Introductory Remarks Why Paradigm Variation is Ensuant upon Contradiction How Externalistic Warrant Parries the Threat of [Truth] Relativism Why Not to Ward Relativism off by Means of Foundationalistic Justification Defending a relativistic View of Warrant A Transcendental Argument against [Truth] Relativism Towards [Partial] convergence A Gradualistic Paraconsistent Way to Convergence 7.1. - Perspectivism and Non Copulative Paraconsistent Logics 7.2. - The Strength and Weakness of Two Copulative Approaches to Paraconsistent Logic 7.3. - The Logic of Contradictorial Gradualism 7.4. - Implementing (...) the Notion of Relative Truth Bibliographic References.. (shrink)
Da Costa's paraconsistent systems of the series Cm (for finite m) (see [C1], [C2], and esp. [C3], pp. 237ff.) share important features with transitive logic, TL (which has been gone into in [P1] and [P2]), namely, they all coincide in that: (c1) they possess a strong negation, `¬', a conditional, `⊃', a conjunction, `∧', and a disjunction, `∨', with respect to which they are conservative extensions of CL or Classical Logic; (c2) they possess a non strong negation, `N' (notations are (...) different for systems C) which does not possess all properties of classical negation, but for which the following schemata are theorematic (I use the letters `p', `q', etc as schematic letters; my notational conventions are basically Church's: associativity leftwards; a dot stands for.. (shrink)
En este trabajo estudio algunas de las convergencias y divergencias entre dos concepciones filosóficas que coinciden en reconocer la contradictorialidad de lo real, o sea: que coinciden en ser dialécticas. Trátase de la filosofía de Hegel y de la concepción que en muy diversos trabajos y desde hace años vengo denominando ontofántica, concepción cuya aceptación de la contradictorialidad de lo real se sitúa más en la línea de Platón que en la de Hegel.
There are two main approaches to a theory of rationality: the positive one and the negative one. The latter, which has gained increasing acceptance, is primarily concerned with rejecting what is irrational, which usually is equated with what is inconsistent. The positive approach has a quite different purpose, that of studying reasoning and, insofar as possible, enhancing the patterns or standards of our reasoning practice.
Arthur Lovejoy's masterful, highly influential interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy has been almost neglected for decades now. This paper tries to rehabilitate Lovejoy's construal (with a number of adaptations) by delving into the underlying logical links connecting Leibniz's principles of order and gradation (the latter also called `law of continuity', `principle of transition' or `principle of the jumpless change': natura non facit saltus ) with other fundamental principles of his mature philosophy.
Still, it is but fair for me to point out that several of the mainstays of the present proposal owe very little to the influence of the philosophers whose epistemological views have attracted me most — or for that matter to that of other analytical philosophers. I am referring to my acknowledging degrees of truth and existence and, consequently, degrees of knowledge, too.
Phonemes are minimal segments within the spoken message whose presence is relevant for distinguishing one message from a different one with another meaning. Each phoneme underlies different phonetic realizations. What sets a phoneme from another is fuzzy cluster of the fuzzy features. Thus the study of phonemic structures is likely to have much to gain from a gradualistic approach. Through a gradualistic treatment synchronic phonology could tally with the diachronic study in a simpler way than is customary. In this connection, (...) an obstacle to be overcome is a widespread adherence to classical logic. (shrink)
This essay belongs to a series of papers whose aim is to show that some differing accounts of relations in contemporary philosophy (commencing with Frege) are flawed because they resort to what can be labelled `hylomorphism'. Some standard difficulties of Aristotelianism reappear in these analytical approaches. All of them resort to «form» as playing the role of `«ctualizing» a given «matter» (objects taken as arguments, relata, or a relation along with the related terms -- the form then being, e.g., (...) a logical form, as Russell thought when writing his Theory of Knowledge) by making it into another entity. In these accounts the actualizing or structuring form lacks the quality (of actuality or objecthood or whatever) it bestows upon the matter it clings to. The puzzle lies in those forms' baffling slipperiness; for they cannot be meant or intended outside their role of actualizing or informing some matter. But, when we point to (the process or result of) their playing such a role, we cannot mean or intend the form itself, but only the informed matter -- or, if you please, the result of its being thus informed. For some approaches, a problem also arises concerning matter itself, one closely resembling Aristotelian problems with prime matter -- problems which have prompted some interpreters to deny that Aristotle posited any such entity Foot note 1_1 . What in these approaches plays the role of Aristotelian matter, when taken «prior to» or outside of its being «informed» by a form, lacks sufficient self being and endowment with qualities and ontological profile to be an entity directly meant as such. Such a problem e.g. affects Tractarian «objects», which are both form and content, but which can be meant as neither separately. It follows that their ipseity always eludes us and evades being meant or signified. As we are about to see, a similar problem affects Bergmann's new ontology. (shrink)
The main claim of this paper is that the boundary between scientific and non scientific knowledge does exist -- which means several things. First, it's not the case that anything goes: some irrationalists have been mistaken into acceptance of that wrong conclusion because they have remarked that, however the boundary might be drawn, some important scientific developments would fall afoul of the standards entitling a research practice to count as scientific. Second, the boundary is not an imaginary one, that is (...) to say besides what is scientific and what is unscientific there also is what lies at the boundary, certain research practices which are neither wholly scientific nor fully unscientific. Third, studying what is science is itself a kind of research belonging to the boundary, since the methods available in that research are not as strictly rigorous as those used in science proper; in fact, all of philosophy is included in the boundary in question. Fourth, the boundary (and in fact science itself) displays a characteristic structure pertaining to what are by now usually called «non wellfounded sets» -- sets, that is, which are somehow or other involved in themselves, whether as members, or as members of members or so on; the significance of the last thesis is that the best way of approaching philosophy of science is not standard set theory, but theories allowing non wellfounded sets are preferable. Fifth, and last, admission of the boundary's existence compels us to go beyond standard classical logic and to look for a more suitable logic, as for instance some kind of fuzzy paraconsistent logic. (shrink)
Raúl Orayen's Lógica, significado y ontología Foot note is a profound book, a thorough inquiry into several important issues in the philosophy of logic. Raúl Orayen is one of the outstanding analytical philosophers in the Spanish speaking world. As in his other publications, he displays a masterly reasoning power. No patched up solutions in this book. Orayen is not going to let what he takes to be unsatisfactory treatments off the hook with vague considerations of their being able to cope (...) «somehow or other» with such difficulties as beset them. (shrink)
It is widely known that Plato seems to be committed in a number of dialogues to the view that all perfections are “united” — whether such unity is construed as identity, which doesn’t lack textual evidence, or, more probably, as some kind of mutual “supervenience”. (See for instance Laches 199e3-4, Alcib. I 114d-116d, Protag. 329c-333d & 349a-c. Whatever the solution to those interpretive problems is, what anyway can be ascertained is that, when writing the Statesman, our philosopher is keen on (...) maintaining that not only is it not the case that all perfections are identical, but, moreover, some perfections do in fact clash with others, which means that a thing can possess one of them only to the extent it lacks the opposite perfection. However, as we’re going to see straight away, the Statesman’s main purpose and thrust is likely to be that of emphasizing the necessity of some unity among opposite qualities. The significance of such a contention can be set off against what will become the Aristotelian (and in effect the commonly received) view on the topic. In the Statesman Plato recognizes that in each case there is some desirable mean between the extremes, but where it lies changes according to circumstances. Trying to secure that convenient mean doesn’t debar us from loking upon the extremes under consideration as virtues or perfections themselves. Thus, when the Statesman is drawing towards its conclusion, the Foreigner abruptly brings up the issue of υπερβολην και την ελλειψιν (283c3-4), and thereby that of the art of measuring (η µετρητικη). Immediately the problem arises of the relations between the opposite extremes. In Theaet. 152d, 157a, 160b-c, it appears that Plato distinguishes relative from non-relative properties or determinations in the same way as he does between empirical, earthly, changeable things and the Forms. Yet in his later dialogues Plato is clearly committed to holding the view that the Forms themselves enter a number of relations, and even that some Forms partake of others. Since very early onwards he seems to have been concerned about some reciprocal relativity of opposite qualities (there are many places where such relativity is stressed, as Charm. 168b5-169a5, Phaed.. (shrink)
The concept of every real thing from all eternity contains the unavoidability of its existence before the divine decision. Thus every complete concept of a real thing contains the property of being such that the thing will exist if a created universe exists. Then a thing's existence cannot be external to its concept. There is bound to be more in the concept of something that exists than in that of "something" that does not-since existence is explained through the quidditative property (...) of being an essence that constitutes an integral part of the most perfect series of things. Such an essential, quidditative perfection explains the divine decision, and hence existence. Therefore, existence can be deduced from that essential perfection. The essence-as-such, the mere possible, contains something from which existence follows. What Leibniz never manages to explain is what distinguishes existence from the quidditative perfection it unavoidably stems from. (edited). (shrink)
While lawers and philosophers of law show the difference between matters of fact and normative situations, this paper proves that the difference is not crisp, since, in accordance with usual international private law, foreign juridical norms are, in principle, considered facts, but only up to a certain degree.
This paper develops several insights put forward in the book Republican Studies. It goes into the difference between republicanism as a concept pertaining to legal theory, i.e. a system free from dynastic power, and the political-philosophy trend which currently goes by the same name, also known as `civicism', hinging upon the notion of freedom as non-domination. As against such a view, the value of a classical notion of liberty is maintained. Further grounds to choose a republic rather than a monarchy (...) are analyzed. A Parlamentarian Republic is shown to offer a reasonable balance of powers. International implications of this conception are also sketched out, opening the prospect of a universal republic. Reparations for past grievances are advanced as a means to approach a system of international relations oriented towards a just integration of Planet Earth. (shrink)
The paper examines Beuchot's approach and agrees that there are many coincidences between medieval Aristotelianism and analytical philosophy. Both pursue philosophical inquiry in an argumentative manner. Nowadays analytical philosophy also tends to recognize as genuine such traditional metaphysical problems as were debated by the Scholastics. The paper's only criticism at Beuchot's views concerns analogy and reduplicative as-clauses. It argues that on that issue the cleavage between medieval and analytical philosophy lies in the latter's tending to favor complete equivocality of the (...) word «being». However, an alternative is possible, namely univocism, as implemented in combinatory logics, which while also rejecting reduplicative clauses is free from the ineffableness attendant upon equivocism. (shrink)
The main starting point of many of the contributions collected into the book is the kind of Twin Earth considerations, along with meaning individualism. Is Putnam's claim about water in this world and a stuff in an alternative world being different materials?. Is meaning in the head? One seems allowed to be skeptical about the starting point of the debate between such as emphasize broad content and those who think that the basic semantic entities are narrow contents, which would fail (...) to be world-dependent or world-oriented. The kind of motivations prompting the essays collected into the book are likely to be regarded as in need of a deeper elucidation by such as have been more or less influenced by Quine. Pettit & McDowell's collection of essays is one of the books most scholars interested in the confines of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind will find worth reading. (shrink)
The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
A comparative study of a broad range of logical systems, showing that classical logic is just one among them and thate there are useful nonclassical logics which are conservative extensions of classical logic, by risorting to several negations and several implications. The book is oriented towards a defense of fuzzy logics.
Many-Valued logics can harbour nonclassical connectives expressing truth-nuances. The course of development of many-valued logics has given rise to paraconsistent systems wherein a sentence can be both negated and asserted just in case it is only partly true. A recently implemented family of such logics is shown to be a useful tool in coping with a number of philosophical difficulties, such as Zeno’s paradox of the arrow. This family is somehow akin to fuzzy logics initiated by Zadeh, but unlike them (...) it contains as a tautology the principle of excluded middle. (shrink)
Castañeda’s most significant insights iie in his awareness of serious ontologicaI problems, which beset usual treatments. Among this outstandlng proposals are these about the structure of relational facts, guise theory and the bundle view of individuals, the I, and practitions. Castañeda’s metaphysics Is one of the most remarkable achievements in anaytical philosophy.
In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...) of 20th century combinatory logic, which (successfully!) practices - sometimes for reasons not entirely unlike Leibniz’s own grounds - reductions of the same kinds he tried to carry out. (shrink)
Three (apparent ) deontic antinomies are discussed: the paradoxes of the watchman and the praiser, as weIl as deontic dilemmas. A paraconsistent deontic logic, Ad, is put forward whose underlying 1st-order calculus is an infinite-valued tensorial logic. Several arguments are offered bearing out be existence of deontic contradictions, while two ways of dealing with conditional obligation paradoxes within the framework of Ad are canvassed. While the aggregation rule and the ought-implies-can principle are upheld, sundry schemata are shown not to obtain (...) which involve iterated deontic operators (most conspicuously: that whatever ought to be obligatory is obligatory; and that it is obligatory that whatever ought to be the case should in fact be the case). (shrink)
Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to speak (...) of subdeterminates and failure of a relation to be had by a referent towards a relatum. Instead of having a sense, a relation is conceived of as a determinate which enters an arrangement whose existence and nature are not properly accounted for. Finally, Bergmann’s Ideal Language is assayed and shown not to be as useful philosophically in itself as he takes it to be. (shrink)