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  1. Lawrence J. Kaye (1995). A Scientific Psychologistic Foundation for Theories of Meaning. Minds and Machines 5 (2):187-206.
    I propose, develop and defend the view that theories of meaning — for instance, a theory specifying the logical form or truth conditions of natural language sentences — should be naturalized to scientific psychological inquiry. This involves both psychologism — the claim that semantics characterizes psychological states — and scientific naturalism — the claim that semantics will depend on the data and theories of scientific psychology. I argue that scientific psychologism is more plausible than the traditional alternative, the view that (...)
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  2. Lawrence J. Kaye (1995). The Languages of Thought. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):92-110.
    I critically explore various forms of the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. Many considerations, including the complexity of representational content and the systematicity of language understanding, support the view that some, but not all, of our mental representations occur in a language. I examine several arguments concerning sententialism and the propositional attitudes, Fodor's arguments concerning infant and animal thought, and Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism and show that none of these considerations require us to postulate a LOT that is (...)
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  3. Lawrence J. Kaye (1994). Robert Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (6):379-381.
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  4. Lawrence J. Kaye (1994). The Computational Account of Belief. Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.
    Fodor and others who think that scientific, computational psychology will vindicate commonsense belief-desire psychology have maintained that belief can be identified with the explicit storage of a token with appropriate content. I review and develop problems for the explicit storage view and show that a more plausible account identifies belief with the disposition to use a token with appropriate content in explicit reasoning and planning processes and as a basis for action. I argue that this type of inner disposition account (...)
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  5. Lawrence J. Kaye (1993). Are Most of Our Concepts Innate? Synthese 2 (2):187-217.
    Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to (...)
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  6. Lawrence J. Kaye (1993). Semantic Compositionality: Still the Only Game in Town. Analysis 53 (1):17 - 23.
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