4 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Lewis Powell (State University of New York, Buffalo)
  1. Lewis Powell (2014). Hume's Treatment of Denial in the Treatise. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (26).
    David Hume fancied himself the Newton of the mind, aiming to reinvent the study of human mental life in the same way that Newton had revolutionized physics. And it was his view that the novel account of belief he proposed in his Treatise of Human Nature was one of that work’s central philosophical contributions. From the earliest responses to the Treatise forward, however, there was deep pessimism about the prospects for his account. It is easy to understand the source of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Lewis Powell (2013). Conceiving Without Concepts: Reid Vs. The Way of Ideas. Protosociology 30:221-237.
    Thomas Reid is notorious for rejecting the orthodox theory of conception (OTC), according to which conceiving of an object involves a mental relationship to an idea of that object. In this paper, I examine the question of what this rejection amounts to, when we limit our attention to bare conception (rather than the more widely discussed case of perception). I present some of the purported advantages of OTC, and assess whether they provide a genuine basis for preferring OTC to a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Lewis Powell (2013). How To Avoid Mis-Reiding Hume's Maxim Of Conceivability. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):105-119.
    In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers a barrage of objections to the view, held by David Hume, that conceivability implies possibility. In this paper, I present Reid's first two objections to the ‘maxim of conceivability’ and defend Hume from them. The first objection concerns our ability to understand impossible claims, while the second concerns thoughts about impossible claims (such as, for instance, the thought that they are impossible). Reid's objections have special force against Hume (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Lewis Powell (2012). How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie , but not to the English sentence London is pretty , both of which he understands perfectly well. The (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation