Search results for 'Libertarianism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  6
    M. Almeida & Lucky Libertarianism (2003). Jonathan Cohen/Color: A Functionalist Proposal 1–42 Ray Buchanan/Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational? 43–75 Matthew Davidson/Presentism and the Non-Present 77–92. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113:291-292.
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  2. Christian List, What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: In Defence of Compatibilist Libertarianism.
    The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. In this paper, I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Both proponents and critics of the argument typically accept the way it is framed and only disagree on whether the argument’s premises and the rules of inference on which it relies are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of (...)
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  3. Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
    The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has (...)
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  4.  10
    David Widerker (2015). On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism. In Carlos Moya, Andrei Buckareff & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency and Responsibility. Palgrave-Macmillan 94-115.
    Abstract -/- Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the choices (or decisions) we make only if those choices are free, and our choices are free only if they are neither caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. Recently, there have been a number of attempts by philosophers to refute libertarianism by arguing that because a libertarianly free decision (choice) is both causally and nomically undetermined, which decision an agent makes in a deliberative situation is a matter (...)
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  5.  57
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2014). Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.
    Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent’s contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since these states and (...)
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  6. Peter J. Graham (2004). Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.
    Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise (...)
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  7.  98
    Derk Pereboom (2012). The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
    The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has the resources (...)
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  8. Manuel Vargas (2004). Libertarianism and Skepticism About Free Will: Some Arguments Against Both. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):403-26.
    In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason (...)
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  9. Steve Daskal (2010). Libertarianism Left and Right, the Lockean Proviso, and the Reformed Welfare State. Social Theory and Practice 36 (1):21-43.
    This paper explores the implications of libertarianism for welfare policy. There are two central arguments. First, the paper argues that if one adopts a libertarian framework, it makes most sense to be a Lockean right-libertarian. Second, the paper argues that this form of libertarianism leads to the endorsement of a fairly extensive set of redistributive welfare programs. Specifically, the paper argues that Lockean right-libertarians are committed to endorsing welfare programs under which the receipt of benefits is conditional on (...)
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  10.  14
    Michael Robinson (2015). Revisionism, Libertarianism, and Naturalistic Plausibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2651-2658.
    In his book, Building Better Beings, Manuel Vargas argues that we should reject libertarianism, on the grounds that it is naturalistically implausible, and embrace revisionism rather than eliminativism, on the grounds that the former is a shorter departure from ordinary thinking about moral responsibility. I argue that Vargas fails to adequately appreciate the extent to which ordinary judgments about moral responsibility involve ascriptions of basic desert as well as the centrality of basic desert in the ordinary conception of moral (...)
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  11. M. Almeida & M. Bernstein (2003). Lucky Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119.
    Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent''s character can still be under the control of, or up to, the agent. The luck problem has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane''s theory is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe, it ultimately cannot account for (...)
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  12.  50
    Alicia Finch (2013). Against Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.
    The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent’s acting freely, or (ii) the consequence (...)
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  13.  91
    Gary Watson (1999). Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.
    In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that (...)
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  14.  86
    Daniel Moseley (2011). What is Libertarianism? Basic Income Studies 6 (2):4.
    This essay is the introduction to a special debate issue of the journal "Basic Income Studies" on the topic of whether libertarians should endorse a universal basic income. The essay attempts to clarify some common uses of the term 'libertarianism" as it is used by moral and political philosophers. It identifies some important common features of libertarian normative theories.
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  15.  38
    Seth Shabo (2014). Assimilations and Rollbacks: Two Arguments Against Libertarianism Defended. Philosophia 42 (1):151-172.
    The Assimilation Argument purports to show that libertarians cannot plausibly distinguish supposed exercises of free will from random outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of free will. If this argument is sound, libertarians should either abandon their position or else concede that free will is a mystery. Drawing on a parallel with the Manipulation Argument against compatibilism, Christopher Franklin has recently contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second (...)
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  16.  11
    Nicolas Maloberti (2015). Rawls and Bleeding Heart Libertarianism: How Well Do They Mix? The Independent Review 19 (4).
    I argue that Tomasi’s most fundamental “bleeding heart libertarian” insights are not adequately served by Rawls’s lexical framework and his idealized theory of institutional choice. Perhaps paradoxically, using Rawls’s lexical framework to articulate Tomasi’s declared concerns for both economic liberty and “social justice” gives the latter concern very little weight. For that reason, Tomasi’s own objections against classical liberalism would ultimately apply to his own positive contribution as well: the satisfaction of a distributional adequacy condition is secured on purely contingent (...)
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  17.  34
    Nicolas Maloberti (2009). Libertarianism and the Possibility of the Legitimate State. Libertarian Papers 1 (5):1-12.
    The classical formulation of libertarianism seems to be incompatible with the requirements of political legitimacy. Some libertarians have endorsed this result, denying that the state is legitimate. This paper argues, however, that the particular nature of that incompatibility represents a problem for the classical formulation of libertarianism. It is argued that acknowledging the existence of a particular minimal form of positive rights might overcome the problem in question. It is further argued that acknowledgment of such positive rights would (...)
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  18.  26
    Brian Zamulinski (2005). Noziek's Anachronistic Libertarianism. Dialogue 44 (2):211-223.
    The conclusions on libertarianism Robert Nozick reaches are appropriate for a bygone era. In a modern market economy, libertarianism requires that employable people have the option of taking up a publicly provided income instead of employment. This is the only way to compensate the involuntarily unemployed that a market economy requires and to ensure that all employment is voluntary. Taxation on voluntary exchanges is unobjectionable because it alters prices, not property, and no one has a right to a (...)
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  19. Gerald K. Harrison (2006). The Case for Hyper-Libertarianism. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):1-6.
    The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compatibilism or traditional libertarianism. It combines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weaknesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck.
     
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  20.  10
    Garvan Walshe (2014). Green Libertarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):955-970.
    People evolved as part of an ecosystem, making use of the Earth’s bounty without reflection. Only when our ancestors developed the capacity for moral agency could we begin to reflect on whether we had taken in excess of our due. This outlines a ‘green libertarianism’ in which our property rights are grounded in fundamental ecological facts. It further argues that it is immune from two objections levelled at right- and left- libertarian theories of acquisition: that Robert Nozick, without justification, (...)
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  21.  21
    Gene Callahan (2013). Liberty Versus Libertarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):48-67.
    This paper aims to persuade its reader that libertarianism, at least in several of its varieties, is a species of the genus Michael Oakeshott referred to as ‘rationalism in politics’. I hope to demonstrate, employing the work of Oakeshott, as well as Aristotle and Onora O’Neill, how many libertarian theorists, who generally have a sincere and admirable commitment to personal liberty, have been led astray by the rationalist promise that we might be able to approach deductive certainty concerning the (...)
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  22.  20
    Ned Dobos (2011). Non-Libertarianism and Shareholder Theory: A Reply to Schaefer. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 98 (2):273 - 279.
    Libertarianism and the shareholder model of corporate responsibility have long been thought of as natural bedfellows. In a recent contribution to the Journal of Business Ethics, Brian Schaefer goes so far as to suggest that a proponent of shareholder theory cannot coherendy and consistently embrace any moral position other than philosophical libertarianism. The view that managers have a fiduciary obligation to advance the interests of shareholders exclusively is depicted as fundamentally incompatible with the acknowledgement of natural positive duties (...)
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  23. David Widerker (forthcoming). In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) (...)
     
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  24. Robert S. Taylor (2005). Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism. Social Theory and Practice 31 (4):465-482.
    In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the incidents (...)
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  25. David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
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  26. Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield (1998). The Mind Argument and Libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
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  27. Laura W. Ekstrom (2002). Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 1st edition. Oxford University Press
  28. Alfred R. Mele (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Control. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
    This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians.
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  29. Robert F. Allen (2005). Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of (...)
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  30.  60
    Benjamin Capps (2011). Libertarianism, Legitimation, and the Problems of Regulating Cognition-Enhancing Drugs. Neuroethics 4 (2):119-128.
    Some libertarians tend to advocate the wide availability of cognition-enhancing drugs beyond their current prescription-only status. They suggest that certain kinds of drugs can be a component of a prudential conception of the ‘good life’—they enhance our opportunities and preferences; and therefore, if a person freely chooses to use them, then there is no justification for the kind of prejudicial, authoritative restrictions that are currently deployed in public policy. In particular, this libertarian idea signifies that if enhancements are a prudential (...)
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  31.  52
    Kevin Timpe (2006). A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism. Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.
    Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue (...)
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  32.  25
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...)
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  33.  31
    Alfred R. Mele (1996). Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):123-41.
  34.  25
    Alfred R. Mele (2015). Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.
    The “problem of present luck” targets a standard libertarian thesis about free will. It has been argued that there is an analogous problem about luck for compatibilists. This article explores similarities and differences between the alleged problems.
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  35.  80
    John D. Bishop (2003). Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O'Connor's Persons and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.
  36.  7
    Alfred R. Mele (2003). Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 251--264.
  37. Mark Balaguer (1999). Libertarianism as a Scientifically Respectable View. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.
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  38.  89
    Ken Levy (2001). The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    There are two reasons to think that determinism is incompatible with responsibility. The first is that determinism negates the ability to do otherwise. The second is that determinism negates "ultimate self-causation" – that is, an agent’s being the ultimately self-caused originator of her action. My article responds to the second reason. I argue that ultimate self-causation is metaphysically impossible. Therefore if "source incompatibilists" like Robert Kane are right that responsibility requires ultimate self-causation, then responsibility is metaphysically impossible.
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  39. Carl Ginet (2003). Libertarianism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 587-612.
     
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  40.  10
    Jakub Wiśniewski (2013). Abortion, Libertarianism, and Evictionism: A Last Word. Libertarian Papers 5 (1):153-162.
    This paper is my last word, in the present journal, in the debate I have been having with Walter Block on the subject of evictionism as an alleged libertarian “third way,” capable of transcending the familiar “pro-life” and “pro-choice” dichotomy. In this debate, I myself defended what might be regarded as a qualified “pro-life” position, while Block consistently argued that the mother is morally allowed to expel the fetus from her womb provided that no non-lethal methods of its eviction are (...)
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  41.  63
    Laurence BonJour (1976). Deeterminism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
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  42.  45
    Randolph Clarke (2000). Libertarianism, Action Theory, and the Loci of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.
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  43.  16
    Fabian Wendt (2015). Justice and Political Authority in Left-Libertarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):316-339.
    From a left-libertarian perspective, it seems almost impossible for states to acquire political authority. For that reason, left-libertarians like Peter Vallentyne understandably hope that states without political authority could nonetheless implement left-libertarian justice. Vallentyne has argued that one can indeed assess a state’s justness without assessing its political authority. Against Vallentyne, I try to show that states without political authority have to be judged unjust even if they successfully promote justice. The reason is that institutions can be unjust independently from (...)
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  44. Peter Vallentyne (2000). Left-Libertarianism: A Primer. In Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (eds.), Left Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate. Palgrave Publishers Ltd.
    Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. Unlike most versions of egalitarianism, leftlibertarianism endorses full self-ownership, and thus places specific limits on what others may do to one’s person without one’s permission. Unlike the more familiar right-libertarianism (which also endorses full self-ownership), it holds that natural resources—resources which are not the results of anyone's choices and which are necessary for any form of activity—may be privately appropriated (...)
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  45.  18
    M. Bernstein (1995). Kanean Libertarianism. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):151-57.
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  46.  24
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). Libertarianism and the Luck Objection. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):329-337.
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  47.  3
    Gerald Harrison (2005). Luck and Hyper-Libertarianism. Sorites 16:93-102.
  48. John Lemos (2014). Libertarianism and Free Determined Decisions. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):675-688.
    Free determined decisions are free decisions that are causally determined by the character of the agent. Robert Kane is a libertarian about free will who believes some of our free decisions are determined in this way. According to Kane, for a determined decision to be free it must proceed from the agent's character and the agent must have shaped that character through previous undetermined free decisions. In recent writings, Mark Balaguer has argued that human beings may well possess libertarian freedom, (...)
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  49. Siegfried van Duffel (2009). The Dependence of Libertarianism On. Critical Review 21 (1):117-124.
    G. E. Morton’s attempt to defend libertarianism against my claim that it relies on an implausible secularization of ideas of divine sovereignty fails. It is not true that morality itself entails human sovereignty, as witnessed by the moral theories of theological voluntarists and of consequentialists. Nor is it true that sovereignty can be conceptually transferred from God to equal human individuals, since they would have no legitimate way to legislate over each other short of a unanimous “general will.” Nor, (...)
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  50. Michael Otsuka (2005). Libertarianism Without Inequality. Oxford University Press.
    Libertarianism without Inequality is a book which everyone interested in political theory should read.
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