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  1. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2013). Voluntary Rehabilitation? On Neurotechnological Behavioural Treatment, Valid Consent and (In)Appropriate Offers. Neuroethics 6 (1):65-77.
    Criminal offenders may be offered to participate in voluntary rehabilitation programs aiming at correcting undesirable behaviour, as a condition of early release. Behavioural treatment may include direct intervention into the central nervous system (CNS). This article discusses under which circumstances voluntary rehabilitation by CNS intervention is justified. It is argued that although the context of voluntary rehabilitation is a coercive circumstance, consent may still be effective, in the sense that it can meet formal criteria for informed consent. Further, for a (...)
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  2. Andrew Altman, Michael Barnhart, Avner Baz, David Benatar, Yitzhak Benbaji, Talia Bettcher, Brian Bix, Jeffrey Bland-Ballard & Lene Bomann-Larsen (2010). Referees for Volume 7. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7:541-542.
     
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  3. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2009). Revisionism and Desert. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
    Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all victims of causal luck , it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One (moderate) revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another (strong) revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all concepts of (...)
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  4. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2004). Licence to Kill? The Question of Just Vs. Unjust Combatants. Journal of Military Ethics 3 (2):142-160.
    This paper questions the moral foundations of the equal war-right to kill in international law. Although there seems to be a moral difference between fighting a just and unjust war, this need not reflect on our moral assessment of soldiers, since unjust combatants can be non-culpable by virtue of excuse. Under the aspect of immunity from blame, an equal war-right to kill is upheld, and belligerent equality restored among innocents. It must therefore be proven that innocent threats can be justifiably (...)
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