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Lionel Shapiro [16]Lionel Stefan Shapiro [2]
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Profile: Lionel Shapiro (University of Connecticut)
  1. Julien Murzi & Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Validity and Truth-Preservation. In D. Achourioti, H. Galinon & J. Martinez (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth Springer. Springer.
    The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...)
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  2. Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Linguistic Function and Content: Reflections on Price's Pragmatism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price’s pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding explanatory appeal to content. Furthermore, I argue that doing so is (...)
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  3. Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Naive Structure, Contraction, and Paradox. Topoi:1-13.
    Rejecting structural contraction has been pro- posed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a ‘‘naive’’ interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily (...)
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  4. Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Sellars on the Function of Semantic Vocabulary. British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper examines two explanations Sellars gives, at successive stages of his career, of how semantic vocabulary (paradigmatically ‘means that ... ’ and ‘is true if and only if ... ’) lets us relate linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic reality. Despite their differences, both explanations reveal a distinctive pragmatist approach. According to Sellars, we do not use semantic vocabulary to describe language- world relations. Rather, our taking language to relate to the world is implicit in the moves (inferential or non-inferential) licensed (...)
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  5. Lionel Shapiro (2013). Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson From Early Modern Philosophy? In Martin Lenz & Anik Waldow (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Nature and Norms in Thought. Springer.
    This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for (...)
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  6. Lionel Shapiro (2013). Intentional Relations and the Sideways‐on View: On McDowell's Critique of Sellars. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):300-319.
    : McDowell opposes the view that the intentionality of language and thought remains mysterious unless it can be understood ‘from outside the conceptual order’. While he thinks the demand for such a ‘sideways-on’ understanding can be the result of ‘scientistic prejudice’, he points to Sellars's thought as exhibiting a different source: a distortion of our perspective ‘from within the conceptual order’. The distortion involves a failure on Sellars's part to see how descriptions from within the conceptual order can present expressions (...)
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  7. Lionel Shapiro (2013). Validity Curry Strengthened. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):100-107.
    Several authors have argued that a version of Curry's paradox involving validity motivates rejecting the structural rule of contraction. This paper criticizes two recently suggested alternative responses to “validity Curry.” There are three salient stages in a validity Curry derivation. Rejecting contraction blocks the first, while the alternative responses focus on the second and third. I show that a distinguishing feature of validity Curry, as contrasted with more familiar forms of Curry's paradox, is that paradox arises already at the first (...)
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  8. Lionel Shapiro (2012). Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):378-418.
    It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes (...)
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  9. Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
    Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then (...)
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  10. Lionel Shapiro (2011). Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314.
    There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a (...)
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  11. Lionel Shapiro (2010). Review of Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):367-71.
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  12. Lionel Shapiro (2010). Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586.
    Ideas play at least two roles in Locke's theory of the understanding. They are constituents of ‘propositions,’ and some of them ‘represent’ the qualities and sorts of surrounding bodies. I argue that each role involves a distinct kind of intentional directedness. The same idea will in general be an ‘idea of’ two different objects, in different senses of the expression. Identifying Locke's scheme of twofold ‘ofness’ reveals a common structure to his accounts of simple ideas and complex ideas of substances. (...)
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  13. Lionel Shapiro (2008). Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
    Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the 'naïve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional theory to an idealized verificationism.
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  14. Lionel Shapiro (2006). The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  15. Lionel Shapiro (2004). Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60.
    Brandom's "inferentialism"—his theory that contentfulness consists in being governed by inferential norms—proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to intentional objectivity. This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference, undermines the criterion of adequacy Brandom employs in motivating inferentialism. Once that constraint is abandoned, moreover, the very constitutive-explanatory availability of Brandom's inferential norms becomes suspect. Yet Brandom intertwines inferentialism with a separate explanatory project, one that in explaining the pragmatic significance (...)
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  16. Lionel Stefan Shapiro (2001). “The Transition From Sensibility to Reason in Regressu”: Indeterminism in Kant's Reflexionen. Kant-Studien 92 (1):3-12.
    In a remarkable series of Critical-period Reflexionen (5611-4, 5616-9), Kant sketches a defense of the possibility of freedom that differs radically from his usual compatibilism by incorporating an indeterministic account of the phenomena. Anticipating Łukasiewicz, Kant reconciles universal causal determination with an open future by positing a lower temporal bound for the infinite regress of prior determining causes issuing in a contingent action. On this account, Kant however concedes, the unity of experience "cannot fully obtain in the case of free (...)
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  17. Lionel Shapiro (1999). Toward 'Perfect Collections of Properties': Locke on the Constitution of Substantial Sorts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):551-593.
    Locke's claims about the "inadequacy" of substance-ideas can only be understood once it is recognized that the "sort" represented by such an idea is not wholly determined by the idea's descriptive content. The key to his compromise between classificatory conventionalism and essentialism is his injunction to "perfect" the abstract ideas that serve as "nominal essences." This injunction promotes the pursuit of collections of perceptible qualities that approach ever closer to singling out things that possess some shared explanatory-level constitution. It is (...)
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  18. Lionel Stefan Shapiro (1994). 'Coordinative Definition' and Reichenbach's Semantic Framework: A Reassessment. Erkenntnis 41 (3):287 - 323.
    Reichenbach's Philosophy of Space and Time (1928) avoids most of the logical positivist pitfalls it is generally held to exemplify, notably both conventionalism and verificationism. To see why, we must appreciate that Reichenbach's interest lies in how mathematical structures can be used to describe reality, not in how words like 'distance' acquire meaning. Examination of his proposed "coordinative definition" of congruence shows that Reichenbach advocates a reductionist analysis of the relations figuring in physical geometry (contrary to common readings that attribute (...)
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