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  1. Slobodan Perovic & Ljiljana Radenovic, Is Nativism in Psychology Reconcilable with the Parity Thesis in Biology?
    The Modern Synthesis of Darwinism and genetics regards non-genetic factors as merely constraints on the genetic variations that result in the characteristics of organisms. Even though the environment (including social interactions and culture) is as necessary as genes in terms of selection and inheritance, it does not contain the information that controls the development of the traits. S. Oyama’s account of the Parity Thesis, however, states that one cannot conceivably distinguish in a meaningful way between nature-based (i.e., gene-based) and nurture-based (...)
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  2. Slobodan Perovic & Ljiljana Radenovic (2011). Fine-Tuning Nativism: The 'Nurtured Nature' and Innate Cognitive Structures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):399-417.
    S. Oyama’s prominent account of the Parity Thesis states that one cannot distinguish in a meaningful way between nature-based (i.e. gene-based) and nurture-based (i.e. environment-based) characteristics in development because the information necessary for the resulting characteristics is contained at both levels. Oyama as well as P. E. Griffiths and K. Stotz argue that the Parity Thesis has far-reaching implications for developmental psychology in that both nativist and interactionist developmental accounts of psychological capacities that presuppose a substantial nature/nurture dichotomy are inadequate. (...)
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  3. Ljiljana Radenović (2010). Reason and Critical Thinking as Educational Goals: A Short Note on Three Critiques and One Defense of Reason. Theoria 53 (1):125-134.
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  4. Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic (2006). Speaking Without Interpreting: A Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):663 – 678.
    We clarify some points previously made by Andrews, and defend the claim that Davidson's account of belief can be and is challenged by the existence of some people with autism. We argue that both Bouma and Andrews (Philosophical Psychology, 15) blurred the subtle distinctions between the psychological concepts of theory of mind and joint attention and the Davidsonian concepts of interpretation and triangulation. And we accept that appeal to control group studies is not the appropriate place to look for an (...)
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  5. Ljiljana Radenovic (2004). Book Review: Mind in Everyday Life and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (3):397-402.