Search results for 'Liar paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.score: 180.0
    One recently proposed solution to the Liar paradox is the contextual theory of truth. Tyler Burge (1979) argues that truth is an indexical notion and that the extension of the truth predicate shifts during Liar reasoning. A Liar sentence might be true in one context and false in another. To many, contextualism seems to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about the semantic paradoxes; this is especially due to its reliance on the so-called Revenge phenomenon. I, however, show (...)
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  2. Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.score: 180.0
    Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes.
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  3. Michael Glanzberg (2004). A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.score: 180.0
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which (...)
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  4. Simon Evnine, &Quot;every Proposition Asserts Itself to Be True&Quot;: A Buridanian Solution to the Liar Paradox?score: 180.0
    In this paper, I try to understand what Buridan means when he suggests that "every proposition, by its very form, signifies or asserts itself to be true." I show how one way of construing this claim - that every proposition is in fact a conjunction one conjunct of which asserts the truth of the whole conjunction - does lead to a resolution of the Liar paradox, as Buridan says, and moreover is not vulnerable to the criticism on the (...)
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  5. Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert & Sonja Smets (1999). The Liar-Paradox in a Quantum Mechanical Perspective. Foundations of Science 4 (2):115-132.score: 180.0
    In this paper we concentrate on the nature of the liar paradox asa cognitive entity; a consistently testable configuration of properties. We elaborate further on a quantum mechanical model (Aerts, Broekaert and Smets, 1999) that has been proposed to analyze the dynamics involved, and we focus on the interpretation and concomitant philosophical picture. Some conclusions we draw from our model favor an effective realistic interpretation of cognitive reality.
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  6. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (forthcoming). Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic:1-11.score: 180.0
    Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either (1) this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 (2), 189–218] or else (2) it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic (...)
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  7. Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo & Emmanuel Genot (eds.) (2008). Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Springer.score: 180.0
    This volume includes a target paper, taking up the challenge to revive, within a modern (formal) framework, a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox which did ...
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  8. William Mark Stuckey, Michael Silbserstein & Michael Cifone (2008). Reconciling Spacetime and the Quantum: Relational Blockworld and the Quantum Liar Paradox. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 38 (4):348-383.score: 180.0
    The Relational Blockworld (RBW) interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) is introduced. Accordingly, the spacetime of NRQM is a relational, non-separable blockworld whereby spatial distance is only defined between interacting trans-temporal objects. RBW is shown to provide a novel statistical interpretation of the wavefunction that deflates the measurement problem, as well as a geometric account of quantum entanglement and non-separability that satisfies locality per special relativity and is free of interpretative mystery. We present RBW’s acausal and adynamical resolution of the (...)
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  9. Björn Lundgren (forthcoming). The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi's RSDI Definition. Philosophy and Technology:1-5.score: 180.0
    In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition.
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  10. Mark Pinder (forthcoming). The Cognitivist Account of Meaning and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 180.0
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar (...)
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  11. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 162.0
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is (...)
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  12. Ming Hsiung (2013). Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's Paradox and the Liar. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31.score: 162.0
    It is proved that Yablo’s paradox and the Liar paradox are equiparadoxical, in the sense that their paradoxicality is based upon exactly the same circularity condition—for any frame ${\mathcal{K}}$ , the following are equivalent: (1) Yablo’s sequence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (2) the Liar sentence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (3) ${\mathcal{K}}$ contains odd cycles. This result does not conflict with Yablo’s claim that his sequence is non-self-referential. Rather, it (...)
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  13. Avrum Stroll (1988). The Liar: What Paradox? [REVIEW] Argumentation 2 (1):63-75.score: 162.0
    Most philosophers believe that the Liar Paradox is semantical in character, and arises from difficulties in the predicate “true.” The author argues that the paradox is pragmatic, not semantic, and arises from violations of essential conditions that define statement-making speech acts. The author shows that his solution to the paradox will not only handle the classical Liar sentences that are “necessarily” or “intrinsically” paradoxical, but also sets of Kripke-sentences that are “contingently” paradoxical.
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  14. Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridans Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.score: 150.0
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia (...)
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  15. Robert L. Martin (ed.) (1984). Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
     
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  16. Jordan Howard Sobel (2008). 'Hoist with His Owne Petar':1 on the Undoing of a Liar Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):115-145.score: 148.0
    Abstract: A Liar would express a proposition that is true and not true. A Liar Paradox would, per impossibile, demonstrate the reality of a Liar. To resolve a Liar Paradox it is sufficient to make out of its demonstration a reductio of the existence of the proposition that would be true and not true, and to "explain away" the charm of the paradoxical contrary demonstration. Persuasive demonstrations of the Liar Paradox in this (...)
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  17. Matti Eklund (2007). The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 144.0
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (...)
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  18. Richard Heck (2012). A Liar Paradox. Thought 1 (1):36-40.score: 132.0
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) (...)
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  19. Richard Heck (2012). More on 'A Liar Paradox'. Thought 1 (4):270-280.score: 132.0
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  20. Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 132.0
    The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence “This sentence is false.”.
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  21. Robert L. Martin (ed.) (1970). The Paradox of the Liar. New Haven [Conn.]Yale University Press.score: 132.0
     
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  22. Ahmed Alwishah & David Sanson (2009). The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World From the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries Ce. Vivarium (1):97-127.score: 120.0
    We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues (...)
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  23. Patrick Greenough (2001). Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.score: 120.0
    A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the (...) is that not all assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink)
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  24. Emil Badici (2008). The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.score: 120.0
    In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to (...)
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  25. Richard Kenneth Atkins (2011). This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.score: 120.0
    Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the (...)
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  26. Jan Broekaert, Diederik Aerts & Bart D.’Hooghe (2006). The Generalised Liar Paradox: A Quantum Model and Interpretation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 11 (4):399-418.score: 120.0
    The formalism of abstracted quantum mechanics is applied in a model of the generalized Liar Paradox. Here, the Liar Paradox, a consistently testable configuration of logical truth properties, is considered a dynamic conceptual entity in the cognitive sphere (Aerts, Broekaert, & Smets, [Foundations of Science 1999, 4, 115–132; International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2000, 38, 3231–3239]; Aerts and colleagues[Dialogue in Psychology, 1999, 10; Proceedings of Fundamental Approachs to Consciousness, Tokyo ’99; Mind in Interaction]. Basically, the intrinsic (...)
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  27. Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.score: 120.0
    In this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons (...)
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  28. John Kearns (2007). An Illocutionary Logical Explanation of the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):31-66.score: 120.0
    This paper uses the resources of illocutionary logic to provide a new understanding of the Liar Paradox. In the system of illocutionary logic of the paper, denials are irreducible counterparts of assertions; denial does not in every case amount to the same as the assertion of the negation of the statement that is denied. Both a Liar statement, (a) Statement (a) is not true, and the statement which it negates can correctly be denied; neither can correctly be (...)
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  29. Dale Jacquette (2010). Liar Paradox and Substitution Into Intensional Contexts. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.score: 120.0
    John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I proposein ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and itsexpression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker (...)
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  30. Mark DelCogliano (2011). Origen and Basil of Caesarea on the Liar Paradox. Augustinianum 51 (2):349-365.score: 120.0
    Both Origen and Basil of Caesarea report that some people saw Ps. 115,2 LXX – “ I said in my alarm, ' Every human being is a liar ' ” -- as an expression of the Liar Paradox and formulated a version of the paradox based upon it. But Ps. 115,2 is actually not susceptible to the Liar paradox, despite Origen and Basil believing it to be so. Not realizing this, both sought to undermine (...)
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  31. Wojciech Żełaniec (2004). New Considerations on The 'Liar' Paradox. Filozofia Nauki 2.score: 120.0
    In this article the author argues that the 'Liar' Paradox sentence: "This sentence is false" is neither true nor false because it does not express any proposition or "Satz" in the sense of Bernard Bolzano. The difficulty left open is that by a similar line of reasoning also the sentence "This sentence is true" would not express any proposition, yet it is sometimes taken to be true (on the strength of a theorem by Loewe).
     
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  32. Riccardo Strobino (2012). Truth and Paradox in Late XIVth Century Logic : Peter of Mantua’s Treatise on Insoluble Propositions. Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 23:475-519.score: 108.0
    This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the late XiVth century and puts it into perspective within the context of the contemporary debate concerning semantic paradoxes. The author of the text is the italian logician Peter of Mantua (d. 1399/1400). The treatise is relevant both from a theoretical and from a historical standpoint. By appealing to a distinction between two senses in which propositions are said to be true, it offers an unusual (...)
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  33. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2013). Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.score: 108.0
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
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  34. Greg Littmann (2012). Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):15-27.score: 108.0
    A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider L If we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, (...)
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  35. Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.score: 108.0
    This book is about one of the most baffling of all paradoxes--the famous Liar paradox. Suppose we say: "We are lying now." Then if we are lying, we are telling the truth; and if we are telling the truth we are lying. This paradox is more than an intriguing puzzle, since it involves the concept of truth. Thus any coherent theory of truth must deal with the Liar. Keith Simmons discusses the solutions proposed by medieval philosophers (...)
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  36. Gary Mar & Paul St Denis (1999). What the Liar Taught Achilles. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.score: 108.0
    Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes.
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  37. Julien Murzi (2012). On Heck's New Liar. Thought 1 (2):258-269.score: 108.0
    Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think (...)
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  38. Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Naive Structure, Contraction, and Paradox. Topoi:1-13.score: 108.0
    Rejecting structural contraction has been pro- posed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a ‘‘naive’’ interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily (...)
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  39. Athanassios Tzouvaras (1998). Logic of Knowledge and Utterance and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (1):85-108.score: 108.0
    We extend the ordinary logic of knowledge based on the operator K and the system of axioms S₅ by adding a new operator Uφ, standing for "the agent utters φ", and certain axioms and a rule for U, forming thus a new system KU. The main advantage of KU is that we can express in it intentions of the speaker concerning the truth or falsehood of the claims he utters and analyze them logically. Specifically we can express in the new (...)
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  40. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1979). The Lessons of the Liar. Theory and Decision 11 (1):55-70.score: 108.0
    The paper argues that the liar paradox teaches us these lessons about English. First, the paradox-yielding sentence is a sentence of English that is neither true nor false in English. Second, there is no English name for any such thing as a set of all and only true sentences of English. Third, ‘is true in English’ does not satisfy the axiom of comprehension.
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  41. Stephen Read (2009). Plural Signification and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):363 - 375.score: 104.0
    In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, (...)
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  42. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). Lessons on Truth From Mediaeval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):58-78.score: 102.0
    Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of (...)
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  43. Peter Eldridge-Smith & Veronique Eldridge-Smith (2010). The Pinocchio Paradox. Analysis 70 (2):212-215.score: 102.0
    The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith in February 2001, is a counter-example to solutions to the Liar that restrict the use or definition of semantic predicates. Pinocchio’s nose grows if and only if what he is stating is false, and Pinocchio says ‘My nose is growing’. In this statement, ‘is growing’ has its normal meaning and is not a semantic predicate. If Pinocchio’s nose is growing it is because he is saying something false; otherwise, it is not (...)
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  44. Jon Barwise (1987). The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press.score: 102.0
    Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that (...)
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  45. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2009). Lessons on Sentential Meaning From Mediaeval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):682-704.score: 102.0
    Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of 'meanings', which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a (...)
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  46. O. Bueno & M. Colyvan (2003). Yablo's Paradox and Referring to Infinite Objects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):402 – 412.score: 102.0
    The blame for the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is often placed on self-reference and circularity. Some years ago, Yablo [1985; 1993] challenged this diagnosis, by producing a paradox that's liar-like but does not seem to involve circularity. But is Yablo's paradox really non-circular? In a recent paper, Beall [2001] has suggested that there are no means available to refer to Yablo's paradox without invoking descriptions, and since Priest [1997] has shown that any such description is circular, (...)
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  47. Alexandre Billon (2013). The Truth-Tellers Paradox. Logique Et Analyse (204).score: 102.0
    Ttler=‘Ttler is true’ says of itself that it is true. It is a truth-teller. I argue that we have equally telling arguments (i) to the effect that all truth-tellers must have the same truth-value (ii) and the effect that truth-tellers differ in truth-value. This is what I call the Truth-Tellers paradox. This paradox stems from the fact that the truth-value of a truth-teller like Ttler should be determined by the fact that it says of itself that it is (...)
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  48. Mark Isalan (2009). Gene Networks and Liar Paradoxes. Bioessays 31 (10):1110-1115.score: 102.0
  49. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2003). Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 98.0
    Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments (...)
     
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  50. Robert C. Koons (1992). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. Cambridge University Press.score: 96.0
    The purpose of this book is to develop a framework for analyzing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents, and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory, and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox (known since antiquity as "the Liar paradox") lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents (...)
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