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  1. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2013). Reason Attribution Without Belief-Desire Ascription. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):157-180.
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  2. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...)
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  3. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
    In this paper, we take issue with the belief?desire model of second- and third-person action interpretation as it is presented by both theory theories and cognitivist versions of simulation theory. These accounts take action interpretation to consist in the (tacit) attribution of proper belief?desire pairs that mirror the structure of formally valid practical inferences. We argue that the belief?desire model rests on the unwarranted assumption that the interpreter can only reach the agent's practical context of action through inference. This assumption (...)
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  4. Leon C. de Bruin (2008). A New Story About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):263 – 271.
    I discuss the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) as a new approach to folk psychology, by highlighting some of the main differences between the NPH and so-called 'principled approaches' and elaborating on the importance of the distinction between intentional and propositional attitudes. Furthermore, I address the question whether reason explanations as understood by the NPH constitute a distinctive and autonomous kind of explanation.
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