Search results for 'Levy Rahmani' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Levy Rahmani (1973). Social Psychology in the Soviet Union. Studies in East European Thought 13 (3-4):218-250.score: 240.0
    Following the evolution of Soviet social psychology is rewarding not only in itself but also for the light it throws on current events and trends in contemporary Soviet philosophy in general.
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  2. Neil Levy & Yasuko Kitano (2011). We're All Folk: An Interview with Neil Levy About Experimental Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:87-98.score: 210.0
    The following is a transcript of the interview I (Yasuko Kitano) conducted with Neil Levy (The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, CAPPE) on the 23rd in July 2009, while he was in Tokyo to give a series of lectures on neuroethics at The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy. I edited his words for publication with his approval.
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  3. Nerys Levy (2005). My Husband, Bob Levy. Ethos 33 (4):433-434.score: 180.0
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  4. Sharon Levy (2011). Response From Levy. Bioscience 61 (4):253-253.score: 180.0
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  5. Robert I. Levy (2005). Ethnography, Comparison, and Changing Times. Ethos 33 (4):435-458.score: 90.0
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  6. Zeev Levy (1974). On the Concept of Reason According to Sartre and Levi-Strauss. Philosophia 4 (4):567-568.score: 80.0
  7. Ze'ev Levy (1998). Claude Lévi-Strauss' Structural Anthropology and Mythology as Ultimate Meaning. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 21 (2):135-143.score: 80.0
     
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  8. Albert Levy (1998). Luis Prieto, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and the Lessons of Phonology. Semiotica 122 (3-4):233-240.score: 80.0
  9. Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to (...)
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  10. Donald Levy (1996). Freud Among the Philosophers: The Psychoanalytic Unconscious and its Philosophical Critics. Yale University Press.score: 60.0
    In this highly original book, Donald Levy considers the most important and persuasive of these philosophical criticisms, as articulated by four figures: Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Adolf Grunbaum.
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  11. Neil Levy (2007). The Social: A Missing Term in the Debate Over Addiction and Voluntary Control. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):35 – 36.score: 60.0
    The author comments on the article “The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman’s article suggests that addicted individuals have impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author agrees with Hyman’s view that addiction weakens the addict’s ability to align his actions with his judgments. The author states that neuroethics may focus on brains and highlight key aspects of behavior but we still risk missing explanatory elements. Accession Number: 24077912; Authors: Levy, Neil (...)
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  12. John Levy (2004/1970). The Nature of Man According to the Vedanta. Sentient Publications.score: 60.0
    You will find this book to be one of the finest expositions of non-dualist philosophy, John Levy--an English mystic, teacher, and artist--uses Advaita's...
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  13. Jacob T. Levy (2008). Self-Determination, Non-Domination, and Federalism. Hypatia 23 (3):pp. 60-78.score: 60.0
    This article summarizes the theory of federalism as non-domination Iris Marion Young began to develop in her final years, a theory of self-government that tried to recognize interconnectedness. Levy also poses an objection to that theory: non-domination cannot do the work Young needed of it, because it is a theory about the merits of decisions not about jurisdiction over them. The article concludes with an attempt to give Young the last word.
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  14. Neil Levy (2014). Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
    Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.
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  15. Catherine Levy (1997). La journée du 8 mars 1965 à Alger. Clio 1:11-11.score: 60.0
    Ce témoignage écrit est le récit d'un 8 mars, très particulier, dans un pays aujourd'hui déchiré par la guerre civile, l'Algérie. Catherine Lévy a enseigné de 1962 à 1965 en tant que « pied-rouge » : on désignait ainsi les Français et les Françaises qui sont partis en Algérie après l'indépendance pour aider à la construction de l'Algérie nouvelle. Professeur au Collège Ben Cheneb à Alger, elle était militante à l'UGTA de Bab-El-Oued et a participé à la manifestation qu'elle décrit (...)
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  16. Ze’ev Levy (2006). Emmanuel Lévinas and Structuralism. Veritas 51 (2).score: 40.0
    O estruturalismo alcançou seu zênite de influência no pensamento francês nos anos 60 e 70 do século XX, quando Lévinas escreveu os seus livros mais importantes. Gostaria, portanto, de examinar sua concepção das implicações filosóficas desta corrente teorético-metodológica, cujo impacto nas sciences humaines quase não deixou nenhum pensador francês indiferente na época. Lévinas acusou o estruturalismo de não passar de uma ilusão, na medida em que sua espontaneidade subjetiva faz com que impulsos e instintos sejam descritos como valores da razão (...)
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  17. Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.score: 30.0
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...)
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  18. Arnon Levy (2011). Information in Biology: A Fictionalist Account. Noûs 45 (4):640-657.score: 30.0
  19. Neil Levy (2009). Neuroethics: Ethics and the Sciences of the Mind. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):69-81.score: 30.0
    Neuroethics is a rapidly growing subfield, straddling applied ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of mind. It has clear affinities to bioethics, inasmuch as both are responses to new developments in science and technology, but its scope is far broader and more ambitious because neuroethics is as much concerned with how the sciences of the mind illuminate traditional philosophical questions as it is with questions concerning the permissibility of using technologies stemming from these sciences. In this article, I sketch the two (...)
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  20. Neil Levy (2003). What (If Anything) is Wrong with Bestiality? Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):444–456.score: 30.0
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  21. Neil Levy (2007). The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.score: 30.0
    The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral (...)
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  22. Arnon Levy (2011). Game Theory, Indirect Modeling, and the Origin of Morality. Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):171-187.score: 30.0
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  23. Tim Bayne & Neil Levy (2005). Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.score: 30.0
    In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had (...)
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  24. Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.score: 30.0
    I develop an account of weakness of the will that is driven by experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology. I will argue that this account demonstrates that there is no such thing as weakness of the will: no psychological kind corresponds to it. Instead, weakness of the will ought to be understood as depletion of System II resources. Neither the explanatory purposes of psychology nor our practical purposes as agents are well-served by retaining the concept. I therefore suggest that (...)
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  25. Neil Levy (2006). Autonomy and Addiction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.score: 30.0
  26. Neil Levy (2007). Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3-11.score: 30.0
    The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are (...)
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  27. Neil Levy, The Luck Problem for Compatibilists.score: 30.0
    Libertarianism in all its varieties is widely taken to be vulnerable to a serious problem of present luck, inasmuch as it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to action. Genuine indeterminism entails luck, and lack of control over the ensuing action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is generally taken to be free of the problem of present luck, inasmuch as it does not require indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a (...)
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  28. Neil Levy (2009). Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick. Ethics 119 (4):729-741.score: 30.0
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  29. Neil Levy & Julian Savulescu (2009). Moral Significance of Phenomenal Consciousness. Progress in Brain Research.score: 30.0
    Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...)
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  30. Neil Levy (2007). Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 155 (1):127 - 155.score: 30.0
    Doxastic responsibility matters, morally and epistemologically. Morally, because many of our intuitive ascriptions of blame seem to track back to agents’ apparent responsibility for beliefs; epistemologically because some philosophers identify epistemic justification with deontological permissibility. But there is a powerful argument which seems to show that we are rarely or never responsible for our beliefs, because we cannot control them. I examine various possible responses to this argument, which aim to show either that doxastic responsibility does not require that we (...)
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  31. Neil Levy (2003). Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):284-304.score: 30.0
    A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy.I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious.I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches.This important opposition accounts for all (...)
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  32. Neil Levy (2002). Virtual Child Pornography: The Eroticization of Inequality. Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4):319-323.score: 30.0
    The United States Supreme Court hasrecently ruled that virtual child pornographyis protected free speech, partly on the groundsthat virtual pornography does not harm actualchildren. I review the evidence for thecontention that virtual pornography might harmchildren, and find that it is, at best,inconclusive. Saying that virtual childpornography does not harm actual children isnot to say that it is completely harmless,however. Child pornography, actual or virtual,necessarily eroticizes inequality; in a sexistsociety it therefore contributes to thesubordination of women.
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  33. Neil Levy, Why Frankfurt-Style Cases Don't Help (Much).score: 30.0
    Frankfurt-style cases are widely taken to show that agents do not need alternative possibilities to be morally responsible for their actions. Many philosophers take these cases to constitute a powerful argument for compatibilism: if we do not need alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, it is hard to see what the attraction of indeterminism might be. I defend the claim that even though Frankfurt-style cases establish that agents can be responsible for their actions despite lacking alternatives, agents can only be responsible (...)
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  34. Neil Levy (2006). Addiction, Autonomy and Ego-Depletion: A Response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu. Bioethics 20 (1):16–20.score: 30.0
  35. Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.score: 30.0
    Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content.
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  36. Ken Levy (2009). On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.score: 30.0
    Gregory Kavka's 'Toxin Puzzle' suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter-preferential action A even if I have a strong self-interested reason to form this intention. The 'Rationalist Solution,' however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter-preferential, A-ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A-ing itself: the 'Self-Promise Argument' and David Gauthier's (...)
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  37. Neil Levy (2006). Cognitive Scientific Challenges to Morality. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.score: 30.0
    Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I (...)
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  38. Neil Levy (2004). Book Review: Understanding Blindness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):315-324.score: 30.0
  39. Neil Levy (2004). Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility. Ratio 17 (3):294-311.score: 30.0
    The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic (...)
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  40. Arnon Levy (2009). Explaining What? Review of Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience by Carl F. Craver. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).score: 30.0
    Carl Craver’s recent book offers an account of the explanatory and theoretical structure of neuroscience. It depicts it as centered around the idea of achieving mechanistic understanding, i.e., obtaining knowledge of how a set of underlying components interacts to produce a given function of the brain. Its core account of mechanistic explanation and relevance is causal-manipulationist in spirit, and offers substantial insight into casual explanation in brain science and the associated notion of levels of explanation. However, the focus on mechanistic (...)
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  41. Philip P. Hanson & Edwin Levy (1982). Book Review:The Scientific Image Bas C. Van Fraassen. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 49 (2):290-.score: 30.0
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  42. Neil Levy (2005). Downshifting and Meaning in Life. Ratio 18 (2):176–189.score: 30.0
    So-called downshifters seek more meaningful lives by decreasing the amount of time they devote to work, leaving more time for the valuable goods of friendship, family and personal development. But though these are indeed meaning-conferring activities, they do not have the right structure to count as superlatively meaningful. Only in work – of a certain kind – can superlative meaning be found. It is by active engagements in projects, which are activities of the right structure, dedicated to the achievement of (...)
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  43. Neil Levy (2009). Empirically Informed Moral Theory: A Sketch of the Landscape. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):3 - 8.score: 30.0
    This introduction to the special issue on empirically informed moral theory sketches the more important contributions to the field in the past several years. Attention is paid to experimental philosophy, the work of philosophers like Harman and Doris, and that of psychologists like Haidt and Hauser.
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  44. Neil Levy (2008). Introducing Neuroethics. Neuroethics 1 (1):1-8.score: 30.0
  45. Neil Levy (2009). Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.score: 30.0
    Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, by contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of (...)
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  46. Neil Levy (2008). Does Phenomenology Overflow Access? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):29-38.score: 30.0
    Ned Block has influentially distinguished two kinds of consciousness, access and phenomenal consciousness. He argues that these two kinds of consciousness can dissociate, and therefore we cannot rely upon subjective report in constructing a science of consciousness. I argue that none of Block's evidence better supports his claim than the rival view, that access and phenomenal consciousness are perfectly correlated. Since Block's view is counterintuitive, and has wildly implausible implications, the fact that there is no evidence that better supports it (...)
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  47. Donald Levy (2003). How to Psychoanalyze a Robot: Unconscious Cognition and the Evolution of Intentionality. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):203-212.score: 30.0
    According to a common philosophical distinction, the `original' intentionality, or `aboutness' possessed by our thoughts, beliefs and desires, is categorically different from the `derived' intentionality manifested in some of our artifacts –- our words, books and pictures, for example. Those making the distinction claim that the intentionality of our artifacts is `parasitic' on the `genuine' intentionality to be found in members of the former class of things. In Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, Daniel Dennett criticizes that claim (...)
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  48. Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.score: 30.0
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  49. Neil Levy (2004). Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.score: 30.0
    According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately (...)
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  50. Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.score: 30.0
    Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then (...)
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