Search results for 'Lorna Selfe' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Lorna Selfe (1980). A Review of Current Theories in Psychology of Children's Drawings. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 20 (2):160-164.score: 240.0
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  2. Lorna Selfe (1983). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 23 (3):268-270.score: 240.0
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  3. Timothy J. Reiss (2003). Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe. Stanford University Press.score: 18.0
    Through extensive readings in philosophical, legal, medical, and imaginative writing, this book explores notions and experiences of being a person from European antiquity to Descartes. It offers quite new interpretations of what it was to be a person—to experience who-ness—in other times and places, involving new understandings of knowing, willing, and acting, as well as of political and material life, the play of public and private, passions and emotions. The trajectory the author reveals reaches from the ancient sense of personhood (...)
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  4. Lorna Green (ed.) (2005). The Reign of the Holy Spirit, Christ-Self: I Am. iUniverse.score: 14.0
    The truth of human indentity in the consciousness universe.
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  5. James H. Wilmoth (1968). Invertebrates Invertebrate Zoology, Vol. 1 Alfred Kaestner Herbert W. Levi Lorna R. Levi. BioScience 18 (5):451-452.score: 10.0
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  6. Harlan B. Miller (1994). Rod Preece and Lorna Chamberlain, Animal Welfare & Human Values Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (3):204-206.score: 10.0
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  7. Stephen G. Nichols (2005). Timothy J. Reiss, Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. Xxi, 608; Black-and-White Frontispiece and 13 Black-and-White Figures. $70. [REVIEW] Speculum 80 (4):1354-1357.score: 10.0
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  8. Lesley Abrams (2004). Thomas R. Liszka and Lorna E. M. Walker, Eds., The North Sea World in the Middle Ages: Studies in the Cultural History of North-Western Europe. Dublin and Portland, Oreg.: Four Courts Press, 2001. Pp. 302; Black-and-White Figures, Tables, and Maps. $45. [REVIEW] Speculum 79 (1):231-232.score: 10.0
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  9. To See Our Flaws as Others (2003). Lorna Veraldi. In Howard Good (ed.), Desperately Seeking Ethics: A Guide to Media Conduct. Scarecrow Press.score: 10.0
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  10. Christopher Cannon (1996). Jennifer Potts, Lorna Stevenson, and Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Eds., Concordance to “Ancrene Wisse”: MS Corpus Christi College Cambridge 402. Woodbridge, Suffolk; and Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 1993. Pp. Xiii, 1249. $216. [REVIEW] Speculum 71 (1):193-195.score: 10.0
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  11. Sarah Cooper (2011). Lorna's Silence: Sartre and the Dardenne Brothers. In Jean-Pierre Boulé & Enda McCaffrey (eds.), Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema: A Sartrean Perspective. Berghahn Books.score: 10.0
     
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  12. Sarah Cooper (2011). Pursuits of Transcendence in The Man Who Wasn't There / Tom Martin - Lorna's Silence: Sartre and the Dardenne Brothers. In Jean-Pierre Boulé & Enda McCaffrey (eds.), Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema: A Sartrean Perspective. Berghahn Books.score: 10.0
     
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  13. John Dreijmanis (1974). Population and the American Future. The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. Pp. 186. (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1972.) Price $1·75.Population Probe: Canada. Lorna R. Marsden. Pp. Xviii + 179. (Copp Clark Publishing Co., Toronto, 1972.) Price $4·95. [REVIEW] Journal of Biosocial Science 6 (3):389-391.score: 10.0
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  14. Rg Farquharson (forthcoming). Population and the American Future. By The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. Pp. 186.(US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1972.) Price $1.75. Population Probe: Canada. By LORNA R. MARSDEN. Pp. Xviii+ 179.(Copp Clark Publishing Co., Toronto, 1972.) Price $4.95. [REVIEW] Journal of Biosocial Science.score: 10.0
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  15. Mario Pezzella, Thea Rimini & Katia Rossi (2009). Matrimonio di Lorna, L'Enfant e Rosetta dei fratelli Dardenne. Iride 22 (1):195-206.score: 10.0
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  16. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 9.0
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (...)
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  17. Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In , Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 55--74.score: 9.0
    In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. The second type of self-awareness he (...)
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  18. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press. 291-€“303.score: 9.0
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  19. Shaun Gallagher & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). The Self in Contextualized Action. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 273.score: 9.0
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the self. First, we (...)
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  20. J. Campbell (1995). The Body Image and Self-Consciousness. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 29--42.score: 9.0
    in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42.
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  21. Tomis Kapitan (2006). Indexicality and Self-Awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 379--408.score: 9.0
    Self-awareness is commonly expressed by means of indexical expressions, primarily, first- person pronouns like.
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  22. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. 141-161.score: 9.0
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  23. Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.) (1992). Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 9.0
    This volume contains an array of essays that reflect, and reflect upon, the recent revival of scholarly interest in the self and consciousness. Various relevant issues are addressed in conceptually challenging ways, such as how consciousness and different forms of self-relevant experience develop in infancy and childhood and are related to the acquisition of skill; the role of the self in social development; the phenomenology of being conscious and its metapsychological implications; and the cultural foundations of conceptualizations of consciousness. Written (...)
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  24. Diana T. Meyers (ed.) (1997). Feminists Rethink the Self. Westview Press.score: 9.0
    How is women’s conception of self affected by the caregiving responsibilities traditionally assigned to them and by the personal vulnerabilities imposed on them? If institutions of male dominance profoundly influence women’s lives and minds, how can women form judgments about their own best interests and overcome oppression? Can feminist politics survive in face of the diversity of women’s experience, which is shaped by race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, as well as by gender? Exploring such questions, leading feminist thinkers have (...)
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  25. Paul Silva Jr (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.score: 8.0
    An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...)
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  26. Bas van der Vossen (2014). Immigration and Self-Determination. Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594-14533167.score: 8.0
    This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions and show that each of these (...)
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  27. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.score: 8.0
    The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of personal identity, and (...)
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  28. Robert S. Taylor (2004). A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership. Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):65-78.score: 8.0
    Many scholars, including G. A. Cohen, Daniel Attas, and George Brenkert, have denied that a Kantian defense of self-ownership is possible. Kant's ostensible hostility to self-ownership can be resolved, however, upon reexamination of the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals. Moreover, two novel Kantian defenses of self-ownership (narrowly construed) can be devised. The first shows that maxims of exploitation and paternalism that violate self-ownership cannot be universalized, as this leads to contradictions in conception. The second shows that physical coercion against (...)
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  29. John A. Foster (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.score: 8.0
    The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
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  30. Neil Van Leeuwen (2009). Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy. Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):107-132.score: 8.0
    I argue here that self-deception is not conducive to happiness. There is a long train of thought in social psychology that seems to say that it is, but proper understanding of the data does not yield this conclusion. Illusion must be distinguished from mere imagining. Self-deception must be distinguished from self-inflation bias and from self-fulfilling belief. Once these distinctions are in place, the case for self-deception falls apart. Furthermore, by yielding false beliefs, self-deception undermines desire satisfaction. Finally, I argue for (...)
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  31. Sylvia Burrow (2012). Protecting One's Commitments: Integrity and Self-Defense. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):49-66.score: 8.0
    Living in a culture of violence against women leads women to employ any number of avoidance and defensive strategies on a daily basis. Such strategies may be self protective but do little to counter women’s fear of violence. A pervasive fear of violence comes with a cost to integrity not addressed in moral philosophy. Restricting choice and action to avoid possibility of harm compromises the ability to stand for one’s commitments before others. If Calhoun is right that integrity is a (...)
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  32. Robert S. Taylor (2005). Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism. Social Theory and Practice 31 (4):465-482.score: 8.0
    In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the incidents (...)
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  33. John Schwenkler (2014). Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'. Noûs 48 (1):137-155.score: 8.0
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, one’s own location can be among the things that visual experience represents, even when one’s body is entirely out of view. By contrast, the Minimal View denies this, and says that visual experience represents things only as "to the right", etc., and never as "to the right of me". But the Minimal View is phenomenologically inadequate: it cannot explain the difference between a visual experience of self-motion and one of an oppositely moving world. To show (...)
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  34. Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford Universityscore: 8.0
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
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  35. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Self-Deception. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 8.0
    In this entry, I seek to show the interdependence of questions about self-deception in philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. I taxonomize solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception, present possible psychological mechanisms behind it, and highlight how different approaches to the philosophy of mind and psychology will affect how we answer important ethical questions. Is self-deception conducive to happiness? How does self-deception affect responsibility? Is there something intrinsically wrong with self-deception? The entry, on the one hand, is a tour of (...)
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  36. Robert S. Taylor (2007). Self-Ownership and Transplantable Human Organs. Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (1):89-107.score: 8.0
    Philosophers have given sustained attention to the controversial possibility of (legal) markets in transplantable human organs. Most of this discussion has focused on whether such markets would enhance or diminish autonomy, understood in either the personal sense or the Kantian moral sense. What this discussion has lacked is any consideration of the relationship between self-ownership and such markets. This paper examines the implications of the most prominent and defensible conception of self-ownership--control self-ownership (CSO)--for both market and nonmarket organ-allocation mechanisms. The (...)
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  37. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar (eds.) (2000). Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Automony, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford University Press.score: 8.0
    This collection of original essays explores the social and relational dimensions of individual autonomy. Rejecting the feminist charge that autonomy is inherently masculinist, the contributors draw on feminist critiques of autonomy to challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical debates about agency, identity, and moral responsibility. The essays analyze the complex ways in which oppression can impair an agent's capacity for autonomy, and investigate connections, neglected by standard accounts, between autonomy and other aspects of the agent, including self-conception, self-worth, memory, and the (...)
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  38. Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2005). The Roots of Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.score: 8.0
    In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.
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  39. U. Neisser (1988). Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):35-59.score: 8.0
    Self-knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different 'self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or 'self-concept' draws (...)
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  40. Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 157--180.score: 8.0
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  41. Stan Klein (2012). The Self and its Brain. Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.score: 8.0
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
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  42. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.score: 8.0
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  43. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.score: 8.0
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
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  44. Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett (1998). Friendship and the Self. Ethics 108 (3):502-527.score: 8.0
    We argue that companion friendship is not importantly marked by self-disclosure as understood in either of these two ways. One's close friends need not be markedly similar to oneself, as is claimed by the mirror account, nor is the role of private information in establishing and maintaining intimacy important in the way claimed by the secrets view. Our claim will be that the mirror and secrets views not only fail to identify features that are in part constitutive of close or (...)
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  45. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.score: 8.0
    In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for (...)
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  46. Corey W. Dyck (2011). A Wolff in Kant's Clothing: Christian Wolff's Influence on Kant's Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):44-53.score: 8.0
    In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute (...)
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  47. Robert Schroer (2013). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.score: 8.0
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  48. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.score: 8.0
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  49. Natalie Gold (2013). Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account. In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and SelfControl.score: 8.0
    Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the incentives or choice-sets of future selves. There is no role for an extended agency over time. However, it is possible to extend game theory to allow multiple levels of agency. At the inter-personal level, theories of team reasoning allow teams to be agents, as well as individuals. I apply team (...)
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  50. T. S. S. Schilhab (2004). What Mirror Self-Recognition in Nonhumans Can Tell Us About Aspects of Self. Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):111-126.score: 8.0
    Research on mirror self-recognition where animals are observed for mirror-guided self-directed behaviour has predominated the empirical approach to self-awareness in nonhuman primates. The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth, or grooming the eye by aid of mirrors has been interpreted as recognition of self and evidence of a self-concept. Three decades of research has revealed that contrary to monkeys, most great apes (humans, common chimpanzees, pygmy chimpanzees and orangutans (...)
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