9 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Lei Zhong
Profile: Leila Zhong
  1. Lei Zhong (forthcoming). Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation. Erkenntnis:1-13.
    In Zhong (Philos Phenomenol Res 83:129–147, 2011; Analysis 72:75–85, 2012), I argued that, contrary to what many people might expect, the counterfactual theory of causation will generate (rather than solve) the exclusion problem. Recently some philosophers raise an incisive objection to this argument. They contend that my argument fails as it equivocates between different notions of a physical realizer (see Christensen and Kallestrup in Analysis 72:513–517, 2012). However, I find that their criticism doesn’t threaten the central idea of my view. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Lei Zhong (2014). 'Moral Perception', by Audi, Robert. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):585-587.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Yingying Tang & Lei Zhong (2013). Toward a Demystification of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Forum 44 (2):149-163.
    The opponents of egalitarianism insist that distributional equality can never have intrinsic value, because it is hard to find how equal distribution could benefit people intrinsically. In this paper, we attempt to demystify the intrinsic value of distributional equality and suggest a possible direction of vindicating egalitarianism. First, we propose the principle that it is (epistemically) reasonable to regard x as an intrinsic value for a person S if S rationally desires x for its own sake. Second, we argue by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Lei Zhong (2013). Internalism, Emotionism, and the Psychopathy Challenge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4):329-337.
  5. Lei Zhong (2013). Psychopathy, Emotion, and Moral Judgment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4):349-352.
  6. Lei Zhong (2012). An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism. Theoria 78 (4):309-325.
    It is generally believed that moral reductionism is immune from notorious problems in moral metaphysics and epistemology, such as the problem of moral explanation – it is at least on this dimension that moral reductionism scores better than moral anti-reductionism. However, in this article I reject this popular view. First, I argue that moral reductionism fails to help vindicate the explanatory efficacy of moral properties because the reductionist solution is either circular or otiose. Second, I attempt to show that a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lei Zhong (2012). Counterfactuals, Regularity and the Autonomy Approach. Analysis 72 (1):75-85.
    Many philosophers insist that the most plausible solution to the exclusion problem is to adopt the so-called ‘autonomy approach’, which denies either upward or downward causation between mental and physical properties. But the question of whether the autonomy approach is compatible with respectable theories of causation has seldom been discussed in the literature. This paper considers two influential theories of causation, the counterfactual account and the regularity account. I argue that neither the counterfactual theory nor the regularity theory can support (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lei Zhong (2011). A Unificationist Vindication of Moral Explanation. Philosophical Forum 42 (2):131-146.
    There are two putative disanalogies between moral explanations and other sorts of higher-order explanations. First, moral properties epistemically depend on their non-normative base properties. Some might thus argue that the explanatory role of moral properties entirely derive from the role of non-normative base properties. Second, moral explanations seem to be characteristically mediated by our moral beliefs, attitudes, and sensibilities, etc., in a way in which most higher-order explanations are not. It could thus be argued that alleged moral explanations are just (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lei Zhong (2011). Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):129-147.
    A quite popular approach to solving the Causal Exclusion Problem is to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation. In this paper, I distinguish three versions of the Causal Exclusion Argument. I argue that the counterfactualist approach can block the first two exclusion arguments, because the Causal Inheritance Principle and the Upward Causation Principle upon which the two arguments are based respectively are problematic from the perspective of the counterfactual account of causation. However, I attempt to show that the counterfactualist approach (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation