Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After (...) Russell reread Lotze in June 1897, he claimed that the solution of the dilemma of pluralism or monism depends on how we see space and time: as relational or as adjectival? (iii) Russell decided for the relational conception only after he attended lectures by McTaggart on Lotze in January to February 1898. The lectures helped Russell to advance (from April to June 1898) a new theory of judgment according to which judgments relate terms (individuals) which are distinct one from another. Space and time moreover are series of moments and places with external relations between themselves. The discussions Russell had with Moore in May to June 1898 took place only after Russell developed this conception; they did not cause his philosophical turn. (shrink)
Hermann Lotze was a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century, influencing practically all the leading philosophical schools of the late nineteenth and the coming twentieth century, including (i) the neo-Kantians; (ii) Brentano and his school; (iii) The British idealists; (iv) William James’s pragmatism; (v) Husserl’s phenomenology; (vi) Dilthey’s philosophy of life; (vii) Frege’s new logic; (viii) the early Cambridge analytic philosophy.
Lotze’s influence on the development of the XIXth and XXth century philosophy and psychology remains largely neglected still today. In this paper, I examine some Lotzean elements in Husserl’s early conception of intentionality, and more specifically in his rejection of the Brentanian concept of intentionality. I argue that Husserl and Lotze, pace Brentano, share a qualitative conception of experiences, what they both call the Zumutesein of experiences. Furthermore, I discuss other issues upon which Husserl and Lotze share (...) common intuitions: the perception of space, the theory of local signs, the realisations of thinking (Leistungen des Denkens) and phenomenology. (shrink)
While Hermann Lotze's philosophy was widely received all over the world, his views on abstraction and Platonic ideas are of particular interest because they were to a large extent adopted by one of the most eminent philosophers of the twentieth century, namely Edmund Husserl. In this paper these views are examined in three distinct aspects. The first of these aspects is to be found in Lotze's thesis that there is a mental process, prior to abstraction, whereby "first universals" (...) are apprehended. The second one lies in his view that there is yet a higher level of apprehension, as found in the process of abstraction itself. According to Lotze, abstraction is not to be identified with the mere removal of particular features, but rather the replacement of these with first universals, resulting in "general images" and ultimately concepts. In addition to Lotze's analysis of the cognition of universals, there is finally a third thesis (an ontological one) which is examined in this paper, namely that the universals are Platonic Ideas in the sense that they have "validity" (Geltung) independently of their corresponding particulars and also of the mind which grasps them. The three claims in question are examined here in detail. Also, an attempt is made to point out some of the connections between Lotze and Husserl on the topic under discussion. (shrink)
Frege held that logical objects are objective but not wirklich, and that psychologism follows from the mistake of believing whatever is not wirklich to be subjective. It has been suggested that Frege's use of the terms ?objective? and ?wirklich? is in line with that found in Lotze's Logic; from this it has been inferred that Frege's doctrines have been misinterpreted as being ontological in character, but that they really belong to epistemology. In fact, Lotze held that something may (...) be the same for all thinkers, and yet may exist only in thought, not independently of it. For Frege, by contrast, there is nothing intermediate between the content of a single consciousness and what exists independently of being thought at all. This crucial disagreement underlies the divergence between Frege's realism and Lotze's idealism. (shrink)
Die Zusammenhänge die zwischen G. Freges und R. H. Lotzes logischen Lehren bestehen, sind, wie die gemeinsame Beurteilung der Gebrauchssprache zeigt, noch tiefer als allgemein angenommen. Insbesondere die von Frege konzipierte logische Sprachkritik ist in drei Punkten von Lotze beeinflußt. Lotze fordert nämlich die strenge Trennung von Logik und Gebrauchssprache. Daneben spielt der Begriff des Logischeinfachen eine zentrale Rolle in seiner Logik. Schließlich unterscheidet er den objektiven Gedanken von seiner Färbung. The connexions that exist between the logical doctrines (...) of G. Frege and R. H. Lotze are, as shows their common treatment of natural language, deeper than is generally admitted. In particular, the logical criticism of language conceived by Frege is influenced in three points by Lotze. Firstly, Lotze postulates the strict separation of logic and natural language. Furthermore, the idea of logical simplicity plays an important role in his logic. Finally, he distinguishes objective thought from its tone. (shrink)
Michael Dummett has shown that the fragment ?17 Kernsätze zur Logik? is evidence that Frege knew Lotze's Logik Dummett?s dating of this fragment prior to 1879, however, must be rejected.The present paper shows that there are other articles of Frege?s which bear clear traces of Lotze's LogikFirst of all, the expressions Vorstellungsverlauf from ?Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift?, and veranlassenden Ursachen, from ?Logik?, certainly are borrowed from Lotze.Second, there are links between ?Booles rechnende Logik und die (...) Begriffsschrift? and Lotze's Logik. Furthermore, it is shown that Frege?s ?Kernsätze?, the ?Dialog mit Pünjer über Existenz?, and his ?Logik? are intimately connected.All of this indicates that these texts were written in roughly the same period, namely the early 1880s.Conclusive evidence for this is that the terms Vorstellung and Vorstellungsverbindung are used indiscriminately in both a psychological and a logical sense in the ?Begriffsschrift?, a fact which contradicts the ?Kernsätze? (shrink)
The development of a methodologically naturalistic approach to physiological and experimental psychology in the nineteenth century was not primarily driven by a naturalistic agenda. The work of R. Hermann Lotze and G. T. Fechner help to illustrate this claim. I examine a selected set of central commitments in each thinkers philosophical outlook, particularly regarding the human soul and the nature of God, that departed strongly from a reductionist materialism. Yet, each contributed significantly to the formation of experimental and physiological (...) psychology. Their work was influenced substantively by their respective philosophical commitments. Nevertheless, the evaluation of the merits of their specific proposals, Fechner's psychophysics and Lotze's local sign hypothesis respectively, did not depend upon sharing their metaphysical views regarding the human soul or the nature of God. A moderate, but significant, distinction between the contexts of discovery and of justification aids in understanding this balancing act. (shrink)
In the Logical Investigations Husserl announced a critique of Lotze’s epistemology, but it was never included in the printed text. The aim of my paper is to investigate the remnant of Husserl’s planned text with special emphasis on the question of whether it goes beyond the obvious aspects of Husserl’s indebtedness to Lotze. Using Husserl’s student notes, excerpts, and book annotations, I refine the dating of Husserl’s encounter with Lotze and separate the various layers of influence. I (...) argue that Husserl’s acquaintance with Lotze’s epistemology forms a separate layer of influence, and that this layer cannot antedate the middle of the decade before the Logical Investigation. Husserl’s investigation of Lotze’s epistemology constitutes the most interesting aspect of the unpublished text that underlies the missing chapter from the Logical Investigations. I show that the most relevant influence of Lotze’s epistemology on Husserl lies in Lotze’s idea of the formal and real significance of logical laws. Although Husserl negatively evaluated Lotze’s epistemological problem both in the planned chapter and in other printed parts of the Logical Investigations, the problem repeatedly surfaced during Husserl’s Göttingen period. Finally, I use an unpublished student transcript to reconstruct Husserl’s SS 1912 seminar on Lotze’s epistemology. I argue that the deeper dimension of Lotze’s epistemological problem (and Husserl’s rejection of it) lies in the way that it highlights the epistemological function of phenomenology. (shrink)
Situating Lotze in the School of Speculative Theology, I use debates about Schelling’s critique of Hegel—then and now—to understand Lotze’s critique of Hegel. Lotze’s early metaphysics seems to employ a version of Hegel’s dialectical analysis of being, phenomena, and mind emphasizing “the interconnection of things.” One can equally argue that he proceeds in an analytic style of reviewing and testing alternative theories. My tentative conclusion is that he assumes the existence of reality (the Absolute) like Schelling, and (...) makes cognition a process subordinate to that reality. In this respect, he goes beyond his Kantian mentors J. F. Fries and E. F. Apelt. From all these sources came a radically original Gestalt metaphysics. For example, he reverses Kant’s forms of intuition (Anschauung) into “forms of intuitability”(Anschaulichkeit), including the relational categories of space, time, motion, mechanism, organism, law, and event. He then makes the categories into ethical levels of a “teleological idealism.” In this way he overcomes his Herbartian teachers’ separation of metaphysics from ethics, evincing his center Hegelian roots. (shrink)
The influence of Brentano on the emergence of Husserl's notion of intentionality has been usually perceived as the key of understanding the history of intentionality, since Brentano was credited with the discovery of intentionality, and Husserl was his discipline. This much debated question is to be revisited in the present essay by incorporating recent advances in Brentano scholarship and by focusing on Husserl's very first work, his habilitation essay (Über den Begriff der Zahl), which followed immediately after his study years (...) at Brentano, and also on manuscript notes from the same period. It is to be shown that (i) although Brentano failed to enact a direct influence on Husserl's notion of intentionality (much in line with K. Schuhmann's claim), (ii) yet the core of Brentano's notion remained operative in Husserl's theory of relations, which is seemingly influenced by John Stuart Mill and Hermann Lotze. This investigation is intended as a contribution towards the proper understanding of the complexities of Husserl's early philosophy. (shrink)
English title: The Problem of the Synthetic a priori Judgements According to Hermann Lotze. The present article compares Kant’s and Lotze’s concepts of synthetic judgements. Lotze’s aim is a renewing of the Kant’s solutions, what he achieves thanks to introduction of the distinction between analytic (identical) content and synthetic form of these judgements which Kant recognised as synthetic. This distinction makes possible to lay down the concept of intentional sense which has influence over Frege and Husserl.
In this study the notion of mechanistic entities is analyzed as it has been conceptualized by Hermann Lotze in his article Life. Vital Force (1842), the metaphysical foundation of which has recourse to his Metaphysik (1841) and Logik (1843). According to Lotze, explanations in the sciences are arguments which have a syntactic and a semantic structure—similar to that which became later known as the DN-model of explanation. The syntactic structure is delineated by ontological forms, the semantic by cosmological (...) ones; the latter comprise the preconditions for the construction of appearances in accord with the ontological forms. Mechanisms are embedded into this logical framework by representing the more complex spatio-temporal arrangements of cosmological entities. The coordinated model of a mechanism is a reductive type of explanation. This study also demonstrates how Lotze made use of his concept of mechanisms in order to explain law-like and probabilistic events in organic and inorganic nature, thereby establishing an original ‘oligomeric’ (i. e., a fraction of the parts of a system determines its development) variant of a preformative theory of ontogenesis which anticipates modern concepts of genetic determination. In this context, Lotze alludes to paradigms of dissipative structures. The relevance of these reflections for subsequent theories is shown by contrasting them with Schrödinger’s theory of organisms. Finally, a comparison of some aspects of Lotze’s concept of mechanisms with equivalent aspects of current normative approaches confirms that essential elements of the latter versions can be retrieved in the former one. Above that, Lotze employs the teleological aspect of ontological forms in order to determine the extent of the mechanistic system under consideration. He further differentiates three modal states of mechanisms and includes a concept to explain exceptions or irregularities. The concept of ‘activity’ is strictly excluded from his account and shown to be a metaphysical illusion. (shrink)