There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a cognitive mechanism (...) that is c-modular is likely to be biologically modular (henceforth, b-modular), and b-modular characters are more evolvable (e.g., Sperber 2002, Carruthers 2005). In evolutionary biology, the evolvability of a character in an organism is understood as the “organism’s capacity to facilitate the generation of non-lethal selectable phenotypic variation from random mutation” with respect to that character. Here I will argue that the notion of cognitive modularity needed to make this argument plausible will have to be understood in terms of the biological notion of variational independence; that is, it will have to be understood in such a way that a cognitive feature is c-modular only if few or no other morphological changes (cognitive and not) are significantly correlated with variations of that feature arising in members of the relevant population. I will also argue that all –except for (possibly) one—of the connotations contained in a cluster of notions of cognitive modularity widely accepted in some of the mainstream currents of thought in classical cognitive science, are simply irrelevant to the argument. In order to argue for this, I will have to examine the question as to whether there are any strong theoretical connections between (1) those connotations and (2) notions of modularity accepted in biology, specially in evolutionary and in developmental biology, that are thought to be most relevant to arguments to the effect that biological modularity enhances evolvability. (shrink)
Here I develop an interpretation of Descartes' theory of ideas which differs from the standard reading in that it incorporates a distinction between what an idea appears to represent and what it represents. I argue that this interpretation not only finds support in the texts but also is required to explain a large number of assertions in Descartes which would otherwise appear irremediably obscure or problematic. For example, in my interpretation it is not puzzling that Descartes responds to Arnauld's difficulty (...) concerning the notion of material falsity by drawing a distinction between that to which an idea conforms (that of which the idea truly is) and that to which it refers. Furthermore, my interpretation also explains how Descartes can intelligibly reject the view that saying that something is clear and distinct is equivalent to saying that it is obvious. Finally, I argue that my interpretation allows Descartes' view that we have some sort of internal access to the objects actually represented by an idea. (shrink)
Northeast Brazil has been targeted for remedial projects to combat drought for more than 100 years, although drought mitigation policies have been mostly ineffective in reducing vulnerability for the majority of the population. In this paper I review some of the historical and contemporary approaches to drought mitigation and examine the efficacy of mitigation through the aperture of contemporary clientalism and the persistence of asymmetric power relations in democratic Brazil. Although the abertura , political opening, and end of a 20-year (...) military dictatorship allowed for improved civil and political rights and public demonstrations, this 'low-intensity' democracy has had few social and economic reforms that have hampered elite interests, minimized inequity, or empowered the poor. Patronage continues to be the dominant tool for survival, especially in the drought-ridden Northeast, where access to scarce state services is extremely competitive and personal connections determine or facilitate access. (shrink)
El artículo tiene entre sus propósitos valorar los modelos y teorías que han tenido una influencia determinante en el proceso de superación en liderazgo docente, y cómo ello influye en la labor que desarrollan los docentes universitarios para el logro de un rol transformador en su actividad. A través de la historia en este campo son muchos los modelos que han surgido, que han sido utilizados y puestos de moda en algunos momentos por diversas razones. Ante la variedad de los (...) mismos vienen preguntas ineludibles acerca de cuál es el modelo más adecuado o más utilizado cuando de liderazgo docente se trata. The main purpose of this article is to briefly assess the models and theories that have had a determining influence on the bettering process in teaching leadership, and the way it influences the job developed by university teaching personnel, specifically designed to achieve a transformer role of their activity. Through history, there have been many models that have come up, have been used, and have come back into fashion in different moments and for several reasons in this field. In view of their variety, unavoidable questions have come up, about the most suitable or used model when dealing with teaching leadership. (shrink)
Es característica de las instituciones de educación superior de calidad desarrollar una pedagogía del cambio. A partir de 1999 se estableció por la Oficina Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe un programa de la red de liderazgo educativo para formar una masa crítica de profesionales de la educación, precursores en liderazgo transformacional. El artículo que se presenta tiene entre sus propósitos valorar las tendencias contemporáneas de la superación en liderazgo docente en Latinoamérica, así como de los principales (...) modelos y teorías donde se incluye además, una estimación de los diversos estilos de liderazgo y su importancia para el logro de un rol transformador en el docente de la educación superior. Quality higher education institutions have the characteristic to develop a pedagogy of change. Since 1999, the Education Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean established a program of the educative leadership net, in order to create a critical group of professionals of the educative system, pioneers in transformational leadership. One of the main purposes of the following article is to assess contemporary trends of the bettering processes in teaching leadership in Latin America, as well as, the main models and theories. The different types of leadership are estimated and also their importance for the development of a transformer role of the teaching personnel in higher education. (shrink)
En el presente artículo argumento que algunos de los descubrimientos empíricos relativamente recientes en la biología del desarrollo nos llevan a abandonar ciertos conceptos de lo innato, en particular, aquellos que llamaremos 'internistas'. También examino la adecuación de tres caracterizaciones de lo innato propuestas recientemente que toman en cuenta los descubrimientos empíricos antes mencionados y pretenden recoger un núcleo importante de las connotaciones y afirmaciones asociadas a lo innato en algunas disciplinas empíricas. Además, argumento que dos de estas caracterizaciones son (...) inadecuadas por razones diversas, y que es más plausible considerar la tercera como una explicación del concepto de un rasgo fenotípico heredado. /// In this paper I argue that some relatively recent empirical findings in developmental biology lead us to abandon some concepts of innateness, in particular those which we shall call 'internalist concepts'. I also examine three characterizations of innateness that have been recently proposed--characterizations which take into account those empirical findings and are attempts to explain some of the most important connotations and assertions associated to the word 'innate' as it is used in some empirical disciplines. It is also argued that two of these characterizations are inadequate for various reasons, and that it is more plausible to consider the third characterization as an explication of the concept of an inherited phenotypic trait. (shrink)
Most cognitive scientists nowadays tend to think that at least some of the mind’s capacities are the product of biological evolution, yet important conceptual problems remain for all of them in order to be able to speak coherently of mental or cognitive systems as having evolved naturally. Two of these important problems concern the articulation of adequate, interesting and empirically useful concepts of homology and variation as applied to cognitive systems. However, systems in cognitive science are usually understood as functional (...) systems of some sort. Thus, talking about functional systems’ being homologous requires one’s having a solid, adequate and empirically articulated concept of functional homology—and the same is true of functional variation. Here I construct an original concept of functional homology that, in my view, adequately systematizes a number of the actual uses of the word ‘functional homology’ in a variety of biological disciplines and in ethology. I also propose a number of criteria for the empirical application of the concept that are analogous to the criteria that are actually used in comparative biology, ethology, and (possibly) molecular developmental genetics. Then I construct a concept of functional variation on the basis of this concept of homology. (shrink)
En el presente artículo examino algunas propuestas recientes que pretenden caracterizar una noción de lo innato coherente y teóricamente útil usando conceptos e ideas de la biología del desarrollo o de la biología evolucionista (o ambas), y argumento que la mayoría de elIas o bien padecen serios problemas conceptuales, o bien no pueden capturar de maneras biológicamente interesantes algunas de las connotaciones más importantes asociadas al termino ‘innato’ tal y como se usa en algunas disciplinas cognitivas de corte evolucionista. Asimismo, (...) defiendo mi propia propuesta mostrando que no tiene los problemas que aquejan a las otras propuestas, y sí muchas de sus ventajas.Here l examine some recent proposals to characterize a notion of innateness having some theoretical usefulness and using some concepts and ideas from either developmental biology or evolutionary biology (or both), and argue that most of them either have serious conceptual problems, or else fail to capture in biologically interesting ways some of the important connotations associated to the term ‘innate’ as it is used in some cognitive disciplines of an evolutionary sort. I also make my own proposal, and show that it does not have the problems that the other proposals have, having many of their advantages. (shrink)
