. The slip lines are long and terminate generally by cross-slip. The number of dislocations per (...) slip line is approximately constant, the spacing of the slip lines varying inversely as the strain. Stage B is characterized by twinning and network formation. A model for stage A is proposed in which the dislocations from sources operating simultaneously trap one another and form dipole bands for edges and screws; the latter cross-slip and annihilate leaving the edges and an excess of screws of one sign. The flow stress is controlled by the internal stress from the excess edge and screw dislocations, and from those with non-primary basal Burgers vectors. The work hardening rate is low because the slip lines are long and the dislocations are paired or annihilate, thereby causing little hardening. The results and the model are discussed in the light of previous work on other crystals. (shrink)
In 1952, Cottrell proposed that the Lomer dislocation formed by interaction of two glide dislocations in a fcc crystal could transform into an immobile dislocation by dissociation into partial dislocations bounding a stacking fault, causing a block to further slip, a concept important in work hardening. Evidence for this and many other dissociations has been provided by the diffraction contrast technique and in particular by its ?weak beam? variant, which has a resolution limit of about 15 angstroms. Today, with the (...) advent of aberration corrected microscopes it is possible to determine directly the atomic structure of the faults and partial dislocations. In this paper, we describe the results of a study using the High Angle Angular Dark Field technique (HAADF) in an aberration corrected scanning transmission electron microscope (STEM), of the dissociation of the [a?+?c] dislocations in (0?0?0?1) GaN films grown on sapphire substrates. The dislocations are found to be inclined with respect to the c-axis, but optical sectioning imaging methods allow the structure to be determined and an estimate of the tilt angle to be made. The dislocations are found to be dissociated by climb and glide on the a plane and the STEM results, and structural arguments supported by theoretical calculations suggest that the dissociation reaction is [a?+?c]?=?1/2[a?+?c]?+?1/2[a?+?c]?+?fault. The structure of the fault is found to be similar to that identified in 1965 by Drum in AlN but frequently modified by steps due to kinks in the inclined dislocation. (shrink)
We confirm a conjecture, about neat embeddings of cylindric algebras, made in 1969 by J. D. Monk, and a later conjecture by Maddux about relation algebras obtained from cylindric algebras. These results in algebraic logic have the following consequence for predicate logic: for every finite cardinal α ≥ 3 there is a logically valid sentence X, in a first-order language L with equality and exactly one nonlogical binary relation symbol E, such that X contains only 3 variables (each of which (...) may occur arbitrarily many times), X has a proof containing exactly α + 1 variables, but X has no proof containing only α variables. This solves a problem posed by Tarski and Givant in 1987. (shrink)
The relationship of the author's intention to the meaning of a literary work has been a persistently controversial topic in aesthetics. Anti-intentionalists Wimsatt and Beardsley, in the 1946 paper that launched the debate, accused critics who fueled their interpretative activity by poring over the author's private diaries and life story of committing the 'fallacy' of equating the work's meaning, properly determined by context and linguistic convention, with the meaning intended by the author. Hirsch responded that context and convention are (...) not sufficient to determine a unique meaning for a text; to avoid radical ambiguity we must appeal to the author's intention, which actualizes one of the candidate meanings. Subsequent writers have defended refined versions of these views, and a variety of positions on the spectrum between them, in a debate that remains central to philosophical aesthetics. While much of the debate has focused on literature, similar questions arise with respect to the interpretation of visual artworks. Some of the readings listed below address this matter explicitly. Author Recommends: William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy', Sewanee Review 54 (1946): 468–88. Locus classicus of the anti-intentionalist position: Wimsatt and Beardsley hold that appeal to the author's intention is always extraneous, since intention cannot override the role of linguistic convention and context in determining meaning. Criticism, they argue, should thus proceed by careful examination of the literary work rather than by sifting through biographical material that might hint at the author's intentions. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967). The seminal statement of actual intentionalism: Hirsch holds that 'meaning is an affair of consciousness and not of physical signs or things' (23), though he allows that linguistic convention constrains the meanings the author can intend for a particular utterance. He argues that the author's intention is necessary to fix meaning, since the application of conventions alone would typically leave a text wildly indeterminate. Alexander Nehamas, 'The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal', Critical Inquiry 8 (1981): 133–49. Nehamas argues for a version of hypothetical intentionalism according to which interpretation is a matter of attributing an intended meaning to a hypothetical author, distinct from the historical writer. This view allows the interpreter to find meaning even in features of the work that may have been mere accidents on the part of the historical writer. Gary Iseminger, ed., Intention and Interpretation (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992). Intention and Interpretation is an outstanding collection including both classic and new essays representing most of the major viewpoints in the debate. Noël Carroll, 'Art, Intention, and Conversation', Intention and Interpretation , ed. Gary Iseminger (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), 97–131. The essay defends modest actual intentionalism, according to which the work's meaning is one compatible both with the author's meaning intentions and with the conventionally allowable meanings of the text. Carroll holds that literature is on a continuum with ordinary conversation, to which an intentionalist analysis is apt; for this reason he rejects anti-intentionalism and hypothetical intentionalism, which emphasize the purported autonomy of literary works from their authors. Daniel Nathan, 'Irony, Metaphor, and the Problem of Intention', Intention and Interpretation , ed. Gary Iseminger (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), 183–202. Nathan argues that even irony and metaphor, which are often thought to require an analysis in terms of the author's actual intentions, are in fact best understood on an anti-intentionalist approach. Jerrold Levinson, 'Intention and Interpretation in Literature', The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 175–213. Revised version of 'Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look', Intention and Interpretation , ed. Gary Iseminger (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), 221–56. The essay defends a version of hypothetical intentionalism according to which the meaning of a literary work is the meaning that would be attributed to the actual author by members of the ideal audience. Levinson argues that literary works should be treated differently from everyday utterances, since it is a convention of literature that its works are substantially autonomous from their authors. Paisley Livingston, Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). Livingston examines competing accounts of the nature of intentions as they pertain to a variety of issues in the philosophy of art, including the ontology of art, the nature of authorship, and art interpretation. In chapter 6, Livingston argues for partial intentionalism, according to which some, but not all, of a work's meanings are non-redundantly determined by the author's intentions. Stephen Davies, 'Authors' Intentions, Literary Interpretation, and Literary Value', British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 223–47. Davies defends the value-maximizing view, according to which, when there is more than one conventional meaning consistent with the work's features, the meaning that should be attributed to the work is the one that makes the work out to be most aesthetically valuable. He allows for the attribution of multiple meanings when more than one candidate (approximately) maximizes the work's value. Online Materials: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beardsley-aesthetics/ Beardsley's Aesthetics (Michael Wreen) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conceptual-art/ Conceptual Art (Elisabeth Schellekens) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-acts/ Speech Acts (Mitchell Green) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/ Hermeneutics (Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal) Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Foundations 1. Wimsatt and Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy'. 2. Livingston, 'What Are Intentions?', Art and Intention , 1–30. Weeks 2–3: Actual Intentionalism 1. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation , ch. 1–2, 1–67. 2. Gary Iseminger, 'An Intentional Demonstration?', Intention and Interpretation , ed. Iseminger, 76–96. Optional reading: 1. Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, 'Against Theory', Critical Inquiry 8 (1982): 723–742. 2. Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, 'Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction', Critical Inquiry 14 (1987): 49–58. Weeks 4–5: Modest, Moderate and Partial Intentionalism 1. Carroll, 'Art, Intention, and Conversation'. 2. Robert Stecker, Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech, and the Law (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), ch. 2, 29–51. 3. Livingston, 'Intention and the Interpretation of Art', Art and Intention , 135–74. Optional reading: 1. Carroll, 'Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism', Metaphilosophy 31 (2000): 75–95. 2. Stecker, 'Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (2006): 429–38. Weeks 6–7: Hypothetical Intentionalism 1. William E. Tolhurst, 'On What a Text Is and How It Means', British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979): 3–14. 2. Nehamas, 'Postulated Author'. 3. Levinson, 'Intention and Interpretation in Literature'. Optional reading: 1. Nehamas, 'What an Author Is', Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 685–91. 2. Nehamas, 'Writer, Text, Work, Author', Literature and the Question of Philosophy , ed. A. J. Cascardi (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 265–91. 3. Levinson, 'Hypothetical Intentionalism: Statement, Objections, and Replies', Is There a Single Right Interpretation? , ed. M. Krausz (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 309–18. Week 8: The Value-Maximizing View 1. Davies, 'The Aesthetic Relevance of Authors' and Painters' Intentions', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41 (1982): 65–76. 2. Davies, 'Authors' Intentions, Literary Interpretation, and Literary Value'. Weeks 9–10: Anti-Intentionalism 1. Beardsley, 'The Authority of the Text,' The Possibility of Criticism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), 16–37. 2. Nathan, 'Irony, Metaphor, and the Problem of Intention'. 3. Nathan, 'Art, Meaning, and Artist's Meaning', Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art , ed. M. Kieran (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 282–95. Optional reading: 1. Beardsley, 'Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived', The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays , ed. M. J. Wreen and D. M. Callen (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 188–207. 2. Nathan, 'Irony and the Author's Intentions', British Journal of Aesthetics 22 (1982): 246–56. Sample Mini-Syllabus: Week 1: Foundations 1. Wimsatt and Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy'. 2. Livingston, 'What Are Intentions?', Art and Intention , 1–30. Week 2: Actual and Modest Intentionalism 1. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation , ch. 1–2, 1–67. 2. Carroll, 'Art, Intention, and Conversation'. Week 3: Hypothetical Intentionalism and Anti-Intentionalism 1. Levinson, 'Intention and Interpretation in Literature'. 2. Nathan, 'Irony, Metaphor, and the Problem of Intention'. Focus Questions 1. Is the difficulty of ascertaining the author's intentions a good reason to reject actual intentionalism? 2. Should literary works be seen as largely autonomous from their authors, even if we think that interpretation of ordinary utterances is properly a matter of ascertaining the speaker's intentions? 3. Are linguistic context and convention sufficient to determine the meaning of a literary work, or is the author's intention required to stave off an unacceptable degree of ambiguity? 4. Should the author's intentions about the genre or category to which the work belongs have a different status than intentions about the work's meaning? 5. Can the author's intentions have a non-redundant role to play in fixing meaning even if we take the role of context and linguistic convention seriously? 6. Should we expect the author's intention to play the same role (if any) in the interpretation of visual artworks that it plays in the interpretation of literature, or do differences between these two art forms require distinct approaches? (shrink)
The explosion of sexualityWe have seen how ideas of the repression of sexual energies within a sex-economic framework, the revolt of sexuality incarnated in youth and the struggle to control/educate children's sexuality, the revolt of women due to greater independence, and the scientizing of the world of morals were brought together to produce the idea of the “sexual revolution” - a specific interpretation of undeniable changes in mores and behavior. While it might seem that the net has been cast rather (...) widely in describing this complex of ideas, it is my contention that all these themes, seemingly contradictory though they may be, were present in the thought of those formulating the idea of the sexual revolution. (One statement by Calverton shows the synthesis: “In the revolt of youth, connected as it is with the economic independence of modern woman, the bankruptcy of the old system of marriage, the decay of the bourgeoisie as a social class, we have the dynamic beginnings of a sexual revolution growing out of the economic background of social struggle.”) Calverton, “Sex and social straggle,” 282.But the idea of a sexual revolution had another element, touched upon at the beginning of this essay, namely the belief that a distinction could be made between revolutionary and non-revolutionary times in moral history. This belief was no doubt derived from the Marxist orientation toward revolutionary times that the writers we have studied shared. But can such a discontinuous change, a “spurt” in evolution in which quantity becomes quality, be supposed to have happened, when we have enough records of people suggesting that there was a “sexual revolution” - “a startling and cataclysmic disruption,” to use Schur's words - underway in 1925 (Lindsey), 1927 (Darmstadt et al.), 1929 (Schmalhausen), 1936 (Reich), 1930–1955 (Hirsch), 1956 (Sorokin), 1964 (Schur), and 1966 (Reiss; Kirkendall and Libby)? To some extent, yes. There is indication of great changes in sexual behavior at certain times (though it is hard to separate age, cohort, and period effects); there was an increase in at least educated females' incidence of premarital intercourse in the 1920s. Furthermore, there are clear differences in the amount of attention paid to sexuality, and to sexual mores, during different periods. At the very least, merely the belief that one is in the midst of a sexual revolution is an important datum, for it may point to changes in extremely “ideologically sensitive” portions of the population (e.g., middle-class women) or to the attempt to legitimize already existing patterns of behavior.However, the writers contributing to the idea of the sexual revolution never gave very plausible explanations as to why the change from normal to revolutionary times should have happened when it did. The suggested causes have generally been continuous, and not immediately preceding the times believed to be sexual revolutions. Women's entry into the labor force followed a roughly exponential curve from 1900 to the present, the orientation of the economy toward service-sector production, as well as the increase in disposable income was, aside from the depression-war period, basically uninterrupted, and the pace of technological change certainly never slackened.The oven-ready idea of the “sexual revolution”I have made it clear that I think that this idea of a “sexual revolution” was available for people in the 1960s and 1970s - both as commentators and as actors - to use in interpreting current changes or perceived changes, and that this idea suggested the relevance of certain explanatory factors and not others. Furthermore, this conceptual vocabulary was available to interpret previous changes (such as when Shorter writes of the increase of intimacy in the nineteenth century, “The libido unfroze in the blast of the wish to be free,” and attributes it to the effects of increased participation in the market). Shorter, Family, 166, 255–260.Why were the same causal factors we found given as explanations for the first sexual revolution (change in economic imperatives, emancipation of women due to labor-force participation, new knowledge and contraception, the emancipation of youth due to technological change and independence from adult authority) so often invoked to explain the second sexual revolution? It certainly might be, as Steven Seidman has argued, that there was one century-long revolution involving a constant set of causes. Steven Seidman, Embattled Eros: Sexual Politics and Ethics in Contemporary America (New York: Routledge, 1992), 21. There is, I think, a great deal of truth to this, but we must bear in mind, as Beth Bailey said, that the term sexual revolution is not a mere scholarly classification, but a term used by contemporaries who experienced a period as being different,Beth Bailey, “Sexual revolution(s),” in David Farber, editor, The Sixties: From Memory to History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994) and there may still be significant discontinuity to explain. I suspect that rather than there being one long revolution (or better, evolution) that had these constant “causes,” during periods of public display of new sexual mores among the middle class - mores that might have been silently changing for some time - people tended to think in terms of a sexual revolution, and with the idea of the sexual revolution, these supposed causes were predisposed to reappear. The use of the idea of the sexual revolution led to two related confusions, one stemming from the Leninist-voluntarist understanding of what constituted a revolution, and the other from the orthodox-determinist understanding, each confusing sexual change with a model of revolution. The first confusion was between, on the one hand, the importance of widespread change in sexual ethics and behavior, and, on the other, the role of self-professed sexual revolutionaries and reformers. The second was between, on the one hand, the freeing of previously repressed sexuality (again, of women and adolescents), and, on the other, change in the economic substructure.Regarding the first, the term “sexual revolution,” as we have seen, was coined by self-professed revolutionaries of a distinctly Leninist stripe, self-styled modernists who believed that the force of history was on their side, but who also believed in the utility of forceful agitation by the vanguard for reform. The most important effect of the adoption of the idea of revolution was to preserve this double-idea: a revolution implied both widespread or secular change (in contrast to the “rebellion” of a few “pioneers”) and also a radical overturning of previously existing order (along the lines of the programme of the rebels and pioneers). Because of this understanding of what a sexual revolution should be, sociologists and other social analysts could, on the one hand, dismiss claims that there had been a sexual revolution by pointing to the incomplete overthrow of monogamous, heterosexual marriage as the dominant pattern and norm. Kate Millet: “A sexual revolution would require, perhaps first of all, an end of traditional sex inhibitions and taboos, particularly those [taboos on activities] that most threaten patriarchal monogamous marriage.” Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 62; hence, says Seidman, “a sexual revolution did not occur in post-world war II America” (Embattled Eros, 21). Cf. Klassen et al., Sex and Morality, 5ff. On the other hand, discussions of the sexual revolution tended to focus on the avant-garde of sexual nonconformism, assuming that there was some important connection between the struggles of far-sighted rebels and the secular change that undoubtedly occurred.D'Emilio and Freedman's thorough historical review (Intimate Matters) dramatically narrows scope as we get to the sexual revolution to focus, significantly, not on the secular sexual revolution, but on sexual revolutionariesBut this voluntarist-Leninist understanding of what constitutes revolution was complimented by the other side of the concept of sexual revolution, namely revolution as inevitable secular change deeply rooted in changing economic imperatives. Like the modernists, analysts of the second sexual revolution have tended to assume that if anyone's sexuality was liberated, it was that of women and youth. An important exception, of course, is Barbara Ehrenreich's emphasis on the male flight from commitment in The Hearts of Men (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1983). Even among those who noted the equivocal nature of the freedom granted by increased permissiveness, the fundamental notion of (women's and youths') sexuality waiting to be freed (or even better, waiting for the right moment to free itself) narrowed the range of what substructural changes would be pointed to - they were those that would, it was believed, make it less costly for a pre-existing female or youthful desire for extramarital sex to be “expressed.” So once again, women's “entry” into the paid labor force was taken to explain the sexual revolution (for example, Ira Reiss: “Economic autonomy reduces dependence on others and makes sexual assertiveness a much less risky procedure”).Ira L. Reiss, An End to Shame: Shaping Our Next Sexual Revolution, with Harriet M. Reiss. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1990), 88; cf. Weeks, Sex, Politics, 257.However there was a catch - sociologists knew that female labor-force participation had been rising at a relatively stable (though exponential) rate since the first World War. While the 1960s did see an increase in the rate of change, it was not so large as to explain a revolution. In other words, the rate of change was steadily increasing, but this acceleration was relatively slow. Around 25% of all women were in the labor force in 1930, 34% in 1950, 38% in 1960, and 43% in 1970. U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1975 Handbook On Women Workers. (Washington D.C.: D.O.L., 1975), U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1983 Handbook On Women Workers. Bulletin No. 298 (Washington D.C.: D.O.L., 1983). The first figure is from Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 24 . So explanations turned to the category of working women that seemed to be growing the fastest, namely working mothers. Unfortunately, there are some obvious problems with pointing to the significance of working mothers. The first is, of course, that it simply doesn't fit well with the idea that independent income leads to fearless sexual experimentation, which remained the dominant explanatory model. (For example, while D'Emilio and Freedman point to the importance of the rise in working mothers, recognizing that women without children had been steadily entering the labor force for some time, the influence of women's work that they speak of seems to assume singleness, not motherhood.)“Whatever the motives, the high proportion of women in the work force promised upheavals in the realm of personal life and heterosexual relations.... Working women brought greater confidence and more power to their relationships with men.” D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 332. Ira Reiss tried to solve this problem by claiming that “the employed mother played a key role in the sexual revolution that began in the late 1960s,” because (1) her children had a greater variety of role models and were therefore more autonomous, and (2) they had a more expanded notion of female autonomy.Reiss, Shame, 92. This, however, undermines the argument connecting independence and assertiveness: if having a working mother expands a son's vision of women's autonomy, then why would assertiveness on women's part still be risky? But if having a working mother only expands a daughter's vision of women's autonomy, then her sexual autonomy would still be risky, and so this factor makes no difference. The second problem with emphasizing the increase in working mothers as opposed to single women is that even here careful scrutiny of the numbers belies the argument being made. If the significance of employed mothers comes from the role models they present to their young children who are learning gender roles, it is in the 1950s (at the latest) that this increase must have taken place (and thus the growth of labor-force participation of mothers with young children in the late 1960s is irrelevant). But the percentage of women with young children who were in the labor force only grew by one fourth over the decade. The bulk of the increased labor-force participation in this period came from women over forty-five - they may have been mothers, but their children were not so impressionable. Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 302ff.The other deep change in the substructure that supposedly accounts for the sexual revolution has to do with a shift in the economy from production to consumption. This confused thesis generally and quite incorrectly maintains that there was an identifiable shift in the “emphasis” of the economy from savings to consumption, and that “capitalism's” need to find new markets explains bar culture and adult bookstores. This major shift seems to have occurred in the 1920s to cause the first sexual revolution, (D'Emilio and Freedman, Kevin White), reappeared in the 1950s to prop up the nuclear family with a new domesticity (Seidman), and then finished things off in the sixties and seventies as the “completion” of the turn towards consumerism (in Weeks's words), led to the increased permissiveness associated with the sexual revolution and the rise of the sexual marketplace (Weeks, Seidman). On the 1920s, see D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 278f, 234, 301; Kevin White, Sexual Revolution, 2, 5, 9, 59,188. For the 1950s, see Steven Seidman, Romantic Longings: Love in America, 1830–1980 (New York: Routledge, 1991), 67, 96, 123. For the 1960s, see Weeks, Discontents, 25, 306, (“The consumer economy of the sixties helps explain how the singles culture could emerge from a period seemingly rooted in a marital sexual ethic and why it won such ready acceptance”); Weeks, Sex, Politics, 205, 248, 252; Steven Seidman, Embattled Eros,35, 37, 41. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain the genesis of this particular idea; suffice it to say that it comes from the basic dialectical materialist assumption that a revolution in sex must at least directly parallel changes in the requirements of the economic substructure. Of course, it wasn't simply changes in the economy that made sexual assertiveness less risky according to explanations of the second sexual revolution; it was also new contraceptive technology and knowledge. The sexual revolution probably could not have occurred without the pill, writes Linda Grant; the pill “liberated women's desires, turning [women] into sexual beings.” Linda Grant, Sexing the Millennium: Women and the Sexual Revolution (New York: Grove Press, 1994), 58f. Were sexuality truly lurking under its cover, trying to get out, this would make sense, but as Bailey and Reiss remind us, Kinsey found that moral reservations, not fear of pregnancy, were the biggest factor in leading women not to have premarital sex.Beth Bailey, “Sexual revolution(s);” Reiss, Shame; Kinsey et al., Female, 315. While there is no need to ignore the differences between the pill and previous forms of contraception, those previous forms seemed effective enough for analysts of the 1920s to attribute that sexual revolution to them, and effective enough to lead to a dramatic decrease in birth-rate before the invention of the pill. Finally, the conception of sexuality wanting to be let out led once more to the assumption that scientific information about the body and sexuality was inherently pro-sexual, and that this new information (now it became Masters and Johnson, or Kinsey, instead of Freud) increased sexual permissiveness. This emphasis on the effects of scientific knowledge also seems quite misplaced; it is more likely, as Gagnon and Smith have argued, that the significant knowledge was social knowledge, that is, knowledge of what people were already doing that destroyed the pluralistic ignorance (in Allport's term) that supported the idea of stability in sexual mores and behavior. John H. Gagnon and William Simon, “Perspectives on the sexual scene,” in The Sexual Scene, 2nd edition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1973). (The emphasis on scientific knowledge as being inherently liberatory was a particularly interesting bit of cultural amnesia, for in the nineteenth-century European scene, those seeking sexual liberation did so not through a scientific discourse, but through a discourse of sin and the transcendence of morality.See, for example, Lindsay Watton, “Constructs of sin and sodom in Russian modernism, 1906–1909,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 4 (1994): 369–394. The significance of such non-scientific attention to sexuality on the history of behavior was erased by the modernist mind.) To summarize, the idea of a “sexual revolution” to some degree preserved a protean explanatory framework merely through its juxta-position of “sexual” and “revolution,” where “revolution” had vaguely Marxist-Leninist connotations. This framework naturally unfolded when people began to ask what had caused the revolution, and whether or not there truly was a revolution, and has since become the dominant framework for interpreting sexual change. A perfect example is the work of Steven Seidman, one of the foremost sociological analysts of sexual history, and someone who tends to be wary of simplistic materialist explanations. He discusses the entrance of women into the paid labor force, arguing that “the contradiction between their growing economic empowerment and political subordination prompted women's demands for social and sexual autonomy including the legitimation of eroticism.” Then he concludes, “Capitalism, changing gender roles [due to the above], technological changes in contraception and birth control, and the broader processes of social and political liberalization contributed to the making of the twentieth century American intimate culture. Yet, social change is not the result of abstract social processes, but is merely made by people ... [and so] the roles of sex reformers and rebels were critical to sexual change in twentieth century America. Seidman, Eros, 42. Aside from the appended effects of general social liberalization (which might be seen as making the more materialistic causes redundant), we see the usual suspects despite any clear reasons why any of them are linked to their effects (why, for example, would economic empowerment lead women to call for the legitimation of eroticism?). This explanation is only comprehensible against the background of an understanding of what a sexual revolution is, i.e., one coming from the combination of Marxist-Leninist and Freudian-vitalist ideas leading to the expectation of witnessing a combination of “deep,” long-term, secular economic effects and the sudden discontinuous self-freeing of the repressed sexuality of youths and women. This is not simply the tendency of the sociological imagination to link any and all things to the development of capitalism, for the emphasis on discontinuity led analysts then to look for “local” causes (often those associated with sexual “rebels” - a prime example is the influence of the civil-rights movement or the second World War) to explain the timing. In both the case of the fundamental economic causes and that of the local sparks, there was a parochial attempt to explain changes that were clearly international with causes that were purely national in scope (the arguments based on economic change cannot be applied to Weimar Germany, for example). As said above, the culture of Weimar Germany paralleled or accentuated in many key respects those aspects of American culture associated with the sexual revolution, but unlike America, in Germany during the 1920s there was economic stagnation, and no aggregate change in women's labor-force participation (though of course there were important shifts in composition). See Peukert, Weimar, 12,96.Finally, while substantiating such a claim would certainly be outside of the bounds of this article, I suggest that it is quite plausible that the preexisting idea of what a sexual revolution is affected not only how later analysts interpreted the second sexual revolution, but also how people as actors interpreted changes they lived through. While actors probably did not stress continuous economic factors as did later analysts, for both, when “cultural” elements were taken into account, it was the “discovery” of “new” scientific information that had (naturally) set sex free at last (many contemporary accounts by protagonists of the sexual revolution stress the illuminating information from Masters and Johnson - in contrast to the repressive effects of Freudianism!). See, for example, Susan Lydon, “Understanding orgasm,” Ramparts, 14 December 1968. The sexual revolution was about knowledge, liberation of the body, and economic change - not changing values or other cultural elements (even though, as we have seen above, it seems most likely that it was precisely cultural values that changed, since moral reservations were the biggest check to female premarital sex before the second sexual revolution). And sociological analysis has shared this blindness - only a few (Daniel Bell for one)Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978). Bell's analysis combines the effects of economic change and autonomous cultural developments. argued that autonomous cultural developments were revolutionizing society.Even the very thorough and restrained analyses of Laumann et al. - who do, by the way, find what seems to be a period effect of increase in number of sex partners in the late 1960s and think it reasonable to term this the sexual revolution - shy away from explicitly pointing to cultural changes as autonomous, even as they discuss the influence of mass media. They conclude: “Social forces - demographic, economic, technological, and social organizational - produced the long-term social trends that have culminated in what some have perceived to be the “revolutionary” transformation of sexuality among young people.” Edward O. Laumann, John H. Gagnon, Robert T. Michael, and Stuart Michaels, The Social Organization of Sexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 199,542. When we take a step back, sociologists have been satisfied with extremely vague and dubious explanations as to the relationship between economic development and “sexual revolutions” - explanations that seem to have a great deal of truth in them, but that are grounded in particular constructions of what a “sexual revolution” should look like. (shrink)
Introduction, by D. J. Silver.--The issues: Some current trends in ethical theory, by A. Edel. Contemporary problems in ethics from a Jewish perspective, by H. Jonas. What is the contemporary problematic of ethics in Christianity? By J. M. Gustafson. Modern images of man, by J. N. Hartt. Is there a common Judaeo-Christian ethical tradition? By I. M. Blank. Problematics of Jewish ethics, by M. A. Meyer. Revealed morality and modern thought, by N. Samuelson.--The Jewish background: Does Torah mean law? By (...) J. Neusner. Confrontation of Greek and Jewish ethics: Philo: De Decalogo, by S. Sandmel. Reprobation, prohibition, invalidity: an examination of the Halakhic development concerning intermarriage, by L. Silberman. Death and burial in the Jewish tradition, by S. B. Freehof. God and the ethical impulse, by W. G. Plaut.--Social action: Civil disobedience and the Jewish tradition, by S. G. Broude. Religious responsibility for the social order: A Jewish view, by E. L. Fackenheim. Toward a theology for social action, by R. G. Hirsch. The mission of Israel and social action, by E. Lipman. Some cautionary remarks, by J. Kravetz.--The mission of Israel: On the theology of Jewish survival, by S. S. Schwarzchild. Meaning and purpose of Jewish survival, by A. Gilbert. Beyond the apologetics of mission, by D. J. Silver. (shrink)