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  1. Lawrie Reznek (1998). On the Epistemology of Mental Illness. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20 (2):215 - 232.
    The most important epistemological problem in psychiatry is the detection of malingering. This is a consequence of the fact that there is no objective way to confirm any psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric diagnosis is based on subjective complaints. The discovery of objective markers for psychiatric diagnosis is problematic because it presupposes we can tell valid from faked subjective symptoms. But this is the difficulty. If we use pervasive irrationality as a sign of mental illness, we encounter the problem of identifying pervasive (...)
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  2. Lawrie Reznek (1997). Evil or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defence. Routledge.
    Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in Evil or Ill ? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of (...)
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  3. Lawrie Reznek (1995). Dis-Ease About Kinds: Reply to D'Amico. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (5):571-584.
    I argued that a value-free account of our concept of <span class='Hi'>disease</span> cannot be given. Part of this argument consisted in showing that diseases as a class do not constitute a natural kind. To understand this, we need only see that we define and classify conditions into diseases and non-diseases not in terms of their causes but in terms of their effects. While no philosophical position is watertight, the arguments overwhelmingly favour the conclusion that diseases do not constitute a natural (...)
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  4. Lawrie Reznek (1991). The Philosophical Defence of Psychiatry. Routledge.
    Psychiatry is plagued with philosophical questions. What is a mental illness? Is it different from brain disease? Is there any objective way of determining whether behaviors such as criminal activity are mental illnesses? Should we explain "abnormal" behavior by reference to psychological forces, learning processes, social factors, or disease processes? This book aspires to answer these and other questions. Broadly divided into two halves, the first analyzes the arguments of psychiatry's critics and covers the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as (...)
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  5. Lawrie Reznek (1987). The Nature of Disease. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  6. Lawrie Reznek (1979). A Note on Relativism. Philosophical Papers 8 (2):69-71.
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