Search results for 'Liar paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael Glanzberg (2004). A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which (...)
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  2. Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
    Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes.
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  3.  55
    Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (1):18-28.
    Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 , 189–218] or else it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ (...)
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  4. William Mark Stuckey, Michael Silbserstein & Michael Cifone (2008). Reconciling Spacetime and the Quantum: Relational Blockworld and the Quantum Liar Paradox. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 38 (4):348-383.
    The Relational Blockworld (RBW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) is introduced. Accordingly, the spacetime of NRQM is a relational, non-separable blockworld whereby spatial distance is only defined between interacting trans-temporal objects. RBW is shown to provide a novel statistical interpretation of the wavefunction that deflates the measurement problem, as well as a geometric account of quantum entanglement and non-separability that satisfies locality per special relativity and is free of interpretative mystery. We present RBW’s acausal and adynamical resolution of the (...)
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  5.  28
    Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) (2008). Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Springer.
    This volume includes a target paper, taking up the challenge to revive, within a modern (formal) framework, a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox which did ...
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  6.  29
    Mark Pinder (2015). The Cognitivist Account of Meaning and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1221-1242.
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar (...)
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  7.  6
    Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2015). Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox. In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Netherlands 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the (...)
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  8.  60
    Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert & Sonja Smets (1999). The Liar-Paradox in a Quantum Mechanical Perspective. Foundations of Science 4 (2):115-132.
    In this paper we concentrate on the nature of the liar paradox asa cognitive entity; a consistently testable configuration of properties. We elaborate further on a quantum mechanical model (Aerts, Broekaert and Smets, 1999) that has been proposed to analyze the dynamics involved, and we focus on the interpretation and concomitant philosophical picture. Some conclusions we draw from our model favor an effective realistic interpretation of cognitive reality.
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  9.  19
    Björn Lundgren (2015). The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition. Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):323-327.
    In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition.
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  10.  57
    Simon Evnine, ''Every Proposition Asserts Itself to Be True'': A Buridanian Solution to the Liar Paradox?
    In this paper, I try to understand what Buridan means when he suggests that "every proposition, by its very form, signifies or asserts itself to be true." I show how one way of construing this claim - that every proposition is in fact a conjunction one conjunct of which asserts the truth of the whole conjunction - does lead to a resolution of the Liar paradox, as Buridan says, and moreover is not vulnerable to the criticism on the (...)
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  11. Robert L. Martin (ed.) (1984). Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12.  77
    J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is (...)
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  13.  38
    Ming Hsiung (2013). Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's Paradox and the Liar. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31.
    It is proved that Yablo’s paradox and the Liar paradox are equiparadoxical, in the sense that their paradoxicality is based upon exactly the same circularity condition—for any frame ${\mathcal{K}}$ , the following are equivalent: (1) Yablo’s sequence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (2) the Liar sentence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (3) ${\mathcal{K}}$ contains odd cycles. This result does not conflict with Yablo’s claim that his sequence is non-self-referential. Rather, it (...)
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  14.  20
    Avrum Stroll (1988). The Liar: What Paradox? [REVIEW] Argumentation 2 (1):63-75.
    Most philosophers believe that the Liar Paradox is semantical in character, and arises from difficulties in the predicate “true.” The author argues that the paradox is pragmatic, not semantic, and arises from violations of essential conditions that define statement-making speech acts. The author shows that his solution to the paradox will not only handle the classical Liar sentences that are “necessarily” or “intrinsically” paradoxical, but also sets of Kripke-sentences that are “contingently” paradoxical.
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  15. Matti Eklund (2007). The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (...)
     
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  16.  37
    Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridan's Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia (...)
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  17. Richard Heck (2012). A Liar Paradox. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) (...)
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  18. Richard Heck (2012). More on 'A Liar Paradox'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  19.  34
    Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence “This sentence is false.”.
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  20.  28
    Jordan Howard Sobel (2008). 'Hoist with His Owne Petar':1 on the Undoing of a Liar Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):115-145.
    Abstract: A Liar would express a proposition that is true and not true. A Liar Paradox would, per impossibile, demonstrate the reality of a Liar. To resolve a Liar Paradox it is sufficient to make out of its demonstration a reductio of the existence of the proposition that would be true and not true, and to "explain away" the charm of the paradoxical contrary demonstration. Persuasive demonstrations of the Liar Paradox in this (...)
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  21.  95
    Dale Jacquette (2010). Liar Paradox and Substitution Into Intensional Contexts. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.
    John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I proposein ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and itsexpression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker (...)
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  22.  95
    Patrick Greenough (2001). Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
    A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the (...) is that not all assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink)
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  23. Ahmed Alwishah & David Sanson (2009). The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World From the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries Ce. Vivarium (1):97-127.
    We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues (...)
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  24.  70
    Emil Badici (2008). The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
    In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to (...)
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  25.  48
    Richard Kenneth Atkins (2011). This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.
    Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the (...)
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  26.  45
    Sloman Aaron (1971). Tarski, Frege and the Liar Paradox. Philosophy 46 (176):133-.
    A.1. Some philosophers, including Tarski and Russell, have concluded from a study of various versions of the Liar Paradox ‘that there must be a hierarchy of languages, and that the words “true” and “false”, as applied to statements in any given language, are themselves words belonging to a language of higher order’. In his famous essay on truth Tarski claimed that ‘colloquial’ language is inconsistent as a result of its property of ‘universality’: that is, whatever can be said (...)
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  27.  5
    Robert L. Martin (ed.) (1970). The Paradox of the Liar. New Haven [Conn.]Yale University Press.
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  28.  18
    Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
    In this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons (...)
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  29.  15
    John Kearns (2007). An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):31-66.
    This paper uses the resources of illocutionary logic to provide a new understanding of the Liar Paradox. In the system of illocutionary logic of the paper, denials are irreducible counterparts of assertions; denial does not in every case amount to the same as the assertion of the negation of the statement that is denied. Both a Liar statement, (a) Statement (a) is not true, and the statement which it negates can correctly be denied; neither can correctly be (...)
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  30.  32
    Jan Broekaert, Diederik Aerts & Bart D’Hooghe (2006). The Generalised Liar Paradox: A Quantum Model and Interpretation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 11 (4):399-418.
    The formalism of abstracted quantum mechanics is applied in a model of the generalized Liar Paradox. Here, the Liar Paradox, a consistently testable configuration of logical truth properties, is considered a dynamic conceptual entity in the cognitive sphere (Aerts, Broekaert, & Smets, [Foundations of Science 1999, 4, 115–132; International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2000, 38, 3231–3239]; Aerts and colleagues[Dialogue in Psychology, 1999, 10; Proceedings of Fundamental Approachs to Consciousness, Tokyo ’99; Mind in Interaction]. Basically, the intrinsic (...)
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  31.  9
    Mark DelCogliano (2011). Origen and Basil of Caesarea on the Liar Paradox. Augustinianum 51 (2):349-365.
    Both Origen and Basil of Caesarea report that some people saw Ps. 115,2 LXX – “ I said in my alarm, ' Every human being is a liar ' ” -- as an expression of the Liar Paradox and formulated a version of the paradox based upon it. But Ps. 115,2 is actually not susceptible to the Liar paradox, despite Origen and Basil believing it to be so. Not realizing this, both sought to undermine (...)
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  32. Robert Charles Koons (1987). Analogues of the Liar Paradox in Systems of Epistemic Logic Representing Meta-Mathematical Reasoning and Strategic Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by (...)
     
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  33.  10
    A. I. Uemov (1977). The Liar Paradox and Methods for its Solution. Russian Studies in Philosophy 15 (4):92-106.
    There is no need to prove the significance to philosophy of the famous liar paradox. Attempts to solve it have not ceased over the course of many centuries, from hoary antiquity to our own day. The failure of attempts undertaken within the bounds of everyday, natural languages has led many philosophers, particularly of the positivist trend, to pessimistic conclusions with respect to the potentials of such languages. This is very clearly evident, for example, in the statement of A. (...)
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  34. Wojciech Żełaniec (2004). New Considerations on The 'Liar' Paradox. Filozofia Nauki 2.
    In this article the author argues that the 'Liar' Paradox sentence: "This sentence is false" is neither true nor false because it does not express any proposition or "Satz" in the sense of Bernard Bolzano. The difficulty left open is that by a similar line of reasoning also the sentence "This sentence is true" would not express any proposition, yet it is sometimes taken to be true (on the strength of a theorem by Loewe).
     
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  35. Andrew J. Hamilton (2002). The Liar Paradox, Self-Understanding, and Nietzschean Perspectivalism. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    The liar paradox in its simplest form is the following argument. Consider the sentence 'this sentence is false'; call that the "liar sentence". Suppose the liar sentence is true. Then, since it says it is false, the liar sentence is false. So our supposition that it is true was mistaken, and the liar sentence must be false. But that's precisely what the liar sentence says, so it is true after all. The liar (...)
     
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  36.  38
    Stephen Read (2009). Plural Signification and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):363 - 375.
    In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, (...)
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  37.  73
    Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). Lessons on Truth From Mediaeval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):58-78.
    Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of (...)
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  38.  41
    Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2009). Lessons on Sentential Meaning From Mediaeval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):682-704.
    Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of 'meanings', which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a (...)
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  39. Andre Chapuis (1993). Circularity, Truth, and the Liar Paradox. Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the (...)
     
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  40. JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg (2010). The Liar Paradox. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Csli
    The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...)
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  41. Charles Parsons (1974). The Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
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  42.  74
    Stephen Read (2002). The Liar Paradox From John Buridan Back to Thomas Bradwardine. Vivarium 40 (2):189-218.
  43. Jose Encarnacion Jr (1955). On Ushenko's Version of the Liar-Paradox. Mind 64 (253):99-100.
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  44. A. P. Ushenko (1957). An Addendum to the Note on the Liar-Paradox. Mind 66 (261):98.
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  45. Michael Glanzberg, The Liar Paradox for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The story goes that Epimenides, a Cretan, used to claim that all Cretans are always liars. Whether he knew it or not, this claim is odd. It is easy to see it is odd by asking if it is true or false. If it is true, then all Cretans, including Epimenides, are always liars, in which case what he said must be false. Thus, if what he says is true, it is false. Conversely, suppose what Epimenides said is false. Then (...)
     
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  46.  46
    Terence Parsons (1984). Assertion, Denial, and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
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  47.  63
    Hans G. Herzberger (1982). Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
  48.  37
    Petr Hájek, Jeff Paris & John Shepherdson (2000). The Liar Paradox and Fuzzy Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):339-346.
    Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying "x is true" and satisfying the "dequotation schema" $\varphi \equiv \text{Tr}(\bar{\varphi})$ for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.
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  49.  24
    Albert Visser (1989). Semantics and the Liar Paradox. Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
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  50.  81
    Michael Clark (1999). Recalcitrant Variants of the Liar Paradox. Analysis 59 (2):117–126.
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