Search results for 'Leonor Moral Soriano' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Leonor Moral Soriano (2003). A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A Model for the European Court of Justice. Ratio Juris 16 (3):296-323.score: 870.0
  2. Leonor Moral Soriano (1998). The Use of Precedents as Arguments of Authority, Arguments Ab Exemplo, and Arguments of Reason in Civil Law Systems. Ratio Juris 11 (1):90-102.score: 870.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ramón Soriano (2011). La corrupción política: tipos, causas y remedios. Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 45:383 - 402.score: 160.0
    La corrupción política presenta diversas definiciones en la doctrina según se enmarque en términos legales estrictamente o abarque a supuestos de moral pública. De ahí deriva también la mayor o menor extensión del abanico de tipos de corrupción política y sus causas. Objetivo central del artículo es señalar y explicar los remedios para la aminoración de la corrupción política: la independencia y autonomía de los poderes públicos, la conciencia y práctica de la moral pública ciudadana, la asunción de (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Uri D. Leibowitz (2014). Explaining Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.score: 27.0
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.score: 27.0
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.score: 27.0
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 27.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation. In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism.score: 27.0
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with moral (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 27.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.score: 27.0
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.score: 27.0
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.score: 27.0
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.score: 27.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 27.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 327-347.score: 27.0
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Anders Schinkel (2009). The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):267 - 277.score: 27.0
    Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.score: 27.0
    P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.score: 27.0
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Andrea Viggiano (2008). Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224.score: 27.0
    In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.score: 27.0
    It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469 - 484.score: 27.0
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.score: 27.0
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.score: 27.0
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.score: 27.0
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.score: 27.0
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Thaddeus Metz (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.score: 27.0
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jurriaan De Haan (2001). The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.score: 27.0
    This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Philip Nickel (2001). Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.score: 27.0
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Peter Schulte (2012). The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.score: 27.0
    Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.score: 27.0
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alfred R. Mele (2009). Moral Responsibility and History Revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.score: 27.0
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.score: 27.0
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Matt King & Peter Carruthers (2012). Moral Responsibility and Consciousness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.score: 27.0
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, in contrast, have aimed to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369 - 388.score: 27.0
    In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agentcentered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Michael J. Zimmerman (2006). On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.score: 27.0
    This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Edward McClennen (2010). Rational Choice and Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):521-540.score: 27.0
    Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Neil Levy (2009). Empirically Informed Moral Theory: A Sketch of the Landscape. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):3 - 8.score: 27.0
    This introduction to the special issue on empirically informed moral theory sketches the more important contributions to the field in the past several years. Attention is paid to experimental philosophy, the work of philosophers like Harman and Doris, and that of psychologists like Haidt and Hauser.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Usable Moral Principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.score: 27.0
    One prominent strand in contemporary moral particularism concerns the claim of "principle abstinence" that we ought not to rely on moral principles in moral judgment because they fail to provide adequate moral guidance. I argue that moral generalists can vindicate this traditional and important action-guiding role for moral principles. My strategy is to argue, first, that, for any conscientious and morally committed agent, the agent's acceptance of (true) moral principles shapes their responsiveness to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Maria Antonaccio (2001). Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):127-141.score: 27.0
    This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch''s moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Marion Hourdequin (2012). Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.score: 27.0
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Logi Gunnarsson (2008). The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):305 - 326.score: 27.0
    The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.score: 27.0
    According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the resources to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Edmund Wall (2012). The Real Direction of Dancy's Moral Particularism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):587-612.score: 27.0
    Jonathan Dancy, who defends a version of moral particularism, is committed to the view that any feature or reason for action might, in logical terms, have a positive moral valence in one context, a negative moral valence in a different context, and no moral valence at all in yet another context. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that, despite the denial by Dancy that proposed grounding properties with invariant moral valences may play a foundational (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jens Timmermann (2007). Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):167-182.score: 27.0
    What is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice . Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.score: 27.0
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Michael Cholbi (2007). Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):323-334.score: 27.0
    Philosophers have harbored doubts about the possibility of moral expertise since Plato. I argue that irrespective of whether moral experts exist, identifying who those experts are is insurmountable because of the credentials problem: Moral experts have no need to seek out others’ moral expertise, but moral non-experts lack sufficient knowledge to determine whether the advice provided by a putative moral expert in response to complex moral situations is correct and hence whether an individual (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Wim Dubbink & Jeffery Smith (2011). A Political Account of Corporate Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):223-246.score: 27.0
    Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens’ moral entitlements. This political account posits (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Patricia Marino (2010). Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.score: 27.0
    This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Rebecca Lynn Stangl (2006). Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201 - 229.score: 27.0
    According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Gerald Lang (2009). Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):317-338.score: 27.0
    In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by Elizabeth Anderson, Jonathan Wolff, and others.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000