Search results for 'Lotteries' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ben Saunders (2009). A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):279 - 290.score: 18.0
    The three most common responses to Taurek’s ‘numbers problem’ are saving the greater number, equal chance lotteries and weighted lotteries. Weighted lotteries have perhaps received the least support, having been criticized by Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other ( 1998 ) and Hirose ‘Fairness in Life and Death Cases’ ( 2007 ). This article considers these objections in turn, and argues that they do not succeed in refuting the fairness of a weighted lottery, which remains a (...)
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  2. Guy Sela (2010). Moral Luck and Liability Lotteries. Res Publica 16 (3):317-331.score: 18.0
    Adversaries of Moral Luck (AMLs) are at pains to explain why wrongdoers are liable to bear burdens (punishment, compensation etc.) which are related to the harm they cause, because the consequences of what we do are a matter of luck. One attempt to solve this problem suggests that wrongdoers who cause more harm are liable to bear a greater burden not because they are more blameworthy but rather because they get the short straw in a liability lottery (represented by the (...)
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  3. Ulrich Schmidt & Stefan Traub (2009). An Experimental Investigation of the Disparity Between WTA and WTP for Lotteries. Theory and Decision 66 (3):229-262.score: 18.0
    In this paper we experimentally investigate the disparity between willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for risky lotteries. The direction of the income effect is reversed by endowing subjects with the highest price of a lottery when asking the WTP question. Our results show that the income effect is too small to be the only source of the disparity. Since the disparity concentrates on a subsample of subjects, parametric and nonparametric tests of the WTA-WTP ratio may lead to contradictory results. (...)
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  4. Philip Kremer (2014). Indeterminacy of Fair Infinite Lotteries. Synthese 191 (8):1757-1760.score: 18.0
    In ‘Fair Infinite Lotteries’ (FIL), Wenmackers and Horsten use non-standard analysis to construct a family of nicely-behaved hyperrational-valued probability measures on sets of natural numbers. Each probability measure in FIL is determined by a free ultrafilter on the natural numbers: distinct free ultrafilters determine distinct probability measures. The authors reply to a worry about a consequent ‘arbitrariness’ by remarking, “A different choice of free ultrafilter produces a different ... probability function with the same standard part but infinitesimal differences.” They (...)
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  5. Rachel McKinnon (2011). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.score: 16.0
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and (...)
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  6. Jennifer Reynolds (2013). Hospital Charitable Lotteries: Taking a Gamble on Systems Thinking. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (6):1090-1094.score: 15.0
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  7. Sylvia Wenmackers (2012). Ultralarge and Infinite Lotteries. In B. Van Kerkhove, T. Libert, G. Vanpaemel & P. Marage (eds.), Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II (Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2010). Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten.score: 14.0
    By exploiting the parallels between large, yet finite lotteries on the one hand and countably infinite lotteries on the other, we gain insights in the foundations of probability theory as well as in epistemology. We solve the 'adding problems' that occur in these two contexts using a similar strategy, based on non-standard analysis.
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  8. Reinhard Selten, Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink (1999). Money Does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do Even Worse. Theory and Decision 46 (3):213-252.score: 14.0
    If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives' (...)
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  9. Sylvia Wenmackers & Leon Horsten (2013). Fair Infinite Lotteries. Synthese 190 (1):37-61.score: 12.0
    This article discusses how the concept of a fair finite lottery can best be extended to denumerably infinite lotteries. Techniques and ideas from non-standard analysis are brought to bear on the problem.
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  10. John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire (...)
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  11. Ben Saunders (2008). The Equality of Lotteries. Philosophy 83 (3):359-372.score: 12.0
    Lotteries have long been used to resolve competing claims, yet their recent implementation to allocate school places in Brighton and Hove, England led to considerable public outcry. This article argues that, given appropriate selection is impossible when parties have equal claims, a lottery is preferable to an auction because it excludes unjust influences. Three forms of contractualism are discussed and the fairness of lotteries is traced to the fact that they give each person an equal chance, as a (...)
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  12. Dorothy P. Coleman (1988). Hume, Miracles and Lotteries. Hume Studies 14 (2):328-346.score: 12.0
    THIS PAPER ANSWERS RECENT CRITICISMS OF HUME’S SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO MIRACLES BY THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT THERE ARE COUNTEREXAMPLES, ILLUSTRATED BY LOTTERIES, TO HUME’S ACCOUNT OF HOW THE TRUTH OF REPORTS ABOUT IMPROBABLE EVENTS MUST BE EVALUATED. THE AUTHOR FIRST SHOWS THAT THESE ARGUMENTS ARE ANALOGOUS TO BUTLER’S CRITICISM OF HUME’S PREDECESSORS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT MIRACLES. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT EACH OF THESE CRITICISMS COLLAPSES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBABILITIES PERTAINING TO EVENTS QUA UNIQUE OCCURRENCES AND PROBABILITIES (...)
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  13. Mathieu Doucet (2013). Playing Dice with Morality: Weighted Lotteries and the Number Problem. Utilitas 25 (2):161-181.score: 12.0
    In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...)
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  14. John Turri & Ori Friedman (forthcoming). Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries. In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology.score: 12.0
    We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the (...)
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  15. Sylvia Wenmackers (2013). Ultralarge Lotteries: Analyzing the Lottery Paradox Using Non-Standard Analysis. Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):452-467.score: 12.0
    A popular way to relate probabilistic information to binary rational beliefs is the Lockean Thesis, which is usually formalized in terms of thresholds. This approach seems far from satisfactory: the value of the thresholds is not well-specified and the Lottery Paradox shows that the model violates the Conjunction Principle. We argue that the Lottery Paradox is a symptom of a more fundamental and general problem, shared by all threshold-models that attempt to put an exact border on something that is intrinsically (...)
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  16. Barbara Goodwin (1992). Justice by Lottery. University of Chicago Press.score: 12.0
    In this imaginative and provocative book, Barbara Goodwin explores the question of how lottery systems can achieve egalitarian social justice in societies with seemingly ineradicable inequalities. She begins with the utopian fable of Aleatoria, a country not unlike our own in the not-too-distant-future, where most goods are distributed by lottery--even the right to have children. She then analyzes the philosophical arguments for and against lottery distribution and a comparison of "justice by lottery" with other contemporary theories of justice. Goodwin also (...)
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  17. Darryl Gunson & Hugh McLachlan (2013). Risk, Russian-Roulette and Lotteries: Persson and Savulescu on Moral Enhancement. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):877-884.score: 12.0
    The literature concerning the possibility and desirability of using new pharmacological and possible future genetic techniques to enhance human characteristics is well-established and the debates follow some well-known argumentative patterns. However, one argument in particular stands out and demands attention. This is the attempt to tie the moral necessity of moral enhancement to the hypothesised risks that allowing cognitive enhancement will bring. According to Persson and Savulescu, cognitive enhancement should occur only if the risks they think it to poses are (...)
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  18. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2012). Doing the Best One Can: A New Justification for the Use of Lotteries. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):45-72.score: 12.0
    : In some cases in which rational and moral agents experience moral uncertainty, they are unable to assign exact degrees of moral value—in a non-arbitrary way—to some of the different acts available to them, and so are unable to choose with certainty the best act. This article presents a new justification for the use of lotteries in this kind of situation. It is argued that sometimes the only rational thing for a morally motivated agent to do here is to (...)
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  19. Gerhard Øverland (2007). Survival Lotteries Reconsidered. Bioethics 21 (7):355–363.score: 11.0
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  20. Rachel McKinnon (2013). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives. Dialogue 52 (3):523-549.score: 11.0
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  21. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 10.0
    It is a platitude in epistemology to say that knowledge excludes luck. Indeed, if one can show that an epistemological theory allows ‘lucky’ knowledge, then that usually suffices to warrant one in straightforwardly rejecting the view. Even despite the prevalence of this intuition, however, very few commentators have explored what it means to say that knowledge is incompatible with luck. In particular, no commentator, so far as I am aware, has offered an account of what luck is and on this (...)
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  22. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.score: 10.0
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, (...)
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  23. Dylan Dodd (2012). Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries. Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.score: 10.0
    Abstract Several philosophers have claimed that S knows p only if S’ s belief is safe, where S's belief is safe iff (roughly) in nearby possible worlds in which S believes p, p is true. One widely held intuition many people have is that one cannot know that one's lottery ticket will lose a fair lottery prior to an announcement of the winner, regardless of how probable it is that it will lose. Duncan Pritchard has claimed that a chief advantage (...)
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  24. Donald Smith (2005). Knowledge and Lotteries. Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131.score: 10.0
    John Hawthorne’s recent monograph Knowledge and Lotteries1 is centred on the following puzzle: Suppose you claim to know that you will not be able to afford to summer in the Hamptons next year. Aware of your modest means, we believe you. But suppose you also claim to know that a ticket you recently purchased in a multi-million dollar lottery is a loser. Most of us have the intuition that you do not know that your ticket is a loser. However, your (...)
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  25. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.score: 10.0
    Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently (...)
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  26. Alexander R. Pruss (2012). Infinite Lotteries, Perfectly Thin Darts and Infinitesimals. Thought 1 (2):81-89.score: 10.0
    One of the problems that Bayesian regularity, the thesis that all contingent propositions should be given probabilities strictly between zero and one, faces is the possibility of random processes that randomly and uniformly choose a number between zero and one. According to classical probability theory, the probability that such a process picks a particular number in the range is zero, but of course any number in the range can indeed be picked. There is a solution to this particular problem on (...)
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  27. Peter Baumann (2004). Lotteries and Contexts. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415 - 428.score: 10.0
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some lottery proposition which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance:I will never be a multi-millionaire entails I will not win this lottery). How is this possible – given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as the Lottery puzzle, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I discuss (...)
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  28. Eugene Mills (2012). Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335 - 352.score: 10.0
    I seem to know that I won't experience spaceflight but also that if I win the lottery, then I will take a flight into space. Suppose I competently deduce from these propositions that I won't win the lottery. Competent deduction from known premises seems to yield knowledge of the deduced conclusion. So it seems that I know that I won't win the lottery; but it also seems clear that I don't know this, despite the minuscule probability of my winning (if (...)
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  29. Alexander R. Pruss (2014). Infinitesimals Are Too Small for Countably Infinite Fair Lotteries. Synthese 191 (6):1051-1057.score: 10.0
    We show that infinitesimal probabilities are much too small for modeling the individual outcome of a countably infinite fair lottery.
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  30. Bruce Langtry (1990). Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles. Hume Studies 16 (1):67-74.score: 10.0
    Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails.
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  31. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (1):178-192.score: 9.0
  32. Steffen Borge (2006). Review of John Hawthorne’s Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Disputatio (20).score: 9.0
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  33. John Hawthorne (2004). Précis of Knowledge and Lotteries. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):476–481.score: 9.0
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  34. Richard Feldman (2007). Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211–226.score: 9.0
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  35. Keith DeRose (1996). Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.score: 9.0
  36. Gilbert Harman & Brett Sherman (2004). Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):492–500.score: 9.0
    John Hawthorne’s marvelous book contains a wealth of arguments and insights based on an impressive knowledge and understanding of contemporary discussion. We can address only a small aspect of the topic. In particular, we will offer our own answers to two questions about knowledge that he discusses.
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  37. Ben Saunders (2010). Fairness Between Competing Claims. Res Publica 16 (1):41-55.score: 9.0
    Fairness is a central, but under-theorized, notion in moral and political philosophy. This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, it criticizes Broome’s seminal account of fairness in ( 1990–1991 ) Proc Aristotelian Soc 91:87–101, showing that there are problems with restricting fairness to a matter of relative satisfaction and holding that it does not itself require the satisfaction of the claims in question. Secondly, it considers the justification of lotteries to resolve cases of ties between competing claims, which Broome claims (...)
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  38. Iwao Hirose (2007). Weighted Lotteries in Life and Death Cases. Ratio 20 (1):45–56.score: 9.0
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  39. Christoph Kelp (2008). Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.score: 9.0
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded (...)
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  40. William Harper, Sheldon J. Chow & Gemma Murray (2012). Bayesian Chance. Synthese 186 (2):447-474.score: 9.0
    This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis’s Principal Principle and David Christensen’s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa’s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assignment to represent preferences (...)
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  41. Gary Becker, Status, Lotteries and Inequality¤.score: 9.0
    For several centuries, economists, sociologists, and philosophers have been concerned with the magnitude and e¤ects of inequality. Economists have concentrated on inequality in income and wealth, and have linked this inequality to social welfare, aggregate savings and investment, economic development, and other issues. They have explained the observed degree of inequality by the e¤ect of random shocks, inherited position, and inequality..
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  42. B. Saunders (2012). Combining Lotteries and Voting. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (4):347-351.score: 9.0
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  43. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Lotteries and Miracles. In Unknown Unknown (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2. Oxford Univ Pr. 275-316.score: 9.0
    (forthcoming in Oxford Readings in the Philosophy of Religion).
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  44. John Collins (2006). Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 83.score: 9.0
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  45. R. A. Duff (1990). Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of Attempts. Law and Philosophy 9 (1):1 - 37.score: 9.0
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  46. Peter Stone (2007). Why Lotteries Are Just. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3):276–295.score: 9.0
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  47. Alan Goldman (2008). Knowledge, Explanation, and Lotteries. Noûs 42 (3):466-481.score: 9.0
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  48. A. Brueckner (2005). Review: Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (453):160-165.score: 9.0
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  49. J. Davies (1997). QALYs, Lotteries and Veils. Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (2):119-119.score: 9.0
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