Online research in philosophy

Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Part I. Backgrounds: 2. Some background: self and reason; 3. Some background: approaches to ethics; 4. Some background: our good; 5. Elusive lines, slippery slopes, and moral principles; Part II. Life, Death, and Bioethics: 6. Being alive; 7. Being healthy; 8. Health and virtue; 9. Death and life; 10. Drawing lines with death; 11. Double effect: euthanasia, and proportionality; 12. Abortion; 13. The gene I: the mystique; 14. The gene II: manipulation; 15. Ethics and biomedical (...) research; 16. Bioethics seen in an eastern light; 17. Toward a wider view. (shrink)

Focusing on Truth explores the question of what truth is, balancing historical with issue-orientated discussion. The book offers a comprehensive survey of all the major theories of truth. Lawrence Johnson investigates a number of closely related matters of truth in his inquiry, such as: What sorts of things are true or false? What is attributed to them when they are said to be true or false? What do facts have to do with truth? What can we learn from previous theories? (...) The book opens with an analysis of the coherence theory of truth and then the correspondence theory of truth, as developed by Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein. Through a study of the semantic conceptions of truth, the author reveals that an adequate theory of truth must take account of the pragmatics of person, purpose, and circumstance. A full understanding of facts and truth bearers is considered central to Johnson's criticism of the opposing truth theories of J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Drawing on the merits of these theories and others, while identifying their deficiencies, Johnson presents a new account of truth, based on the correlation of referential foci and the use of linguistic conventions. This account is defended as being adequate to meet the legitimate demands made on a theory of truth. Johnson argues that the account leaves scope for statements of many different sorts to be true in their own widely varying ways, without the existence of a need to posit fundamentally different kinds of truth. (shrink)

I develop the thesis that species and ecosystems are living entities with morally significant interests in their own right and defend it against leading objections. Contrary to certain claims, it is possible to individuate such entities sufficiently well. Indeed, there is a sense in which such entities define their own nature. I also consider and reject the argument that species and ecosystems cannot have interests or even traits in their own right because evolution does not proceed on that level. Although (...) evolution proceeds on the level of the genotype, those selected are able to cooperate in entities of various higher orders—including species and ecosystems. Having their own nature and interests, species and ecosystems can meaningfully be said to have moral standing. (shrink)

The human race is an ongoing entity, not just a collection of individuals. It has interests which are not just the aggregated interests of individual humans. These interests are morally significant and have important implications for environmental ethics.