The first edition of Peter Lipton's Inference to the Best Explanation, which appeared in 1991, is a modern classic in the philosophy of science. Yet in the second edition of the book, Lipton proves that even a classic can be improved. Not only does Lipton elaborate and expand on the themes covered in the first edition, but he also adds a new chapter on Bayesianism. In particular, he attempts a reconciliation between the Bayesian approach and that offered by Inference to (...) the Best Explanation (IBE). (shrink)

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot (...) of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change. (shrink)

Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn's account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn's philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn's account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the 'observational vocabulary' within Kuhn's picture of scientific theories. The upshot (...) of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn's Claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change. (shrink)

Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs's approach and then (...) take up the task of rebutting Hagar's charge by demonstrating the internal coherence of Fuchs's realism. (shrink)

Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar, who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs’s approach and then take (...) up the task of rebutting Hagar’s charge by demonstrating the internal coherence of Fuchs’s realism. (shrink)