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Joseph Levine [64]James Levine [24]J. Levine [10]Joseph M. Levine [7]
J. M. Levine [3]Joseph R. Levine [2]Joe Levine [1]James P. Levine [1]

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Profile: Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
  1.  81
    Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the "explanatory gap," the fact that we can't explain (...)
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  2.  36
    Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze. Oxford University Press.
    In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ...
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  3. Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
  4. Joseph Levine (2010). Demonstrative Thought. Mind and Language 25 (2):169-195.
    In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the (...)
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  5. Joseph Levine (1993). On Leaving Out What It's Like. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
     
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  6. Joseph Levine (1993). On Leaving Out What It's Like. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press 543--557.
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  7. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1997). Reduction with Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.
  8. Joseph Levine (2006). Conscious Awareness and Representation. In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. The MIT Press 173--198.
  9. Joseph Levine (1998). Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind. Noûs 32 (4):449-480.
  10. Joseph Levine (2010). The Q Factor: Modal Rationalism Versus Modal Autonomism. Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
    Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. (...)
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  11. Joseph Levine (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press
  12. Joseph Levine (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
  13. Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon (2009). The Modal Status of Materialism. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.
    Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian (...)
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  14.  31
    Joseph Levine (2015). Phenomenal Intentionality, Edited by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (495):924-927.
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  15. Joseph M. Levine (2005). Intellectual History as History. Journal of the History of Ideas 66 (2):189-200.
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  16. A. N. Perret-Clermont, J. F. Perret, N. Bell, L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine & S. D. Teasley (1991). Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition. In Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D. (eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition. American Psychological Association
     
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  17.  57
    Joseph Levine (2014). Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):775-784.
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  18. Joseph M. Levine (2003). Matter of Fact in the English Revolution. Journal of the History of Ideas 64 (2):317-335.
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  19. Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
    In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet (...)
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  20.  30
    Joseph Levine (2011). On the Phenomenology of Thought. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press 103.
  21.  50
    James Levine (2002). Analysis and Decomposition in Frege and Russell. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216.
    Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: 'analysis', which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and 'decomposition', which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate 'analysis' into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct 'decompositions', no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. I argue (...)
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  22. Joseph Levine (2003). Experience and Representation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
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  23. Joseph Levine (1995). On What It is Like to Grasp a Concept. Philosophical Issues 6:38-43.
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  24. Joseph Levine (2010). Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.
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  25.  38
    Joseph Levine (1991). Cool Red. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
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  26.  79
    Thomas Ricketts & James Levine (1996). Logic and Truth in Frege. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70:121 - 175.
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  27.  7
    Joseph Levine (2007). Two Kinds of Access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.
    I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
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  28.  41
    Joseph Levine (1994). Out of the Closet: A Qualophile Confronts Qualophobia. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):107-126.
  29. James Levine (2013). 1 Berkeley's Master Argument and Prior's Analysis. In Peter Sullivan Michael Potter (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus. History and Interpretation. OUP 170.
     
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  30. Joseph Levine (2004). Review: Consciousness and Cognition. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):596-599.
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  31.  49
    Joseph Levine (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  32. J. Levine (2008). Review: Daniel Stoljar: Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (465):228-231.
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  33.  57
    James Levine (2004). On the "Gray's Elegy" Argument and its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
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  34. Joseph Levine (2003). Knowing What It's Like. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate
  35.  7
    James Levine (forthcoming). Prior, Berkeley, and the Barcan Formula. Synthese:1-15.
    This paper presents structural similarities and historical connections between Prior ’s rejection of the Barcan formula and his critique of Berkeley’s master argument for idealism in his 1955 paper “Berkeley in Logical Form”. Making use of Mackie’s paper “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, it concludes with some suggestions concerning what is at stake in the debate between Prior and Berkeley and in structurally similar debates such as whether to accept the Barcan formula.
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  36.  47
    J. Levine (2008). Demonstrative Concepts. Croation Journal of Philosophy 8 (24):328-336.
    Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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  37.  16
    Joseph Levine (1999). Philosophy as Massage: Seeking Relief From Conscious Tension. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):159-78.
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  38.  10
    Joseph Levine (1997). Are Qualia Just Representations? Mind and Language 12 (1):101-13.
  39.  76
    James Levine (1998). Acquaintance, Denoting Concepts, and Sense. Philosophical Review 107 (3):415-445.
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  40. Joseph Levine (1988). Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited. Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
  41.  16
    James Levine (2003). The Metaphysicians of Meaning. Dialogue 42 (1):145-147.
  42.  46
    Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in Mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
  43.  1
    Joseph Levine (1999). Philosophy as Massage: Seeking Cognitive Relief for Conscious Tension. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):159-178.
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  44.  53
    Joseph Levine (1993). Intentional Chemistry. In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi 103-134.
    This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments (...)
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  45.  13
    Joseph Levine (1995). Qualia: Intrinsic, Relational, or What? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh 277--292.
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  46.  91
    Joseph Levine, Comments on Melnyk's A Physicalist Manifesto.
  47.  28
    Joseph Levine (2010). Out of the Closet. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):107-126.
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  48. Joseph Levine (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and the First-Person. Psyche 7 (10).
    Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from what it's like to have it. (...)
     
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  49. Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1991). The Nomic and the Robust. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
     
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  50. Joseph Levine (2003). Materialism and Qualia. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. OUP Oxford
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