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Profile: Lorenzo Peña (Spanish national council for scientific research)
  1. Lorenzo Peña (1996). Graham Priest's «Dialetheism» -- Is It Althogether True? Sorites 7:28-56.
    Graham Priest's book In Contradiction is a bold defense of the existence of true contradictions. Although Priest's case is impressive, and many of his arguments are correct, his approach is not the only one allowing for true contradictions. As against Priest's, there is at least one contradictorialist approach which establishes a link between true contradictions and degrees of truth. All in all, such an alternative is more conservative, closer to mainstream analytical philosophy. The two approaches differ as regards the floodgate (...)
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  2.  22
    Lorenzo Peña (1990). Enlightened Empiricism. Theoria 5 (1-2):300-302.
  3.  14
    Lorenzo Peña (1987). Conferencia Internacional “Perspectives on Quine”. Theoria 3 (1):637-640.
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  4.  13
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). Second Intemational Colloqium on Cognitive Science. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):332-332.
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  5.  11
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Crónica de la Conferencia Internacional sobre la Argumentación. Theoria 2 (4):225-227.
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  6.  11
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1988). III International Congress of IDG-CNR: Expert Systems in Law. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (1):296-296.
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  7.  11
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1988). International Symposium on “Structures in Mathematical Theories”, Del Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia de la UPV. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (1):307-307.
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  8.  11
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Symposium Internacional Sobre El Pensamiento Filosófico de W. V. O. Quine. Theoria 1 (3):861-865.
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  9.  86
    Manuel Liz & Lorenzo Peña, Critical Notice of Subject, Thought and Context.
    `Houto') and XYZ (or whatever) in an alternative world (call it `Ekeino') being different stuffs. Of course the example is not by itself that important, since many other cases could be invented. Still, in the same way as that famous example has served to buttress Putnam's dictum about meaning not being in the head, the example's weakness detract plausibility from that sort of considerations. Now in fact there are such weaknesses. If the aquatic stuff in Houto is quite similar to (...)
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  10.  21
    Lorenzo Peña (1991). De la Logique Combinatoire des 'Generales Inquisitiones' aux Calculs Combinatoires Contemporains. Theoria 6 (1):129-159.
    In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...)
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  11.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1989). International Conference on Dialectics and Inconsistency in Knowledge Acquisition (Budapest, 16-18 de Mayo de 1989). Theoria 4 (2):555-557.
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  12.  10
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). International Conference ‘Symbolic-Numeric Data Analysis and Leaming’. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):334-335.
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  13.  18
    Lorenzo Peña (1991). De la logique combinatoire des 'Generales Inquisitiones' aux calculs combinatoires contemporains. Theoria 6 (1/2):129-159.
    In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...)
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  14.  9
    Lorenzo Peña (1988). º Congreso de la Asociación de Sociedades de Filosofía de Lengua Francesa, Dijon. Theoria 4 (1):278-280.
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  15.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1985). La II Conferencia sobre Frege. Ideas Y Valores 68 (68):151-161.
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  16.  8
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Filosofía Y Análisis Dei Lenguaje. Theoria 2 (1):192-195.
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  17.  8
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). Próximas colaboraciones en THEORIA. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):337-337.
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  18.  8
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1988). Premier Colloque Européen d’ELLIA sur “Droit-Décision-Informatique”. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (1):297-306.
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  19.  8
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1988). Special Issue of Theoria: “Leibniz’s Logical Calculi and Their Present Developments and Applications” . Call for Papers. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (1):308-308.
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  20.  14
    Lorenzo Peña (1991). Contradictions and Paradigms: A Paraconsistent Approach. In Marcelo Dascal (ed.), Cultural Relativism and Philosophy: North and Latin American Perspectives. E.J. Brill 7--29.
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  21.  32
    Lorenzo Peña (1985). Filosofia Della Logica. Theoria 1 (2):573-577.
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  22.  7
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1989). Special Issue of Theoria: “Leibniz’s Logical Calculi and Their Present Developments and Applications” . Second Announcement. Call for Papers. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (2):585-585.
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  23.  14
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). I Conferencia Internacional Sobre la Argumentación. Theoria 2 (1):225-227.
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  24.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1990). XXIII Congrès de l'Association Des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française (Hammamet, 1-5 de Septiembre de 1990). Theoria 5 (1):318-319.
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  25.  13
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Notes on Bergmann's New Ontology and Account of Relations. Philosophy Research Archives 12:219-249.
    Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to speak (...)
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  26.  13
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Lenguaje Y Privacidad. Theoria 2 (1):195-198.
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  27.  13
    Lorenzo Peña (1987). Lógica Y Ontología. Theoria 3 (1):610-613.
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  28.  13
    Lorenzo Peña (1987). Un Enfoque No-Clásico de Varias Antinomias Deónticas. Theoria 3 (1):67-94.
    Three (apparent ) deontic antinomies are discussed: the paradoxes of the watchman and the praiser, as weIl as deontic dilemmas. A paraconsistent deontic logic, Ad, is put forward whose underlying 1st-order calculus is an infinite-valued tensorial logic. Several arguments are offered bearing out be existence of deontic contradictions, while two ways of dealing with conditional obligation paradoxes within the framework of Ad are canvassed. While the aggregation rule and the ought-implies-can principle are upheld, sundry schemata are shown not to obtain (...)
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  29.  12
    Lorenzo Peña (1988). IV Congreso de Lenguajes Naturales Y Lenguajes Formales, Lerida. Theoria 4 (1):280-283.
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  30.  19
    Lorenzo Peña (1985). En memoria de Ayda J. Arruda. Theoria 1 (1):347-347.
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  31.  7
    Lorenzo Peña (1989). Crónica de la International Conference on Dialectics and Inconsistency in Knowledge Acquisition. Budapest, 16-18 de Mayo de 1989. [REVIEW] Theoria 11:555-557.
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  32.  11
    Lorenzo Peña (1992). Algunas aplicaciones filosóficas de las lógicas multivalentes. Theoria 7 (1/2/3):141-163.
    Many-Valued logics can harbour nonclassical connectives expressing truth-nuances. The course of development of many-valued logics has given rise to paraconsistent systems wherein a sentence can be both negated and asserted just in case it is only partly true. A recently implemented family of such logics is shown to be a useful tool in coping with a number of philosophical difficulties, such as Zeno’s paradox of the arrow. This family is somehow akin to fuzzy logics initiated by Zadeh, but unlike them (...)
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  33.  11
    Lorenzo Peña (1986). Logica Indutiva Et Probabilidade. Theoria 2 (1):189-191.
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  34.  5
    Lorenzo Peña (1985). Review of Nicola Grana, Filosofia della logica, Sentieri della logica & Logica paraconsistente. [REVIEW] Theoria 2:573-577.
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  35.  5
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). Congreso Intemacional ‘La Ciencia y el Descubrimiento de America’. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):333-333.
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  36.  5
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1988). 1989 International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 4 (1):293-293.
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  37.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1985). Agregados, Sistemas Y Euerpos: Un Enfoque Difuso-Conjuntual. Theoria 1 (1):159-175.
    A Fuzzy-Set Theoretical Framework -resting on a paraconsistent infinite-valued logic- is sketched, wherein a thorough ontological-reduction program can be carried out. The framework includes formulae of the form “x comprises z in the time-interval e”. Reducing aggregates to sets thus handled is shown to escape usual objections. Likewise, systems generally can be regarded as aggregates, hence as (fuzzy) sets -the purported nonextensionality of systems objection being disposed of owing to our system’s recognizing infinitely many membership degrees. So do bodies, too, (...)
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  38.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1988). Algunos debates filosóficos sobre los conjuntos difusos. Ideas Y Valores 78 (78):3-27.
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  39.  10
    Lorenzo Peña & Fernando Martínez Llorca (1991). VI Encuentro de la Sociedad Castellano-Leonesa de Filosofía (Salamanca, 8-11 de noviernbre de 1990). Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 6 (1/2):325-328.
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  40. Lorenzo Peña (1989). Pegueroles, Juan: San Agustín: Un platonismo cristiano. Diálogo Filosófico 14:296-298.
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  41.  6
    Lorenzo Peña (1993). Introducción a las lógicas no clásicas. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
    A comparative study of a broad range of logical systems, showing that classical logic is just one among them and thate there are useful nonclassical logics which are conservative extensions of classical logic, by risorting to several negations and several implications. The book is oriented towards a defense of fuzzy logics.
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  42.  8
    Lorenzo Peña (1993). Le choix de Dieu et le principe du meilleur. Dialectica 47 (2‐3):217-254.
    RésuméL'article examine la thèse leibnizienne de la tendance à l'existence de toutes les essences et de la réalisation de la série des êtres possibles qui, ensemble, ont le plus d'entité. Bien qu'elle offre une réponse à la question de savoir pourquoi il y a un monde – et pourquoi il s'agit du monde réel et non d'un autre –, la thèse se heurte à de nombreux obstacles. On tend actuellement àécarter les lectures nécessitaristes. L'article s'inscrit en faux contre cette tendance; (...)
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  43.  4
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). VI Congreso de la Society for Philosophy and Technology. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):331-331.
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  44.  12
    Lorenzo Peña (1992). La metafísica de Hector Castañeda. Theoria 7 (1/2/3):387-407.
    Castañeda’s most significant insights iie in his awareness of serious ontologicaI problems, which beset usual treatments. Among this outstandlng proposals are these about the structure of relational facts, guise theory and the bundle view of individuals, the I, and practitions. Castañeda’s metaphysics Is one of the most remarkable achievements in anaytical philosophy.
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  45.  4
    Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). III Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia de la Ciencia y de la Tecnología. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 5 (1-2):336-336.
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  46.  8
    Lorenzo Pena (forthcoming). Essence and Existence in Leibniz's Ontology. Synthesis Philosophica.
    The concept of every real thing from all eternity contains the unavoidability of its existence before the divine decision. Thus every complete concept of a real thing contains the property of being such that the thing will exist if a created universe exists. Then a thing's existence cannot be external to its concept. There is bound to be more in the concept of something that exists than in that of "something" that does not-since existence is explained through the quidditative property (...)
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  47.  10
    Lorenzo Peña (1987). Simposio Sobre “Hermeneutics and the Tradition”. Theoria 3 (1):641-643.
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  48.  7
    Lorenzo Peña (1989). Reseña de: Juan Pegueroles, San Agustín: Un platonismo cristiano. Diálogo Filosófico 14:296-298.
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  49.  7
    Lorenzo Peña (1991). Los dilemas morales en la filosofía analítica. Isegoría 3:43-79.
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  50.  7
    Lorenzo Peña (1989). Review of Lloyd P. Gerzon (Ed.), Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophia 19 (1):73-79.
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