Search results for 'Literal truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Heidi Savage, Literal Truth and the Habits of Sherlock Holmes.score: 212.0
    Because names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and because it has been supposed that all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ will be true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, many philosophers have denied that the sentence or an utterance of the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could be true, or at least, it cannot be true taken at face value. Despite this, natural (...)
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  2. Geoffrey Rees (2003). The Anxiety of Inheritance: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Literal Truth of Original Sin. Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (1):75 - 99.score: 174.0
    Widely regarded as the most influential proponent of the truth of original sin in the twentieth century, Reinhold Niebuhr worked hard to excise any "literalistic" element from his interpretation of the doctrine. In his attempt to "correct" the Augustinian tradition on original sin by purging it of all "literalistic errors," however, Niebuhr assumed as his starting point the most characteristically modern objection to the doctrine: that birth is a thoroughly natural, animal, and morally meaningless event. As a result, Niebuhr (...)
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  3. Alfred Sidgwick (1927). Literal Truth. Mind 36 (141):61-63.score: 150.0
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  4. Durant Drake (1915). Practical Versus Literal Truth. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (9):236-243.score: 150.0
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  5. Jerome J. McGann (1992). Laura (Riding) Jackson and the Literal Truth. Critical Inquiry 18 (3):454.score: 150.0
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  6. Jj Mcgann (1992). Ridingjackson, Laura and the Literal Truth. Critical Inquiry 18 (3):454-473.score: 150.0
     
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  7. Petra Gelhaus (2013). Relational Truth-Creation: Between Bare Literal Openness and Mutual Manipulation. Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (2):38-54.score: 132.0
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  8. Jonathan Ac Brown (2009). Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism. Journal of the American Oriental Society 129 (2):259-285.score: 120.0
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  9. Ross Charnock (2010). The Linguistics of Misrepresentation: Intentions and Truth Values. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 23 (4):427-449.score: 92.0
    During contractual negotiations, one party may lead the other into error, thus causing loss or damage. If misrepresentation is shown, the aggrieved party may therefore claim for damages or rescission. In the English law, it was for many years unclear whether a finding of misrepresentation required proof of deliberate, intentional fraud, or whether it could be analysed as a simple failure of consensus, in which case it would be sufficient to show negligence. According to the traditional rule, the misleading declaration (...)
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  10. Peter Heckman (1991). Nietzsche's Clever Animal: Metaphor in "Truth and Falsity". Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (4):301 - 321.score: 60.0
    In this essay I show how Nietzsche's use of metaphor in "Truth and Falsity in an Ultra-Moral Sense" helps make the general point of the essay itself. I argue that the essay both distinguishes between the human and the natural order and yet works to erase that distinction, just as it both posits and denies a difference between truth and lie, dream and reality. Given that Nietzsche's text is directed against the possibility of literal truth, I (...)
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  11. Alice Crary (2002). The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words. Inquiry 45 (1):59 – 80.score: 54.0
    This article aims to disrupt received views about the significance of J. L. Austin's contribution to philosophy of language. Its focus is Austin's 1955 lectures How To Do Things With Words . Commentators on the lectures in both philosophical and literary-theoretical circles, despite conspicuous differences, tend to agree in attributing to Austin an assumption about the relation between literal meaning and truth, which is in fact his central critical target. The goal of the article is to correct this (...)
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  12. Oswaldo Chateaubriand (2007). The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):199-215.score: 54.0
    In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply (...)
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  13. Josef Stern (2006). Metaphor, Literal, Literalism. Mind and Language 21 (3):243–279.score: 54.0
    This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it (...)
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  14. Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.score: 54.0
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles (...)
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  15. M. W. Rowe (1997). Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):322-341.score: 54.0
    In Fiction, Truth and Literature, Lamarque and Olsen argue that if a critic claims or attempts to prove that the outlook of a work of literature is true or false, he is not engaging in literary or aesthetic appreciation. This paper argues against this position by adducing cases where literary critics discuss the truth or falsity of a work’s view, when their opinions are obviously relevant to the work’s aesthetic assessment. The paper considers in detail the way factual (...)
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  16. Francois Recanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press.score: 54.0
    According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to (...)
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  17. D. Carr (2004). Reason, Meaning and Truth in Religious Narrative: Towards an Epistemic Rationale for Religious and Faith School Education. Studies in Christian Ethics 17 (1):38-53.score: 54.0
    It would appear that certain deeper concerns about epistemic status and credibility underlie recent heated controversies about faith schools. The evident hostility of secular liberals to religious education in general and faith schools in particular rests on the deep-seated conviction that religious claims, beliefs and narratives are essentially non-rational, if not irrational, and therefore that no religious instruction could avoid indoctrination. Proceeding via an exploration of the non-literal signification of myth and fiction, this essay sets out to show how (...)
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  18. Brian Flanagan (2010). Revisiting the Contribution of Literal Meaning to Legal Meaning. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2):255-271.score: 54.0
    Many theorists take the view that literal meaning can be one of a number of factors to be weighed in reaching a legal interpretation. Still others regard literal meaning as having the potential to legally justify a particular outcome. Building on the scholarly response to HLA Hart’s famous ‘vehicles in the park’ hypothetical, this article presents a formal argument that literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s legally correct, one which, unusually, makes no appeal to controversial theories (...)
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  19. François Récanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press.score: 54.0
    According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to (...)
     
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  20. Juan José Acero (2007). Searle y el significado literal. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):9-30.score: 48.0
    In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of (...)
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  21. Douglas J. Wulf (2009). Two New Challenges for the Modal Account of the Progressive. Natural Language Semantics 17 (3):205-218.score: 42.0
    The progressive in English appears to be inherently modal, due to what Dowty (Word meaning and Montague grammar: The semantics of verbs and times in generative semantics and in Montague’s PTQ, 1979) terms the imperfective paradox. In truth-conditional accounts, the literal truth of a clause with the modal progressive hinges on the possibility of the described outcome. The clause’s truth under such accounts has also been tacitly assumed to describe its felicitous use. Two challenges for this (...)
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  22. Anthony Hemetz (1966). Self-Evident Truths Cannot Be Stated Literally. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 40:163-168.score: 40.0
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  23. Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.score: 38.0
    Recent philosophy of language has been profoundly impacted by the idea that mainstream, model-theoretic semantics is somehow incompatible with deflationary accounts of truth and reference. The present article systematizes the case for incompatibilism, debunks circularity and “modal confusion” arguments familiar in the literature, and reconstructs the popular thought that truth-conditional semantics somehow “presupposes” a correspondence theory of truth as an inference to the best explanation. The case for compatibilism is closed by showing that this IBE argument fails (...)
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  24. Adam Morton (2002). Emotional Truth: Emotional Accuracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (76):265-275.score: 38.0
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such (...)
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  25. P. P. Allport (1993). Are the Laws of Physics 'Economical with the Truth'? Synthese 94 (2):245 - 290.score: 36.0
    It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics are deceitful in that they give the impression of greater unity and coherence in our theories than is actually found to be the case. Causal stories and phenomenological relationships are claimed to provide a more acceptable account of the world, and only theoretical entities — not laws — are considered as perhaps corresponding to real features of the world.This paper examines these claims in the light of the author's own field (...)
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  26. Mark Pinder (forthcoming). The Cognitivist Account of Meaning and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 36.0
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the (...)
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  27. Claudia Bianchi, Contextualism. Handbook of Pragmatics Online.score: 30.0
    Contextualism is a view about meaning, semantic content and truth-conditions, bearing significant consequences for the characterisation of explicit and implicit content, the decoding/inferring distinction and the semantics/pragmatics interface. According to the traditional perspective in semantics (called "literalism" or "semantic minimalism"), it is possible to attribute truth-conditions to a sentence independently of any context of utterance, i.e. in virtue of its meaning alone. We must then distinguish between the proposition literally expressed by a sentence ("what is said" by the (...)
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  28. Ronald N. Giere (2005). Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 63 (2):149 - 165.score: 30.0
    Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to (...)
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  29. James W. Allard (2010). T.H. Green's Theory of Positive Freedom: From Metaphysics to Political Theory (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):538-539.score: 30.0
    Although T. H. Green is primarily remembered today as a moral and political philosopher, many of his philosophical concerns owe their origins to the Victorian crisis of faith in which a widespread belief in the literal truth of Scripture confronted seemingly incompatible scientific theories. Green attributed this crisis to the inability of science and religion to find accommodation in the popular version of empiricism widely accepted by educated men and women of his day. In his 371-page introduction to (...)
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  30. Murali Ramachandran, The Ambiguity Thesis Vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell: Further Developments.score: 30.0
    Kripke (1977) presents an argument designed to show that the considerations in Donnellan (1966) concerning attributive and referential uses of (definite) descriptions do not, by themselves, refute Russell’s (1905) unitary theory of description sentences (RTD), which takes (utterances of) them to express purely general, quantificational, propositions. Against Kripke, Marga Reimer (1998) argues that the two uses do indeed reflect a semantic ambiguity (an ambiguity at the level of literal truth conditions). She maintains a Russellian (quantificational) analysis of utterances (...)
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  31. Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008). Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68 (2):213 - 224.score: 30.0
    There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly false, our best physical theories are nevertheless in some sense probably approximately true. This paper presents a notion of local probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current and subsequent (...)
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  32. Joseph F. Hanna (1983). Empirical Adequacy. Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-34.score: 30.0
    In his book, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen argues for an anti-realist view of science according to which the sole epistemological aim of science is to "save the phenomena". As originally conceived, his constructive empiricism is strongly extensional, but in his account of the empirical adequacy of probabilistic theories, van Fraassen reluctantly abandons this extensional position, arguing that modal (intensional) notions are unavoidable in interpreting probability. I argue in this paper that van Fraassen has not presented the strongest possible (...)
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  33. Konrad Waloszczyk (2010). Religia jako poezja? O filozofii religii George\'a Santayany. Filo-Sofija 10 (11 (2010/2)):93-106.score: 30.0
    Author: Waloszczyk Konrad Title: THE RELIGION AS THE POETRY. ABOUT PHILOSOPHY OF THE RELIGION OF GEORGE SANTAYANA (Religia jako poezja? O filozofi i religii George’a Santayany) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.11, number: 2010/2, pages: 93-106 Keywords: RELIGIOUS DOGMA, METAPHOR, “COPERNICAN REVOLUTION” IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:George Santayana (1863–1952) has contended that religion should be seen as a kind of poetry and not as (...)
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  34. Maciej Witek (2006). Spór o naturę prawdy z punktu widzenia teorii czynności mowy. Filozofia Nauki 2 (2006):131-146.score: 30.0
    There are at least three distinct arguments about the nature of truth. The first two are, respectively, between correspondence theories and epistemic theories and between inflationism and deflationism. The aim of the paper is to characterise the third dispute whose starting question is whether truth and truth conditions are semantic or pragmatic concepts. In other words, the question is whether it is semantics or pragmatics that provides an adequate account of truth conditions of utterances. There are (...)
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  35. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 27.0
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  36. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer.score: 27.0
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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  37. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 5--280.score: 27.0
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms (...)
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  38. John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max K”Obel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 81--102.score: 27.0
    From García-Carpintero and Kölbel, eds, Relative Truth.
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  39. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). The Moral Truth. In Michael Glanzburg (ed.), Oxford Handbook to Truth. Oxford.score: 27.0
    Common-sense allows that talk about moral truths makes perfect sense. If you object to the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s assertion that it is a truth that ‘all men’ are ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’, you are more likely to object that these rights are not unalienable or that they are not endowed by the Creator, or even that its wording ignores the fact that women have rights too, than that this is not the sort of (...)
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  40. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij (forthcoming). Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence. In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, K. Fujimoto & J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), Volume on Truth. Springer.score: 27.0
    We say that a sentence A is a permissive consequence of a set of premises Gamma whenever, if all the premises of Gamma hold up to some standard, then A holds to some weaker stan- dard. In this paper, we focus on a three-valued version of this notion, which we call strict-to-tolerant consequence, and discuss its fruitfulness toward a uni ed treatment of the paradoxes of vagueness and self-referential truth. For vagueness, st-consequence supports the principle of tolerance; for (...), it supports the requisit of transparency. Permissive consequence is non-transitive, however, but this feature is argued to be an essential component to the understanding of paradoxical reasoning in cases involving vagueness or self-reference.. (shrink)
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  41. Julien Murzi & Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Validity and Truth-Preservation. In D. Achourioti, H. Galinon & J. Martinez (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth Springer. Springer.score: 27.0
    The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly (...)
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  42. N. Maxwell (2012). Arguing for Wisdom in the University: An Intellectual Autobiography. Philosophia 40 (4):663-704.score: 26.0
    For forty years I have argued that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes to seek and promote wisdom. How did I come to argue for such a preposterously gigantic intellectual revolution? It goes back to my childhood. From an early age, I desired passionately to understand the physical universe. Then, around adolescence, my passion became to understand the heart and soul of people via the novel. But I never discovered how (...)
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  43. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.score: 24.0
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  44. Stewart Duncan (forthcoming). Hobbes on Language: Propositions, Truth, and Absurdity. In A. P. Martinich & Kinch Hoekstra (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Draft for Martinich and Hoekstra (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Hobbes. -/- Language was central to Hobbes's understanding of human beings and their mental abilities, and criticism of other philosophers' uses of language became a favorite critical tool for him. This paper connects Hobbes's theories about language to his criticisms of others' language, examining Hobbes's theories of propositions and truth, and how they relate to his claims that various sorts of proposition are absurd. It considers whether Hobbes in fact means (...)
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  45. Keqian Xu (2010). Chinese “Dao” and Western “Truth”: A Comparative and Dynamic Perspective. Asian Social Science 6 (12):8.score: 24.0
    In the Pre-Qin time, pursuing “Dao” was the main task in the scholarship of most of the ancient Chinese philosophers, while the Ancient Greek philosophers considered pursuing “Truth” as their ultimate goal. While the “Dao” in ancient Chinese texts and the “Truth” in ancient Greek philosophic literature do share or cross-cover certain connotations, there are subtle and important differences between the two comparable philosophic concepts. These differences have deep and profound impact on the later development of Chinese and (...)
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  46. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.score: 24.0
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, (...)
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  47. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or (...)
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  48. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus on (...)
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  49. Richard Heck (1997). Tarski, Truth, and Semantics. Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.score: 24.0
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  50. Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.score: 24.0
    Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is a transparent concept but not a property). I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and (...)
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