23 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Lawrence B. Solum (Georgetown University)
  1. Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader's Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin.
    The purpose of this essay is two-fold. The first aim is to introduce the reader to Semantic Originalism - a version of the New Originalism that is fully articulated in a long article of that name. The reader's guide in Part II provides a very short summary and accessible guide to the argument of Semantic Originalism. The second aim is to provide access to an exchange between Stephen Griffin and myself in the Blogosphere. Griffin's eight questions and comments about Semantic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism.
    Semantic originalism is a theory of constitutional meaning that aims to disentangle the semantic, legal, and normative strands of debates in constitutional theory about the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation and construction. This theory affirms four theses: (1) the fixation thesis, (2) the clause meaning thesis, (3) the contribution thesis, and (4) the fidelity thesis. -/- The fixation thesis claims that the semantic content of each constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision is framed and ratified: (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content.
    This essay investigates a familiar set of questions about the relationship between legal texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, opinions, orders, and contracts) and the content of the law (e.g., norms, rules, standards, doctrines, and mandates). Is the original meaning of the constitutional text binding on the Supreme Court when it develops doctrines of constitutional law? Should statutes be given their plain meaning or should judges devise statutory constructions that depart from the text to serve a purpose? What role should default rules (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, and the Philosophy of Law.
    The Legal Theory Lexicon series usually explicates some concept in legal theory, jurisprudence, or philosophy of law. But what are those fields and how do they relate to each other? Is "jurisprudence" a synonym for "philosophy of law" or are these two overlapping but distinct fields? Is "legal theory" broader or narrower than jurisprudence? And why should we care about this terminology? As always, this entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon series is aimed at law students, especially first-year law students (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Lawrence B. Solum (2011). What is Originalism? : The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory. In Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Essays in Constitutional Theory. Cambridge University Press.
  6. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction.
    The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much discussed these days. I shall argue that the distinction is both real and fundamental – that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political actors process legal texts. My account of the distinction will not be precisely the same as some others, but I shall argue that it is the correct account and captures the essential (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lawrence B. Solum (2009). Philosophy of Law. In Francis J. Mootz (ed.), On Philosophy in American Law. Cambridge University Press. 122.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lawrence B. Solum (2009). The Aretaic Turn in American Philosophy of Law. In Francis J. Mootz (ed.), On Philosophy in American Law. Cambridge University Press.
    This essay explores the development of "virtue jurisprudence," a general theory of law that draws on ideas developed in virtue ethics.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lawrence B. Solum (2008). Constitutional Possibilities. Indiana Law Journal 83:307-337.
    What are our constitutional possibilities? The importance of this question is illustrated by the striking breadth of recent discussions, ranging from the interpretation of the United States Constitution as a guarantee of fundamental economic equality and proposals to restore the lost constitution to arguments for the virtual abandonment of structural provisions of the Constitution of 1789. Such proposals are conventionally understood as placing constitutional options on the table as real options for constitutional change. Normative constitutional theory asks the question whether (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum (2007). An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law. In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan.
  11. Lawrence B. Solum (2007). A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and the Rule of Law. In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Lawrence B. Solum (2007). Natural Justice : An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of Lawfulness. In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Lawrence B. Solum (2006). Natural Justice. American Journal of Jurisprudence 51 (1):65-105.
    Justice is a natural virtue. Well-functioning humans are just, as are well-ordered human societies. Roughly, this means that in a well-ordered society, just humans internalize the laws and social norms (the nomoi)--they internalize lawfulness as a disposition that guides the way they relate to other humans. In societies that are mostly well-ordered, with isolated zones of substantial dysfunction, the nomoi are limited to those norms that are not clearly inconsistent with the function of law--to create the conditions for human flourishing. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason.
    What role does and should religion play in the legal sphere of a modern liberal democracy? Does religion threaten to create divisions that would undermine the stability of the constitutional order? Or is religious disagreement itself a force that works to create consensus on some of the core commitments of constitutionalism--liberty of conscience, toleration, limited government, and the rule of law? This essay explores these questions from the perspectives of contemporary political philosophy and constitutional theory. The thesis of the essay (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason.
    This essay develops an ideal of public legal reason--a normative theory of legal reasons that is appropriate for a society characterized by religious and moral pluralism. One of the implications of this theory is that normative theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should instead rely on what the author calls public values--values that can be affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of particular comprehensive moral doctrines. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Lawrence B. Solum (2005). The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory. Brooklyn Law Review 70:475.
    The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory argues that an institutional approach to theories of constitutional interpretation ought to be supplemented by explicit focus on the virtues and vices of constitutional adjudicators. Part I, The Most Dysfunctional Branch, advances the speculative hypothesis that politicization of the judiciary has led the political branches to exclude consideration of virtue from the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices and to select Justices on the basis of the strength of their commitment to particular positions (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Lawrence B. Solum (2004). Procedural Justice. Southern California Law Review 78:181.
    "Procedural Justice" offers a theory of procedural fairness for civil dispute resolution. The core idea behind the theory is the procedural legitimacy thesis: participation rights are essential for the legitimacy of adjudicatory procedures. The theory yields two principles of procedural justice: the accuracy principle and the participation principle. The two principles require a system of procedure to aim at accuracy and to afford reasonable rights of participation qualified by a practicability constraint. The Article begins in Part I, Introduction, with two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Lawrence B. Solum (2003). Virtue Jurisprudence a Virtue–Centred Theory of Judging. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):178--213.
    “Virtue jurisprudence” is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory. The main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue–centred theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis, or sound practical judgement. A virtue–centred account (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Lawrence B. Solum (1994). Inclusive Public Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (3-4):217-231.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Lawrence B. Solum (1992). Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences. North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.
    Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial intelligence (AI) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Lawrence B. Solum (1989). Freedom of Communicative Action. Northwestern University Law Review 83 (1):54-135.
    The thesis of "Freedom of Communicative Action" is that Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action illuminated the deep structure of the First Amendment freedom of speech. Haberams's theory takes speech act theory as its point of departure. Communicative action coordinates indivudal behavior through rational understanding. Communicative action is distinguished from strategic action--the use of communication to manipulate, deceive, or coerce. Part I offers an introduction. Part II outlines a hermeneutic approach to interpretation of the First Amendent. Part III explores and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Lawrence B. Solum (1987). On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma. University of Chicago Law Review 54:462.
    This essay investigates the indeterminacy thesis - roughly the claim that the content of authoritative legal materials (such as the texts of constitutions, statutes, cases, rules, and regulations) does not determine the outcome of particular legal disputes. The indeterminacy thesis can be formulated as either "strong" or weak." The strong version of the indeterminacy thesis is demonstrably false, but several weak versions of the thesis are true but lack the radical implications of strong indeterminacy.The strong indeterminacy thesis is the claim (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation