1. Lisa Damm (2011). Emotions and Moral Agency. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):275-292.
    In this paper, I present a general profile of individuals with psychopathy, autism, and acquired sociopathy as well as look specifically at the abilities of these individuals with respect to the moral domain. These individuals are individually and collectively interesting because of their significant affective and social impairments. I argue that none of these individuals should be considered full moral agents based on a proposed account of moral agency consisting of the following two necessary conditions: (1) the capacity for moral (...)
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  2. Lisa Damm (2011). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):149 - 153.
  3. Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
    In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self-deception—instances in which one is self-deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self-deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self-deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self-deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two (...)
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