16 found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (forthcoming). Three Misconceptions Concerning Strong Embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Liam P. Dempsey (2014). Newtonian Idealism: Matter, Perception, and the Divine Will. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):86-112.
    This paper investigates Isaac Newton's rather unique account of God's relation to matter. According to this account, corpuscles depend on a substantially omnipresent God endowing quantities of objective space with the qualities of shape, solidity, the unfaltering tendency to move in accord with certain laws, and—significantly—the power to interact with created minds. I argue that there are important similarities and differences between Newton's account of matter and Berkeley's idealism. And while the role played by the divine will might at first (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (2013). Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):590-617.
    In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature’s mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Liam P. Dempsey (2012). Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience. Dialogue 51 (3):373-395.
    In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Liam P. Dempsey (2011). 'A Compound Wholly Mortal' : Locke and Newton on the Metaphysics of (Personal) Immortality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):241-264.
    In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Liam P. Dempsey (2010). Alexander Batthyany and Avshalom Elitzur, Eds. Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 28 (4):240-243.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Liam P. Dempsey (2010). An Early'sensation-Based'argument for Dualism. Locke Studies 10:159-177.
    This paper considers a seventeenth century argument for (substance) dualism propounded by Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth that appeals to the nature of secondary qualities or sensations. I argue that, despite the widespread acceptance of the primary/secondary quality distinction, this argument is relatively unique for its time since seventeenth century arguments for dualism generally appeal, not to sensory qualities, but to thought, language, rationality, and volition. Indeed, for many, sensations are the most embodied of mental phenomena. I draw points of comparison (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Liam P. Dempsey (2010). Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (4):301-304.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Liam P. Dempsey & Byron Stoyles (2010). Comfort in Annihilation: Three Studies in Materialism and Mortality. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1).
    This paper considers three accounts of the relationship between personal immortality and materialism. In particular, the pagan mortalism of the Epicureans is compared with the Christian mortalism of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It is argued 1) that there are significant similarities between these views, 2) that Locke and Hobbes were, to some extent, influenced by the Epicureans, and 3) that the relation between (im)mortality and (im)materialism is not as straightforward as is commonly supposed.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Liam P. Dempsey (2009). Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography. Philosophy in Review 29 (4):301.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Liam P. Dempsey (2009). Thinking-Matter Then and Now: The Evolution of Mind-Body Dualism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (1):43 - 61.
    Since the seventeenth century, mind-body dualism has undergone an evolution, both in its metaphysics and its supporting arguments. In particular, debates in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England prepared the way for the fall of substance dualism—the view that the human mind is an immaterial substance capable of independent existence—and the rise of a much less radical property dualism. The evolution from the faltering plausibility of substance dualism to the growing appeal of property dualism depended on at least two factors. On the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Liam P. Dempsey (2006). Written in the Flesh: Isaac Newton on the Mind–Body Relation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):420-441.
    Isaac Newton’s views on the mind–body relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mind–body monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the power by which we move our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Liam P. Dempsey (2004). Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl’s “twofold-access theory,” is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although twofold-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way “eliminates” conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Liam P. Dempsey (2002). Chalmers' Fading and Dancing Qualla. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
    It has become popular to distinguish between phenomenal and non-phenomenal kinds of mentality and consciousness, for example, phenomenal and functional kinds of consciousness, or qualia and cognition. As Chalmers has so famously suggested, explaining mental phenomena like functionally “conscious” states constitutes some of the “easy problems” in philosophy of mind; explaining phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, is the “hard problem.” One difficulty with this distinction is that it leaves open the nomological possibility of systems (“phenomenal zombies”) which are conscious (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation