Search results for 'Literal truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Heidi Savage, Literal Truth and the Habits of Sherlock Holmes.score: 76.0
    Because names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and because it has been supposed that all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ will be true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, many philosophers have denied that the sentence or an utterance of the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true, or at least, it cannot be true taken at face value. Despite this, natural (...)
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  2. Geoffrey Rees (2003). The Anxiety of Inheritance: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Literal Truth of Original Sin. Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (1):75 - 99.score: 57.0
    Widely regarded as the most influential proponent of the truth of original sin in the twentieth century, Reinhold Niebuhr worked hard to excise any "literalistic" element from his interpretation of the doctrine. In his attempt to "correct" the Augustinian tradition on original sin by purging it of all "literalistic errors," however, Niebuhr assumed as his starting point the most characteristically modern objection to the doctrine: that birth is a thoroughly natural, animal, and morally meaningless event. As a result, Niebuhr (...)
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  3. Alfred Sidgwick (1927). Literal Truth. Mind 36 (141):61-63.score: 45.0
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  4. Durant Drake (1915). Practical Versus Literal Truth. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (9):236-243.score: 45.0
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  5. Jerome J. McGann (1992). Laura (Riding) Jackson and the Literal Truth. Critical Inquiry 18 (3):454.score: 45.0
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  6. Jj Mcgann (1992). Ridingjackson, Laura and the Literal Truth. Critical Inquiry 18 (3):454-473.score: 45.0
     
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  7. Petra Gelhaus (2013). Relational Truth-Creation: Between Bare Literal Openness and Mutual Manipulation. Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (2):38-54.score: 42.0
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  8. Ross Charnock (2010). The Linguistics of Misrepresentation: Intentions and Truth Values. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 23 (4):427-449.score: 40.0
    During contractual negotiations, one party may lead the other into error, thus causing loss or damage. If misrepresentation is shown, the aggrieved party may therefore claim for damages or rescission. In the English law, it was for many years unclear whether a finding of misrepresentation required proof of deliberate, intentional fraud, or whether it could be analysed as a simple failure of consensus, in which case it would be sufficient to show negligence. According to the traditional rule, the misleading declaration (...)
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  9. Jonathan Ac Brown (2009). Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism. Journal of the American Oriental Society 129 (2):259-285.score: 36.0
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  10. Peter Heckman (1991). Nietzsche's Clever Animal: Metaphor in "Truth and Falsity". Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (4):301 - 321.score: 24.0
    In this essay I show how Nietzsche's use of metaphor in "Truth and Falsity in an Ultra-Moral Sense" helps make the general point of the essay itself. I argue that the essay both distinguishes between the human and the natural order and yet works to erase that distinction, just as it both posits and denies a difference between truth and lie, dream and reality. Given that Nietzsche's text is directed against the possibility of literal truth, I (...)
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  11. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 21.0
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  12. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer.score: 21.0
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  13. John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max K”Obel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 81--102.score: 21.0
    From García-Carpintero and Kölbel, eds, Relative Truth.
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  14. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 5--280.score: 21.0
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms (...)
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  15. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). The Moral Truth. In Michael Glanzburg (ed.), Oxford Handbook to Truth. Oxford.score: 21.0
    Common-sense allows that talk about moral truths makes perfect sense. If you object to the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s assertion that it is a truth that ‘all men’ are ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’, you are more likely to object that these rights are not unalienable or that they are not endowed by the Creator, or even that its wording ignores the fact that women have rights too, than that this is not the sort of (...)
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  16. Alice Crary (2002). The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words. Inquiry 45 (1):59 – 80.score: 21.0
    This article aims to disrupt received views about the significance of J. L. Austin's contribution to philosophy of language. Its focus is Austin's 1955 lectures How To Do Things With Words . Commentators on the lectures in both philosophical and literary-theoretical circles, despite conspicuous differences, tend to agree in attributing to Austin an assumption about the relation between literal meaning and truth, which is in fact his central critical target. The goal of the article is to correct this (...)
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  17. Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.score: 21.0
    Recent philosophy of language has been profoundly impacted by the idea that mainstream, model-theoretic semantics is somehow incompatible with deflationary accounts of truth and reference. The present article systematizes the case for incompatibilism, debunks circularity and “modal confusion” arguments familiar in the literature, and reconstructs the popular thought that truth-conditional semantics somehow “presupposes” a correspondence theory of truth as an inference to the best explanation. The case for compatibilism is closed by showing that this IBE argument fails (...)
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  18. Oswaldo Chateaubriand (2007). The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):199-215.score: 21.0
    In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply (...)
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  19. Josef Stern (2006). Metaphor, Literal, Literalism. Mind and Language 21 (3):243–279.score: 21.0
    This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it (...)
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  20. Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.score: 21.0
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles (...)
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  21. M. W. Rowe (1997). Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):322-341.score: 21.0
    In Fiction, Truth and Literature, Lamarque and Olsen argue that if a critic claims or attempts to prove that the outlook of a work of literature is true or false, he is not engaging in literary or aesthetic appreciation. This paper argues against this position by adducing cases where literary critics discuss the truth or falsity of a work’s view, when their opinions are obviously relevant to the work’s aesthetic assessment. The paper considers in detail the way factual (...)
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  22. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (forthcoming). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, K. Fujimoto & J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), Volume on Truth. Springer.score: 21.0
    We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Gamma whenever, if all the premises of Gamma hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker stan- dard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a uni ed treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for (...), it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.. (shrink)
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  23. Julien Murzi & Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Validity and Truth-Preservation. In D. Achourioti, H. Galinon & J. Martinez (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth Springer. Springer.score: 21.0
    The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly (...)
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  24. Francois Recanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to (...)
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  25. Douglas J. Wulf (2009). Two New Challenges for the Modal Account of the Progressive. Natural Language Semantics 17 (3):205-218.score: 21.0
    The progressive in English appears to be inherently modal, due to what Dowty (Word meaning and Montague grammar: The semantics of verbs and times in generative semantics and in Montague’s PTQ, 1979) terms the imperfective paradox. In truth-conditional accounts, the literal truth of a clause with the modal progressive hinges on the possibility of the described outcome. The clause’s truth under such accounts has also been tacitly assumed to describe its felicitous use. Two challenges for this (...)
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  26. D. Carr (2004). Reason, Meaning and Truth in Religious Narrative: Towards an Epistemic Rationale for Religious and Faith School Education. Studies in Christian Ethics 17 (1):38-53.score: 21.0
    It would appear that certain deeper concerns about epistemic status and credibility underlie recent heated controversies about faith schools. The evident hostility of secular liberals to religious education in general and faith schools in particular rests on the deep-seated conviction that religious claims, beliefs and narratives are essentially non-rational, if not irrational, and therefore that no religious instruction could avoid indoctrination. Proceeding via an exploration of the non-literal signification of myth and fiction, this essay sets out to show how (...)
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  27. Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth: Emotional Accuracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):265-275.score: 21.0
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such (...)
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  28. Brian Flanagan (2010). Revisiting the Contribution of Literal Meaning to Legal Meaning. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2):255-271.score: 21.0
    Many theorists take the view that literal meaning can be one of a number of factors to be weighed in reaching a legal interpretation. Still others regard literal meaning as having the potential to legally justify a particular outcome. Building on the scholarly response to HLA Hart’s famous ‘vehicles in the park’ hypothetical, this article presents a formal argument that literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s legally correct, one which, unusually, makes no appeal to controversial theories (...)
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  29. François Récanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to (...)
     
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  30. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.score: 18.0
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  31. Keqian Xu (2010). Chinese “Dao” and Western “Truth”: A Comparative and Dynamic Perspective. Asian Social Science 6 (12):8.score: 18.0
    In the Pre-Qin time, pursuing “Dao” was the main task in the scholarship of most of the ancient Chinese philosophers, while the Ancient Greek philosophers considered pursuing “Truth” as their ultimate goal. While the “Dao” in ancient Chinese texts and the “Truth” in ancient Greek philosophic literature do share or cross-cover certain connotations, there are subtle and important differences between the two comparable philosophic concepts. These differences have deep and profound impact on the later development of Chinese and (...)
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  32. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.score: 18.0
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, (...)
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  33. Stewart Duncan, Hobbes on Language: Propositions, Truth, and Absurdity.score: 18.0
    Draft for Martinich and Hoekstra (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Hobbes. -/- Language was central to Hobbes's understanding of human beings and their mental abilities, and criticism of other philosophers' uses of language became a favorite critical tool for him. This paper connects Hobbes's theories about language to his criticisms of others' language, examining Hobbes's theories of propositions and truth, and how they relate to his claims that various sorts of proposition are absurd. It considers whether Hobbes in fact means (...)
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  34. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus on (...)
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  35. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or (...)
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  36. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.score: 18.0
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is a transparent concept but not a property). I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and (...)
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  37. Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.score: 18.0
    I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands (...)
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  38. Richard Heck (1997). Tarski, Truth, and Semantics. Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.score: 18.0
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  39. Stephen Barker, Expressivism About Truth-Making.score: 18.0
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some (...)
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  40. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. 603--615.score: 18.0
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  41. Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.score: 18.0
    Many philosophers believe that truth is grounded: True propositions depend for their truth on the world. Some philosophers believe that truth’s grounding has implications for our ontology of time. If truth is grounded, then truth supervenes on being. But if truth supervenes on being, then presentism is false since, on presentism, e.g., that there were dinosaurs fails to supervene on the whole of being plus the instantiation pattern of properties and relations. Call this the (...)
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  42. Tuomas E. Tahko (forthcoming). The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth. In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of (...)
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  43. Michael Hannon (2013). 'Knows' Entails Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.score: 18.0
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
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  44. Kate Hodkinson (2008). How Should a Nurse Approach Truth-Telling? A Virtue Ethics Perspective. Nursing Philosophy 9 (4):248-256.score: 18.0
    Abstract Truth-telling is a key issue within the nurse–patient relationship. Nurses make decisions on a daily basis regarding what information to tell patients. This paper analyses truth-telling within an end of life scenario. Virtue ethics provides a useful philosophical approach for exploring decisions on information disclosure in more detail. Virtue ethics allows appropriate examination of the moral character of the nurse involved, their intention, ability to use wisdom and judgement when making decisions and the virtue of truth-telling. (...)
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  45. William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.score: 18.0
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  46. Jamin Asay (2013). Tarski and Primitivism About Truth. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (17):1-18.score: 18.0
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share (...)
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  47. Gilbert Plumer (1996). Truth and Collective Truth. Dialectica 50 (1):3-24.score: 18.0
    The paper argues for the applicability of the notion of collective truth as opposed to distributive truth, that is, truth at times or possibilia taken in groups rather than individually. The underlying reasoning is that there are transtemporal and transworld relationships, e.g., those involving the relations of <being a descendant of> and <thinking about>. Relationships are (one type of) truth-makers. Hence, there are transtemporal and transworld truth-makers. Therefore, there is transtemporal and transworld truth, i.e., (...)
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  48. Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, (...)
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  49. Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2003). Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT. 49-105.score: 18.0
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. (...)
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  50. Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne (2009). Relativism and Monadic Truth. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Relativism has dominated many intellectual circles, past and present, but the twentieth century saw it banished to the fringes of mainstream analytic philosophy. Of late, however, it is making something of a comeback within that loosely configured tradition, a comeback that attempts to capitalize on some important ideas in foundational semantics. Relativism and Monadic Truth aims not merely to combat analytic relativism but also to combat the foundational ideas in semantics that led to its revival. Doing so requires a (...)
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