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Satz posed the term "legal gerrymandering for human interest," referring to the redrawing of the natural baseline of protections for other animals to further human use of them. One of the domains where this exists most clearly is in scientific research on animal models. An animal model is sufficiently like humans in anatomy, physiology, or psychology to be used in research considered too harmful or risky for humans. I argue that the use of animal models is, by its very nature, (...) ethical gerrymandering and a corruption of the self-correcting component of the scientific process. (shrink)

One of the mammalian groups absent from the Finlay et al. study is cetaceans (dolphins, whales, and porpoises). Inclusion of cetaceans would be useful for assessing the generalizability of the authors' conclusions. Recent findings suggest dolphins may differ from the general pattern observed by Finlay et al. I encourage Finlay and her colleagues to include developmental neurobiological data on cetaceans, when available.

Smith et al. propose that the most parsimonious explanation for identical responses of humans and nonhumans under the same conditions is not always the simplest cognitive explanation but could be the one that has the most logical consistency across species. The authors provide convincing evidence and a reasonable argument for declarative consciousness as a shared psychological property in humans, monkeys, and dolphins.