175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on anything but the consent of the people, yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of; and, therefore, many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one (...) of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any government as demolishing a house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one. (shrink)
... a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it only does by the consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking ... [Essay II, xxvii, '9].
When we engage in practical deliberation, we sometimes engage in careful probabilistic reasoning. At other times, we simply make flat out assumptions about how the world is or will be. A question thus arises: when, if ever, is it rationally permissible to engage in the latter, less sophisticated kind of practical deliberation? Recently, a number of authors have argued that the answer concerns whether one knows that p. Others have argued that the answer concerns whether one is justified in believing (...) that one knows that p. Against both of these, this paper argues that the answer concerns whether p is ‘practically certain’—that is, whether the actual epistemic probability that p differs from epistemic certainty that p only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision one currently faces. (shrink)
Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ‘quiddities’. Here I grant (...) that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ‘austere quidditism’, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ‘property individuation’. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis’s posthumously published ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis’s argument. (shrink)
The anthropology of consciousness is a field of enormous and demanding scope. In this article, there is no attempt to address all of the current trends in thinking and research; rather, the aim was to draw a line through the field that extends from the 19th century and European philosophies to some contemporary expressions of those philosophies in social science research. In particular, taking the original project of Edmund Husserl, an approach to the phenomenological investigation of the nature of consciousness (...) and, in addition, states of consciousness is proposed in the form of “existential grammars.” The treatment is propaedeutic: The ideas presented here are part of an on-going, long-term project tied to cross-cultural and experimental research on consciousness. However, the short-term outcomes are promising in elucidating the foundational questions not only about consciousness but also about specific areas of interest such as healing and the nature of scientific investigation itself. One important direction in this work is to illuminate, where possible, the pre-reflective rationalities of human experience, of consciousness itself, in such a way that we might generate codes of consciousness ultimately not as the equivalent of genetic models, but as descriptors of the core matrix of consciousness out of which alterations of consciousness might be better understood. (shrink)
The book also includes a chronological table of significant events, select bibliography, succinct explanatory notes, and an index--all of which supply ...
To fully understand human language, an evolved trait that develops in the young without formal instruction, it must be possible to observe language that has not been influenced by instruction. But in modern societies, much of the language that is used, and most of the language that is measured, is confounded by literacy and academic training. This diverts empirical attention from natural habits of speech, causing theorists to miss critical features of linguistic practice. To dramatize this point, I examine data (...) from a special population––the canal boat children of early twentieth century England––whose language developed without academic influence, but was evaluated using instruments designed primarily for academic use. These data, taken together with related research, suggest that formal instruction can convert language from a purely biological trait that was selected, to a talent that was instructed, while altering the users of language themselves. I then review research indicating that formal instruction can also mask or distort inter-sexual differences in the social applications of language, a significant handicap to evolutionary theorizing. I conclude that if biological theories of language are to succeed, they must explain the spontaneous speaking practices of naturally behaving individuals. (shrink)
In the beginning: introduction -- This I believe: preview -- This they believe: other views -- Where it begins: anatomy and environment -- Where it began: evolution -- What is it?: consciousness -- There was the word: self-consciousness and language -- See here: attention -- Perhaps to dream: sleep -- x=2y: representation -- The dance of life: movement -- They all fall down: dissolution of function -- Been there, done that: experience -- Which have eyes and see not: stimulus hierarchy (...) -- Buy one, get one free: volition -- Play it again: speculative reprise -- In the end: conclusion. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance practices of small cap companies have had on their financial performances. Previous studies have mainly examined governance practices of larger corporations. This analysis focuses on the governance variables that have been highlighted by the New Zealand Securities Commission (2004) governance principles and guidelines and also on the governance variables that are supported in the literature as providing an appropriate structure for the firm in the environment in which (...) it operates. The data for 71 small cap companies listed in New Zealand over a five-year period from 2001 to 2005 was analysed. Pooled data, OLS and 2SLS regression techniques were used and Tobin's Q, ROA and OPINC were used as the dependent variables. The evidence does support the hypothesis that the existence of board independence and audit committee has enhanced firm financial performance, as measured by Tobin's Q. (shrink)
: Recent works have recovered the ethical and political value of shame, suggesting that if shame is felt for the right reasons, toxic forms of shame may be alleviated. Rereading Hannah Arendt's biography of the "conscious pariah," Rahel Varnhagen, Locke concludes that a politics of shame does not have the radical potential its proponents seek. Access to a public world, not shaming those who shame us, catapults the shamed pariah into the practices of democratic citizenship.
John Locke (2007). Second Treatise on Government. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..
... i . La very is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man,and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation ; that 'tis hardly to be ...
It has long been claimed that Homo sapiens is the only species that has language, but only recently has it been recognized that humans also have an unusual pattern of growth and development. Social mammals have two stages of pre-adult development: infancy and juvenility. Humans have two additional prolonged and pronounced life history stages: childhood, an interval of four years extending between infancy and the juvenile period that follows, and adolescence, a stage of about eight years that stretches from juvenility (...) to adulthood. We begin by reviewing the primary biological and linguistic changes occurring in each of the four pre-adult ontogenetic stages in human life history. Then we attempt to trace the evolution of childhood and juvenility in our hominin ancestors. We propose that several different forms of selection applied in infancy and childhood; and that, in adolescence, elaborated vocal behaviors played a role in courtship and intrasexual competition, enhancing fitness and ultimately integrating performative and pragmatic skills with linguistic knowledge in a broad faculty of language. A theoretical consequence of our proposal is that fossil evidence of the uniquely human stages may be used, with other findings, to date the emergence of language. If important aspects of language cannot appear until sexual maturity, as we propose, then a second consequence is that the development of language requires the whole of modern human ontogeny. Our life history model thus offers new ways of investigating, and thinking about, the evolution, development, and ultimately the nature of human language. (shrink)
Language, like other human traits, could only have evolved during one or more stages of development. We enlist the theoretical framework of human life history to account for certain aspects of linguistic evolution, with special reference to initial phases in the process. It is hypothesized that selection operated at several developmental stages, the earlier ones producing new behaviors that were reinforced by additional, and possibly more powerful, forms of selection during later stages, especially adolescence and early adulthood. Peer commentaries have (...) provided opportunities to explain human life history more comprehensively, and to add details to our account of spoken language. We made no attempt to explain syntax in the target article, but we propose here that selection for “vocal plumage” may have increased our species’ capacity for utterance complexity, a development that would have benefited all levels of language. (shrink)
Falk claims that human language took a step forward when infants lost their ability to cling and were placed on the ground, increasing their fears, which mothers assuaged prosodically. This claim, which is unsupported by anthropological and psychological evidence, would have done little for the syllabic and segmental structure of language, and ignores infants' own contribution to the process.
Locke lived at a time of heightened religious sensibility, and religious motives and theological beliefs were fundamental to his philosophical outlook. Here, Victor Nuovo brings together the first comprehensive collection of Locke's writings on religion and theology. These writings illustrate the deep religious motivation in Locke's thought.
Parallels to Shanker & King's (S&K's) proposal for a model of language teaching that values dyadic interaction have long existed in language development, for the neotenous human infant requires care, which is inherently interactive. Interaction with talking caregivers facilitates language learning. The “new” paradigm thus has a decidedly familiar look. It would be surprising if some other paradigm worked better in animals that have no evolutionary linguistic history.
In 1695 John Locke published The Reasonableness of Christianity, an enquiry into the foundations of Christian belief. He did so anonymously, to avoid public involvement in the fiercely partisan religious controversies of the day. In the Reasonableness Locke considered what it was to which all Christians must assent in faith; he argued that the answer could be found by anyone for themselves in the divine revelation of Scripture alone. He maintained that the requirements of Scripture were few and simple, and (...) therefore offered a basis for tolerant agreement among all Christians, and the promise of peace, stability, and security through toleration. -/- This is the first critical edition of the Reasonableness: for the first time an authoritative annotated text is presented, with full information about sources, variants, amendments, and the publishing history of the work. Also provided in the editorial notes are cross-references, references to other works by Locke, definitions of terms, and other information conducive to an understanding of the text. -/- Though modern interest has focused particularly on Locke's philosophy and political theory, increasing attention is being paid to his religious thought. These different strands cannot be understood properly in isolation from each other: so the broader aim of this edition is to help towards an improved understanding of his religious thought in the context of his work as a philosopher, political theorist, and exponent of religious toleration. In his editorial introduction John Higgins-Biddle investigates how Locke's ideas developed, and offers a critical assessment of the three main contemporary and subsequent interpretations of Locke's religious thought, all of which are shown to be unsatisfactory. (shrink)
This essay is a reading of two Hollywood films: The Defiant Ones (1958, directed by Stanley Kramer, starring Tony Curtis and Sidney Poitier) and Rising Sun (1993, directed by Philip Kauffman starring Wesley Snipes and Sean Connery, based on the Michael Crichton novel of the same name). The essay argues that these films work to contain black demand for social and political equality not through exclusionary measures, but rather through deliberate acknowledgment of blackness as integral to US identity. My reading (...) shows how a homosocial bond between white and black stands in for US national identity, and how this identity is unified by foregrounding the threat of an apocalyptic outcome. I use the concept of brinkmanship to illustrate the political effects of this particular narrative form. Then I move to Rising Sun, a film that employs a racial triangle of white, black and Asian men to manage black demand for social change. I argue that the narrative logic and the cultural politics of the film require any figure that is both Asian and masculine to be coded as a foreign enemy. (shrink)
The Reasonableness of Christianity is a major work by one of the greatest modern philosophers. Published anonymously in 1695, it entered a world upset by fierce theological conflict and immediately became a subject of controversy. At issue were the author’s intentions. John Edwards labelled it a Socinian work and charged that it was subversive not only of Christianity but of religion itself others praised it as a sure preservative of both. Few understood Locke’s intentions, and perhaps no one fully. This (...) new collection describes the background to Locke’s book and documents the disputes that followed its publication. Providing an invaluable insight into the context of its conception and reception, it includes contributions by Samuel Bold, John Edwards, Charles Blount, and Daniel Waterland, bringing the discussion up to the eighteenth century. Also included is a review of the Reasonableness found among Locke’s unpublished papers and published here for the first time. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of religion and theologians as well as historians. (shrink)
This comprehensive collection brings together the main published works (excluding polemical attacks on other people's views) with the most important surviving ...
Abstract The study was designed as a test of an especially constructed series of dilemma discussion methods for an experimental group of female offenders and their guards. The programme conducted on prison grounds, consisted of a five?month programme for the offenders and a separate ten?month programme for the staff. The results indicated that the experimental group of inmates improved on both the Defining Issues Test (DIT), an estimate of moral judgement and the Loevinger Sentence Completion Test (SCT), an estimate of (...) ego development, when compared to a random group. The results for the staff programme were similar except that initially the guards? scores were much lower than those of the inmates, especially on the DIT. Two?year, follow?up information indicated that the experimental group of females achieved more positive outcomes than did the controls. Implications for prison reform from an educational and developmental perspective are stressed. (shrink)
This volume is the first of three which will contain all of Locke's extant writings on philosophy which relate to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, other than those contained in volumes of the Clarendon Edition of John Locke such as the Correspondence. The book contains the two earliest known drafts of the Essay, both written in 1671, and provides for the first time an accurate version of Locke's text together with a record of virtually all his changes, in notes at (...) the foot of each page. (shrink)
Introduction Robert Horwitz i . Locke and "The Thinkeing Men at Oxford" Enemies and admirers alike among John Locke's contemporaries, along with countless ...
This is the first of three volumes which will contain all of Locke's extant philosophical writings relating to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, not included in other Clarendon editions like the Correspondence. It contains the earliest known drafts of the Essay, Drafts A and B, both written in 1671, and provides for the first time an accurate version of Locke's text. Virtually all his changes are recorded in footnotes on each page. -/- Peter Nidditch, whose highly acclaimed edition of An (...) Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published in this series in 1975, used pioneering editorial techniques in his compilation of Volume 1. Most of the work was completed before his tragically early death in 1983. -/- Volumes 2 and 3, almost wholly the work of G. A. J. Rogers will contain the third extant draft of the Essay (Draft C), the Epitome and the Conduct of the Understanding. They will also include a History of the Writing of the Essay, together with other shorter writings by Locke. (shrink)
One of the major works of John Locke (1632-1704), this detailed and comprehensive guide is mainly concerned with moral education. While concentrating on its role in creating a responsible adult and on the importance of virtue as a transmitter of culture, it also ranges over such practical topics as the effectiveness of physical punishment, how best to teach foreign languages, table manners, and varieties of crying. -/- This critical edition is based on the third (1695) edition, and includes variants from (...) the first five editions, from the Harvard University Library and the British Library drafts, and from Locke's correspondence to Edward Clarke and his wife. (shrink)
This is a new revised version of Dr. Laslett's standard edition of Two Treatises. First published in 1960, and based on an analysis of the whole body of Locke's publications, writings, and papers. The Introduction and text have been revised to incorporate references to recent scholarship since the second edition and the bibliography has been updated.
Locke's posthumously published work on Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans and Ephesians, provides important evidence of his thought during the final years of his life, ad gives insights into his theology which are not available in his other writings. This critical edition of the work is based as far as possible on Locke's manuscript, and includes an editorial introduction, textual, manuscript, and explanatory notes, as well as transcriptions of hitherto unpublished papers by Locke.
Abstract Two groups of undergraduates helped to devise a contemporary Ten Commandments. By comparison with the original, they preferred general, positive formulations to specific, negative ones. The explanation may be the assumption that what is needed for morality are exceptionless principles, which can easily be formulated only in highly general terms, but at the cost of obscuring their implications for actual conduct. A preferable alternative might be to think in terms of rules which can be formulated more precisely, but which (...) can also admit of exceptions. (shrink)
Abstract Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such (...) as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour. Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive?developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage?development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive?developmental account stands in need of radical re?thinking, to put it no higher. (shrink)
Abstract After some preliminary doubts about Kohlberg's method of assessing moral reasoning, his ?stage?structural? theory is criticized under six heads. (1) The claim that the stages constitute structural wholes, representing unified and differentiated patterns of thought: it is argued that the available evidence, and Kohlberg's own methodology, unambiguously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures. (2) Invariance, which, after counter?evidence led to a revision in the theory, has yet to be demonstrated. (3) Cultural Universality: it is argued that, because (...) of an ambiguity in the notion of a universal principle, Kohlberg's arguments against cultural relativism tend, if anything, to support it. (4) Logical Necessity: it is argued that Kohlberg shows at most that the sequence forms a hierarchy, from which neither its logical nor even its psychological necessity follows. (5) Increasing Cognitive Adequacy, with the associated claim that it is cognitive conflict which produces movement from one stage to another: it is argued that the empirical evidence conflicts with the theoretical claims, and that the theoretical arguments establish, at most, an increase in moral understanding, which could well increase, rather than decrease, cognitive conflict. (6) Increasing Moral Adequacy: this claim is as yet unjustified in any of its three possible interpretations. Finally it is suggested that Kohlbergian theory is in danger of becoming, in Lakatos's terms, a degenerating research programme. (shrink)
Yolton's introduction and commentary explicate Locke's doctrines and provide the reader with the general background knowledge of other seventeenth-century ...
