Search results for 'Legal Reasoning' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. F. Atria (1999). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):537-577.
    This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal (...) that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them. (shrink)
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  2.  47
    Jaap Hage (1996). A Theory of Legal Reasoning and a Logic to Match. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):199-273.
    This paper describes a model of legal reasoning and a logic for reasoning with rules, principles and goals that is especially suited to this model of legal reasoning. The paper consists of three parts. The first part describes a model of legal reasoning based on a two-layered view of the law. The first layer consists of principles and goals that express fundamental ideas of a legal system. The second layer contains legal (...)
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  3.  40
    Kathleen Freeman & Arthur M. Farley (1996). A Model of Argumentation and its Application to Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):163-197.
    We present a computational model of dialectical argumentation that could serve as a basis for legal reasoning. The legal domain is an instance of a domain in which knowledge is incomplete, uncertain, and inconsistent. Argumentation is well suited for reasoning in such weak theory domains. We model argument both as information structure, i.e., argument units connecting claims with supporting data, and as dialectical process, i.e., an alternating series of moves by opposing sides. Our model includes burden (...)
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  4.  32
    Tokuyasu Kakuta, Makoto Haraguchi & Yoshiaki Okubo (1997). A Goal-Dependent Abstraction for Legal Reasoning by Analogy. Artificial Intelligence and Law 5 (1-2):97-118.
    This paper presents a new algorithm to find an appropriate similarityunder which we apply legal rules analogically. Since there may exist a lotof similarities between the premises of rule and a case in inquiry, we haveto select an appropriate similarity that is relevant to both thelegal rule and a top goal of our legal reasoning. For this purpose, a newcriterion to distinguish the appropriate similarities from the others isproposed and tested. The criterion is based on Goal-DependentAbstraction (GDA) (...)
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  5.  7
    Dr Richard Susskind (1989). Pragmatism and Purism in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning. AI and Society 3 (1):28-38.
    The paper identifies and assesses the implications of two approaches to the field of artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. The first — pragmatism — concentrates on the development of working systems to the exclusion of theoretical problems. The second — purism — focuses on the nature of the law and of intelligence with no regard for the delivery of commercially viable systems. Past work in AI and law is classified in terms of this division. By reference to The (...)
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  6.  43
    Joseph Raz (1993). On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning. Ratio Juris 6 (1):1-15.
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  7.  10
    Gian Piero Zarri (2007). Ontologies and Reasoning Techniques for (Legal) Intelligent Information Retrieval Systems. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):251-279.
    An application of Narrative Knowledge Representation Language (NKRL) techniques on (declassified) ‘terrorism in Southern Philippines’ documents has been carried out in the context of the IST Parmenides project. This paper describes some aspects of this work: it is our belief, in fact, that the Knowledge Representation techniques and the Intelligent Information Retrieval tools used in this experiment can be of some interest also in an ‘Ontological Modelling of Legal Events and Legal Reasoning’ context.
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  8.  32
    Alison Chorley & Trevor Bench-Capon (2005). An Empirical Investigation of Reasoning with Legal Cases Through Theory Construction and Application. Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (3-4):323-371.
    In recent years several proposals to view reasoning with legal cases as theory construction have been advanced. The most detailed of these is that of Bench-Capon and Sartor, which uses facts, rules, values and preferences to build a theory designed to explain the decisions in a set of cases. In this paper we describe CATE (CAse Theory Editor), a tool intended to support the construction of theories as described by Bench-Capon and Sartor, and which produces executable code corresponding (...)
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  9.  42
    Adam Wyner (2008). An Ontology in Owl for Legal Case-Based Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (4):361-387.
    The paper gives ontologies in the Web Ontology Language (OWL) for Legal Case-based Reasoning (LCBR) systems, giving explicit, formal, and general specifications of a conceptualisation LCBR. Ontologies for different systems allows comparison and contrast between them. OWL ontologies are standardised, machine-readable formats that support automated processing with Semantic Web applications. Intermediate concepts, concepts between base-level concepts and higher level concepts, are central in LCBR. The main issues and their relevance to ontological reasoning and to LCBR are discussed. (...)
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  10.  55
    Gilbert E. Plumer (2000). A Review of the LSAT Using Literature on Legal Reasoning. Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 97 (8):1-19.
    Research using current literature on legal reasoning was conducted with the goals of (a) determining what skills are most important in good legal reasoning according to such literature, (b) determining the extent to which existing Law School Admission Test item types and subtypes are designed to assess those skills, and (c) suggesting test specifications or new or refined item types and formats that could be developed in the future to assess any important skills that appear [by (...)
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  11.  42
    Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon (2005). Legal Case-Based Reasoning as Practical Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (1):93-131.
    In this paper we apply a general account of practical reasoning to arguing about legal cases. In particular, we provide a reconstruction of the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions for a particular well-known case from property law. This is done through the use of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents to replicate the contrasting views involved in the actual decision. This reconstruction suggests that the reasoning involved can be separated into three distinct levels: factual and normative levels (...)
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  12.  47
    Giovanni Sartor (1992). Normative Conflicts in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):209-235.
    This article proposes a formal analysis of a fundamental aspect of legal reasoning: dealing with normative conflicts. Firstly, examples are illustrated concerning the dynamics of legal systems, the application of rules and exceptions, and the semantic indeterminacy of legal sources. Then two approaches to cope with conflicting information are presented: the preferred theories of Brewka, and the belief change functions of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. The relations between those approaches are closely examined, and some aspects of (...)
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  13.  7
    A. Soeteman (1995). Formal Aspects of Legal Reasoning. Argumentation 9 (5):731-746.
    This paper discusses the functions of deductive justification in ideal reconstructions of judicial reasoning. It departs from the point of judicial reasoning: explaining and justifying the judicial decision. It argues that deductive validity is not enough for good judicial argument. On the other hand, deductive justification is necessary, not only for easy cases but for hard cases as well. It draws some consequences for the concept of ‘jumps’ in legal reasoning and for the traditional distinction between (...)
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  14.  30
    Scott Brewer (ed.) (1998). Moral Theory and Legal Reasoning. Garland Pub..
    The articles in this volume consider at what stage of legal reasoning should a judge or lawyer make specifically moral judgments.
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  15.  12
    Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon & Giovanni Sartor (2003). A Model of Legal Reasoning with Cases Incorporating Theories and Values. Artificial Intelligence 150 (1-2):97-143.
    Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is a view of the relationship between (...)
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  16. Neil MacCormick (2005). Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    This book discusses theories of legal reasoning and provides an overall view of the rhetoric of legal justification. It shows how and why lawyers arguments can be rationally persuasive even though rarely, if ever, logically conclusive or compelling. It examines the role of "legal syllogism" and universality of legal reasoning, looking at arguments of consequentialism and principle, and concludes by questioning the infallibility of judges as lawmakers.
     
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  17.  20
    H. Prakken & G. Sartor (1996). A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):331-368.
    Inspired by legal reasoning, this paper presents a formal framework for assessing conflicting arguments. Its use is illustrated with applications to realistic legal examples, and the potential for implementation is discussed. The framework has the form of a logical system for defeasible argumentation. Its language, which is of a logic-programming-like nature, has both weak and explicit negation, and conflicts between arguments are decided with the help of priorities on the rules. An important feature of the system is (...)
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  18. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin (2008). Demystifying Legal Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision (...)
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  19.  19
    Andrew Stranieri, John Zeleznikow, Mark Gawler & Bryn Lewis (1999). A Hybrid Rule – Neural Approach for the Automation of Legal Reasoning in the Discretionary Domain of Family Law in Australia. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):153-183.
    Few automated legal reasoning systems have been developed in domains of law in which a judicial decision maker has extensive discretion in the exercise of his or her powers. Discretionary domains challenge existing artificial intelligence paradigms because models of judicial reasoning are difficult, if not impossible to specify. We argue that judicial discretion adds to the characterisation of law as open textured in a way which has not been addressed by artificial intelligence and law researchers in depth. (...)
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  20.  52
    Aldo Schiavello (2011). Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View. Ratio Juris 24 (2):140-155.
    This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. (...)
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  21.  35
    Jürgen Hollatz (1999). Analogy Making in Legal Reasoning with Neural Networks and Fuzzy Logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):289-301.
    Analogy making from examples is a central task in intelligent system behavior. A lot of real world problems involve analogy making and generalization. Research investigates these questions by building computer models of human thinking concepts. These concepts can be divided into high level approaches as used in cognitive science and low level models as used in neural networks. Applications range over the spectrum of recognition, categorization and analogy reasoning. A major part of legal reasoning could be formally (...)
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  22.  40
    Barbara Baum Levenbook (1984). On Universal Relevance in Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 3 (1):1 - 23.
    The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important (...)
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  23.  30
    Matti Ilmari Niemi (2010). Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning: Two Conceptions. Ratio Juris 23 (4):479-492.
    There are two possible ways to understand form and substance in legal reasoning. The first refers to the distinction between concepts and their applications, whereas the second concentrates on the difference between authoritative and non-authoritative reasons. These approaches refer to the formalistic and positivistic conceptions of the law, the latter being the author's point of departure. Nevertheless, they are both helpful means of analysis in legal interpretation. Interpretation is divided into formal and substantive justification. They have certain (...)
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  24.  16
    Carole D. Hafner & Donald H. Berman (2002). The Role of Context in Case-Based Legal Reasoning: Teleological, Temporal, and Procedural. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 10 (1-3):19-64.
    Computational models of relevance in case-based legal reasoning have traditionallybeen based on algorithms for comparing the facts and substantive legal issues of aprior case to those of a new case. In this paper we argue that robust models ofcase-based legal reasoning must also consider the broader social and jurisprudentialcontext in which legal precedents are decided. We analyze three aspects of legalcontext: the teleological relations that connect legal precedents to the socialvalues and policies they (...)
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  25. Federico Picinali (2014). Legal Reasoning as Fact Finding? A Contribution to the Analysis of Criminal Adjudication. Jurisprudence 5 (2):299-327.
    This paper attempts to shed light on the dynamics of criminal adjudication. It starts by exploring some significant—and often ignored—similarities and dissimilarities between the practices and disciplines of, respectively, legal reasoning and fact finding. It then discusses the problem of defining the nature of these processes—legal reasoning, in particular—in terms of their being instances of practical or theoretical reasoning. Thus understood, the problem is shown to be distinct from two traditional questions of jurisprudence, namely whether (...)
     
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  26.  14
    Peter Suber, Analogy Exercises for Teaching Legal Reasoning.
    Legal reasoning is not the same as the reasoning in mathematics or the physical sciences. It is like them. Specifying the likeness in more detail, and deciding whether there is more likeness than unlikeness, are the kinds of tasks that legal reasoning is better adapted to do than mathematical or scientific reasoning.
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  27.  6
    Fábio P. Shecaira (2014). Gardner on Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 33 (6):747-772.
    In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is (...)
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  28.  2
    Sheldon Wein, Legal Reasoning When the Supreme Court is Corrupt.
    This paper suggests a way of thinking about the legal reasoning done by conscientious judges working in a legal system during periods when those judges believed that their Supreme Court was malfunctioning. Seeing a legal system as a shared cooperative activity allows us to best understand how legal decision-making can remain consistent when it contains elements at the highest level which are believed not to be functioning properly.
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  29.  4
    David van Mill (1998). The Voice of the People in the Legal Reasoning of Cass Sunstein. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):152-156.
    Cass Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997.
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  30. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin (2012). Demystifying Legal Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision (...)
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  31.  2
    Matthias Armgardt, Patrice Canivez & Sandrine Chassagnard-Pinet, Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic.
    This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning (...)
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  32. Ronald Dworkin (1998). Natural Law and Legal Reasoning. In Scott Brewer (ed.), Moral Theory and Legal Reasoning. Garland Pub.
     
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  33. Neil MacCormick (2009). Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford University Press Uk.
    When cases come before courts can we predict the outcome? Is legal reasoning rationally persuasive, working within a formal structure and using recognisable forms of arguments to produce predictable results? Or is legal reasoning mere 'rhetoric´in the pejorative sense, open to use, and abuse, to achieve whatever ends unscrupulous politicians, lawyers and judges desire? If the latter what becomes of the supposed security of living under the rule of law? This book tackles these questions by presenting (...)
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  34. Cass R. Sunstein (1996). Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning (...)
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  35. Cass R. Sunstein (1997). Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning (...)
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  36. Phoebe C. Ellsworth (2005). Legal Reasoning. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr 685--704.
     
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  37.  14
    Ronald K. Stamper (1991). The Role of Semantics in Legal Expert Systems and Legal Reasoning. Ratio Juris 4 (2):219-244.
    The consensus among legal philosophers is probably that rule-based legal expert systems leave much to be desired as aids in legal decision-making. Why? What can we do about it? A bureaucrat administering some set of complex rules will ascertain the facts and apply the rules to them in order to discover their consequences for the case in hand. This process of deductive reasoning is characteristically bureaucratic.
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  38.  14
    Julie C. van Camp (2007). How Religion Co-Opts Morality in Legal Reasoning. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):241-251.
    Some recent commentators have acquiesced in the efforts of some religious groups to co-opt concepts of morality, thus leading many—inappropriately, I believe—to think we must keep all morality out of our civic life and especially out of the reasoning in our legal system. I review examples of the confusion in characterizing the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision as a conflict between constitutional rights and religious moral precepts. I argue that this approach capitulates to particular views of morality as (...)
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  39.  3
    Julie C. Van Camp (2007). How Religion Co-Opts Morality in Legal Reasoning: A Case Study of Lawrence V. Texas. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):241-251.
    Some recent commentators have acquiesced in the efforts of some religious groups to co-opt concepts of morality, thus leading many—inappropriately, I believe—to think we must keep all morality out of our civic life and especially out of the reasoning in our legal system. I review examples of the confusion in characterizing the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision as a conflict between constitutional rights and religious moral precepts. I argue that this approach capitulates to particular views of morality as (...)
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  40.  8
    Pauline Westerman (2010). Arguing About Goals: The Diminishing Scope of Legal Reasoning. [REVIEW] Argumentation 24 (2):211-226.
    This article investigates the implications of goal-legislation for legal argumentation. In goal-regulation the legislator formulates the aims to be reached, leaving it to the norm-addressee to draft the necessary rules. On the basis of six types of hard cases, it is argued that in such a system there is hardly room for constructing a ratio legis. Legal interpretation is largely reduced to concretisation. This implies that legal argumentation tends to become highly dependent on expert (non-legal) knowledge.
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  41.  23
    Audun Jøsang & Viggo A. Bondi (2001). Legal Reasoning with Subjective Logic. Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (4):289-315.
    Judges and jurors must make decisions in an environment of ignoranceand uncertainty for example by hearing statements of possibly unreliable ordishonest witnesses, assessing possibly doubtful or irrelevantevidence, and enduring attempts by the opponents to manipulate thejudge''s and the jurors'' perceptions and feelings. Three importantaspects of decision making in this environment are the quantificationof sufficient proof, the weighing of pieces of evidence, and therelevancy of evidence. This paper proposes a mathematical frameworkfor dealing with the two first aspects, namely the quantification ofproof (...)
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  42.  25
    Scott Brewer (ed.) (1998). Evolution and Revolution in Theories of Legal Reasoning: Nineteenth Century Through the Present. Garland Pub..
    This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.Explores enduring questionsFocusing ...
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  43. Brussels World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy & Hubert Hubien (1971). Le Raisonnement Juridique. Legal Reasoning. Actes du Congrès Mondial de Philosophie du Droit Et de Philosophie Sociale, Bruxelles, 30 Aôut-3 Septembre 1971. Publiés Par Hubert Hubien. [REVIEW] E. Bruylant.
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  44.  61
    Barbara Baum Levenbook (1984). The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 3 (3):355 - 374.
    Many contemporary philosophers of law agree that a necessary condition for a decision to be legally justified, even in a hard case, is that it coheres with established law. Some, namely Sartorius and Dworkin, have gone beyond that relatively uncontroversial claim and described the role of coherence in legal justification as analogous to its role in moral and scientific justification, on contemporary theories. In this, I argue, they are mistaken. Specifically, coherence in legal justification is sometimes specific to (...)
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  45.  27
    Lothar Philipps & Giovanni Sartor (1999). Introduction: From Legal Theories to Neural Networks and Fuzzy Reasoning. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):115-128.
    Computational approaches to the law have frequently been characterized as being formalistic implementations of the syllogistic model of legal cognition: using insufficient or contradictory data, making analogies, learning through examples and experiences, applying vague and imprecise standards. We argue that, on the contrary, studies on neural networks and fuzzy reasoning show how AI & law research can go beyond syllogism, and, in doing that, can provide substantial contributions to the law.
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  46.  13
    Vern R. Walker, Nathaniel Carie, Courtney C. DeWitt & Eric Lesh (2011). A Framework for the Extraction and Modeling of Fact-Finding Reasoning From Legal Decisions: Lessons From the Vaccine/Injury Project Corpus. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 19 (4):291-331.
    This article describes the Vaccine/Injury Project Corpus, a collection of legal decisions awarding or denying compensation for health injuries allegedly due to vaccinations, together with models of the logical structure of the reasoning of the factfinders in those cases. This unique corpus provides useful data for formal and informal logic theory, for natural-language research in linguistics, and for artificial intelligence research. More importantly, the article discusses lessons learned from developing protocols for manually extracting the logical structure and generating (...)
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  47. Giovanni Sartor (2012). Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning. In Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti (eds.), The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility. Oxford University Press
     
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  48.  12
    Richard Warner (2005). Adjudication and Legal Reasoning. In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Pub. 259--270.
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  49.  35
    Hannu Tapani Klami, Johanna Sorvetulla & Minna Hatakka (1991). Evidence and Legal Reasoning: On the Intertwinement of the Probable and the Reasonable. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 10 (1):73 - 107.
    The facts to be proven in a lawsuit can be more or less probable. But the recognition of the relevant facts may require discretion or evaluative operations; moreover, a just and equitable interpretation of a contract may depend on what the contracting parties knew about the intentions of each other. Can, e.g., negligence be more or less probable? Can Ought be proven? There is, however, a structural similarity between legal interpretation and the evalution of evidence and not only an (...)
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  50.  30
    Jacky Legrand (1999). Some Guidelines for Fuzzy Sets Application in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (2-3):235-257.
    As an introduction to our work, we emphasize the parallel interpretation of abstract tools and the concepts of undetermined and vague information. Imprecision, uncertainty and their relationships are inspected. Suitable interpretations of the fuzzy sets theory are applied to legal phenomena in an attempt to clearly circumscribe the possible applications of the theory. The fundamental notion of reference sets is examined in detail, hence highlighting their importance. A systematic and combinatorial classification of the relevant subsets of the legal (...)
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