James Watson February 6, 2002 Genes, Girls, and Gamow Lou Massa: Welcome to Science & the Written Word. I'm Lou Massa. Dr. James D. Watson is President of ...
Awareness is a personal experience, which is only accessible to the rest of world through interpretation. We set out to identify a neural correlate of visual awareness, using brief subliminal and supraliminal verbal stimuli while measuring cerebral blood flow distribution with H215O PET. Awareness of visual verbal stimuli differentially activated medial parietal association cortex (precuneus), which is a polymodal sensory cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is thought to be primarily executive. Our results suggest participation of these higher order perceptual (...) and executive cortical structures in visual verbal awareness. (shrink)
Hu Shi frequently gave lectures on the history of Chinese philosophy, especially the history of ancient Chinese philosophy, from the year 1919 to 1937. A large number of papers and dissertations published during this period are related to his research on this topic. In his opinion, there are three characteristics of the history of ancient Chinese philosophy: “ religionalization of thought,” “Indianization of philosophy,” and “conflict between Chinese thought and Indian thought.” In this paper, I explore Hu Shi’s deep insight (...) into the religionalization of Confucianism in Han dynasty and into the thought of Taoism in the medieval times. (shrink)
Este trabalho tem como objetivo, investigar como se deu o surgimento do que Hannah Arendt denominou esfera do social, assim como a formação do homem de massa após a vitória do animal laborans na era moderna. Para tanto recorreremos Grécia antiga com o fito de conceituar o que esta autora denominou de público e privado, em seguida mostraremos como está configurado tais domínios na era moderna e suas influências na formação do que se denomina esfera do social na filosofia (...) política arendtiana. Resumé Cette étude a pour objectif analyser l’origine de ce que Hannah Arendt appelait la sphère social, ainsi que la formation de l'homme de masse après la victoire de l’ animal laborans dans l'ère moderne. De ce fait, nous recourrerons à la Grèce antique dans le but de conceptualiser ce qui s’appelais autrefois public et privé, puis nous montrerons comment sont configurés tels domaines dans l'époque moderne et leurs influences sur la formation de ce qu'on appelle la sphère social dans la philosophie politique de Hannah Arendt. Mots-clé : sphère social, homme de masse, animal laborans , sphère public, sphère privé. (shrink)
De kennis van de "werkelijkheid", die zich achter den dichten nevel van veelzinnige woorden verbergt, is op het gebied der massa-psychologie wel heel moeilijk toegankelijk. Dit blijkt duidelijk uit de heerschende theorieën, inzonderheid de pessimistische theorieën van de laatste halve eeuw, over den zoogenaamd noodlottigen invloed van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel op het oordeel van de, in zulk een gevoel vereenigde, menschen. De meeste der opvattingen, die thans over de mogelijkheden en de onontbeerlijkheid der politieke propaganda worden verkondigd, passen in hetzelfde (...) kader van onklare, overdreven angstvoorstellingen betreffende de verstandelijke tekortkomingen van den mensch in de massa. Het nuchtere onderzoek, dat op de vaststelling van verifieerbare feiten is gericht, dient zich te hoeden voor de vele fouten, die vooral op het gebied der massa-psychologie plegen te worden gemaakt. Het dient zich voornamelijk bewust te zijn, dat het gevaar eener ongegronde veralgemeening hier bijzonder groot is. We zien "dè massa" niet, zelfs niet, wanneer we menschenmenigten vóór ons zien. We willen immers doordringen tot de onzichtbare gevoelens, waarvan we niet kunnen weten, in hoeverre en in welken graad ze zich van de menschen, die we zien, hebben meester gemaakt! Inderdaad zijn we dan ook niet in staat, de "massa" psychologisch te onderzoeken, maar wel afzonderlijke individuen, zij het dan ook vele individuen. Daarbij komt nog, dat de in dit verband voor de geestelijke processen gebezigde woorden zoo vaag onmogelijk zijn. We kennen bij voorbeeld zeer weinig nauwkeurige bijzonderheden, wanneer we de "meening" van een mensch "vaststellen". Want de "meening" is ook voor den enkelen mensch een min of meer vaag begrip. En voor de "openbare meening" geldt dit in het bijzonder. Voorzichtig te werk gaande, kunnen we evenwel voldoende en betrouwbare waarnemings-resultaten op dit terrein te bereiken, wanneer we door den woordnevel heendringen. Zulke resultaten worden bij voorbeeld verkregen door de waarneming van het gedrag van krantenlezers in verband met pogingen tot beïnvloeding der meening door censuur, door misleiding en andere "propaganda"-middelen. Het gedrag der krantenlezers schijnt ons veelal vol tegenstrijdigheid, maar geeft den deskundige toch een bruikbaar en scherp-omlijnd beeld van onbewuste neigingen en behoeften. Overschat wordt in den regel het aantal menschen, dat tot blinde daden van zoogenaamde massahartstocht wordt opgezweept. Het nuchtere onderzoek van de feiten toont aan, dat de meerderheid slechts de rol van radelooze en hulpelooze toeschouwster speelt, een toeschouwster, die in den grond der zaak vreedzaam en verdraagzaam is. Het gedrag der meerderheid wordt in zulke gevallen bepaald door dwang en intimidatie. De problemen der massa-psychologie, die nog niet zijn onderzocht, liggen dan ook hoofdzakelijk op dit gebied. Voornamelijk dient de werking van dwang en intimidatie -- de "moreele" en de gewelddadige intimidatie -- te worden onderzocht en haar invloed op de achteraf gevormde meening der meerderheden, die zich in radelooze gelatenheid in hun lot hebben geschikt. De door gewelddadige minderheden uitgeoefende dwang en intimidatie zijn altijd en overal de oorzaken van de ontstellende ontaardingsverschijnselen van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel, die op rekening van de "massa" worden gesteld. (shrink)
Foucault come educatore non dirige da un luogo esterno verso di noi un insegnamento, una dottrina, piuttosto sente la responsabilità di cercare e di estrarre dal mondo «qualcosa» che possa animare l’esperienza che si fa del mondo, di mostrare da una prospettiva latente l’esperienza già fatta, come una scheggia di «reale» che nel mondo si manifesta. Foucault può essere un educatore se accettiamo che la verità è sempre ancora da fare, concretamente, che siamo sempre corresponsabili della verità che è in (...) gioco nella nostra formazione. Può essere educatore, infatti, solo chi è disposto non tanto a «comprendere prima», ma a comprendere nuovamente ogni volta, ogni volta che si dà un’occasione formativa e a profanare eventualmente l’attualità e la solidità di quel che si sa nella condivisione del rischio e della libertà che ogni pratica di ricerca comporta. (shrink)
Some people, they like to go out dancing And other peoples, they have to work And there’s even some evil mothers Well they’re gonna tell you that everything is just dirt You know, that women, never really faint And that villains always blink their eyes And that, children are the only ones who really blush And that, life is just to die. And, everyone who had a heart, They wouldn’t turn around and break it And that everyone who played a (...) part Oh wouldn’t turn around and hate it. – Lou Reed, “Sweet Jane”. (shrink)
On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and (...) so allows for the possibility of genuine normative conflicts. (shrink)
This volume presents a definitive introduction to twenty core areas of philosophical logic including classical logic, modal logic, alternative logics and close ...
The physics and metaphysics of quantum field theory Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9609-2 Authors Federico Laudisa, Department of Human Sciences “R. Massa”, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan, Italy Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
The results of this paper extend some of the intimate relations that are known to obtain between combinatory logic and certain substructural logics to establish a general characterization theorem that applies to a very broad family of such logics. In particular, I demonstrate that, for every combinator X, if LX is the logic that results by adding the set of types assigned to X (in an appropriate type assignment system, TAS) as axioms to the basic positive relevant logic B∘T, then (...) LX is sound and complete with respect to the class of frames in the Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant and substructural logics that meet a first-order condition that corresponds in a very direct way to the structure of the combinator X itself. (shrink)
The paper presents an infinite hierarchy PR m [ m = 1, 2, . . . ] of sound and complete axiomatic systems for modal logic with graded probabilistic modalities , which are to reflect what I have elsewhere called the Bolding-Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength as applied to the establishment of matters of fact in law-courts. Our present approach is seen to differ from earlier work by the author in that it treats the logic of these graded modalities not (...) only from a semantical or model-theoretic viewpoint but from a prooftheoretical and axiomatic stance as well. A paramount feature of the approach is its use of so-called systematic frame constants as labels of diverse grades of probability. Apart from this novel feature our approach can be seen to go back to pioneering work by Lou Goble in 1970. (shrink)
This paper presents a neighborhood semantics for logics of entailment. It begins with a minimal system Min that expresses the most fundamental assumptions about the entailment relation, and continues by examining various extensions that reflect further assumptions that might be made about entailment. This leads first to the logic B that is the basic relevant logic, and then to more powerful systems. All of these logics are proved to be sound and strongly complete. With B the neighborhood semantics meets the (...) Routley–Meyer relational semantics for relevant logic; these connections are examined. The minimal and basic entailment logics are shown to have the finite model property, and hence to be decidable. (shrink)
The struggle that prompted Bonhoeffer’s “unconscious Christianity” offers a concrete illustration of the commonsensical in Rahner’s “anonymous Christian.” Thus Rahner’s theory adds theological coherence to what Bonhoeffer intuited. While Bonhoeffer faced the seeming ineffectiveness of Jesus’ teaching for the majority of Christians in Germany, Rahner faced his church’s view of Augustine’s “massa damnata” through a reexamination of church mission and theological categories. In both theologians, Jesus the God-man is the symbol of God’s communion with “the human” in God’s care (...) for all peoples. The article concludes by asking whether the advent of such Christologies signals an approaching time of greater humility with regard to the Christian path to salvation. (shrink)
Because our actions change, our responsibility is modified; because our responsibility is modified, we need to question the ethics of the action. Our action is situated right there between announcing a diagnosis, the theoretical and practical result of identification, the determining and naming of a fact and voicing the disease which is a human action where medical and technical expertise comes up against a life and its story. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s disease, is a degenerative disease of (...) the motor neurons leading to paralysis. In the absence of any curative treatment, the natural course always results in death. Since 1989, progress in the management of this disease in France has been exponential, resulting in the creation of 17 expert centres throughout the country in 2003. Guidelines have been drawn up through consensus conferences and coordination meetings. For the delicate stage of the announcement, three requirements have been adopted: the quality of receptiveness of the medical practitioner and his team, their ability to listen and to adapt to the particularities of the patient in their care; their commitment with regard to legal obligations as to how and to whom to transmit information; and the need for a multidisciplined approach to be able to rapidly support the patient and his family. Questioning in the field of applied ethics has led us to examine whether having a benevolent and non-harmful attitude towards these patients, respecting their autonomy and legal rights are parameters required in this specialized practice. Through a transversal thematic analysis of the experiences of the medical practitioners at the Centres, we would like to explore a hypothesis of the remarkable epistemological progression of the neurologist in this form of care in the pure Hippocratic tradition. Through the compassionate experience of the other by these committed doctors and their teams, we will try to outline the view of anthropological phenomenology with regard to the ALS patient, their awareness of the future paralysis of the body that is being announced, their awareness of the temporality and will characteristic of the ALS patient and of his finality that they will be accompanying. (shrink)
Combinator logics are a broad family of substructual logics that are formed by extending the basic relevant logic B with axioms that correspond closely to the reduction rules of proper combinators in combinatory logic. In the Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logic each such combinator logic is characterized by the class of frames that meet a first-order condition that also directly corresponds to the same combinator's reduction rule. A second family of logics is also introduced that extends B with the (...) addition of propositional constants that correspond to combinators. These are characterized by relational frames that meet first-order conditions that reflect the structures of the combinators themselves. (shrink)
This multiplex semantics incorporates multiple relations of deontic accessibility or multiple preference rankings on alternative worlds to represent distinct normative standards. This provides a convenient framework for deontic logic that allows conflicts of obligation, due either to conflicts between normative standards or to incoherence within a single standard. With the multiplex structures, two general senses of "ought" may be distinguished, an indefinite sense under which something is obligatory when it is enjoined by some normative standard and a core sense for (...) when something is enjoined by all normative standards. Multiple normative standards may themselves be given a preferential order; this leads to a concept of ranked obligation. This paper presents the foundations of this multiplex semantics and the propositional deontic logics they define. (shrink)
Some statements owe their truth (or falsity) to the way things are; others seem to owe their truth (or falsity) to the way things go. The statement (1) Lou’s hat is lovely will be true or false according to whether Lou’s hat (an object) is lovely or not. The statement (2) Lou’s lecture is boring will be true or false according to whether Lou’s lecture (an event) is boring or not. Davidson (1967) and many others have argued that this distinction (...) is central to the way we talk about the world, and that both objects and events must be included in the ontological inventory if one is to make sense of much ordinary talk (and of much philosophical talk too, e.g., talk about causation). Moreover, we often speak in such a way as to suggest—implicitly—that we are talking about events. If the statement (3) Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife were taken to assert that a certain three-place relation obtained among Brutus, Caesar, and a knife, then it would be hard to explain why (3) entails (4) Brutus stabbed Caesar (a statement that involves a different, two-place relation). By contrast—the story goes—if we take (3) to assert that a certain event occurred (namely, a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus) and that it had a certain property (namely, of being done with a knife), then the entailment is straightforward. This is not a proof that there are such entities as events. But if we are interested in an account of how it is that certain statements mean what they mean, and if the meaning of a state- 1 ment is at least in part determined by its logical relations to other statements, then one can hardly ignore the relevance of facts such as these. This by now is standard lore. There are even some logic textbooks (e.g., Forbes 1994) that include Davidson’s event-based analysis of sentences such as (3) or (4) as part of the basic apparatus for representing logical forms, on a par with Russell’s theory of descriptions. The official advantage, in both cases, is that we may hope to capture the truth conditions of such sentences without going beyond the framework of a purely Tarskian account.. (shrink)
This paper focuses on the ethical and moral implications of findings from the authors? national survey of television news directors? policies, practices, and perceptions of good/bad news. In light of the potentially negative effects of excessive amounts of bad news on individuals and society, the authors ask whether television journalists have an ethical responsibility?beyond legal constraints and professional criteria?in the selection and presentation of bad news and good news. An earlier version of this paper, detailing the findings of the survey, (...) was presented to the Radio?TV Journalism Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in August, 1986. (shrink)
Bioethics, and indeed much ethicalwriting generally, makes its point throughnarratives. The religious parable no less thanthe medical teaching case uses a simple storyto describe appropriate action or theapplication of a critical principle. Whilepowerful, the telling story has limits. In thispaper the authors describe a simple teachingcase on ``end-of-life'' decision making that wasill received by its audience. The authors ill-receivedexample, involving the disconnection ofventilation in a patient with ALS (Lou Gherig'sDisease) was critiqued by audience members withlong-term experience as ventilation users. Inthis (...) case, the supposedly simple narrative ofthe presenters conflicted with the lifehistories of the audience. The lessons of thisstory, and the conflict that resulted, speakcritically to the limits of simple teachingcases as well as the strengths of narrativeanalysis as a tool for the exploration ofbioethical case histories. (shrink)
A new generation, earmarked the Thirteeners, is an emerging force in the marketplace. The Thirteener cohort group, so designated since they are the thirteenth generation to know the American flag and constitution, encompass over 62 million adult consumers. All the former "Mall Rats" have grown up. The normative structures that these Thirteeners employ in both acquisition and disposition retail settings is empirically assessed in this study through the use of a national sample. The findings suggest that Thirteeners are more likely (...) to attempt to rationalize away unethical retailing consumption behaviors than their parent's generation. The managerial and theoretical implications for the practice of retailing in the 1990s associated with these observations are discussed. (shrink)
Despite the widespread agreement that the ontology of the marketing discipline is exchange, marketing ethics researchers have largely adopted a monadic viewpoint of ethical decision making. In this research, an interactionist approach is adopted in order to introduce a dyadic perspective of un/ethical decision making. The dyadic model includes each channel member's individual, situational and decision process factors linked by relationalism, an emerging paradigm in marketing channels. Relationalism is represented as a discriminating variable between perceived ethical dilemma and decision behaviour. (...) Finally, a number of theoretical propositions are presented and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)
This paper reports the responses of 251 mental health care practitioners to a mail survey examining their views concerning ethical conflicts and practices within their work environments. Besides identifying the sources and types of conflicts they experience, respondents were asked how ethical standards have changed over the last 10 years as well as the factors influencing these changes. Conclusions and implications are outlined and future research needs are described.
The relevant modal logic G is a simple extension of the logic RT, the relevant counterpart of the familiar classically based system T. Using the Routley–Meyer semantics for relevant modal logics, this paper proves three main results regarding G: (i) G is semantically complete, but only with a non-standard interpretation of necessity. From this, however, other nice properties follow. (ii) With a standard interpretation of necessity, G is semantically incomplete; there is no class of frames that characterizes G. (iii) The (...) class of frames for G characterizes the classically based logic T. (shrink)
Teaching in university education programmes, can, at times, involve the uncomfortable situation of discriminatory speech. A situation that has often occurred in our own teaching, and in those of our colleagues, is the citation of homophobic and heterosexist comments. These are comments that are more likely to occur in foundation subjects such as philosophy and sociology of education. The occurrence of such situations has prompted debate regarding ‘silencing words that wound’. This has prompted the question, ‘should we keep students from (...) stating such discriminatory speech?’ Our article takes up this issue, and considers it from the perspective of the importance of critique. Working with Foucault's What is Critique? together with his discussion of subjectivation in the 1981–82 lectures at the Collège de France, we set out to make the case for the significance of the relationship between truth and critique. This leads us to a position where we ask the question, if we silence, what do we risk doing to critique? (shrink)
& A college development officer is offered a generous gift by a donor whose identity would embarrass the institution. Should the development officer accept? & A volunteer lies about his level of giving, but classmates believe him and match his "gift." Should donors be told the truth? & A development officer must explain to a donor the difference between naming an endowed chair and selecting the person to fill the chair. Where is the line between reasonable donor expectations and intrusion? (...) "There was a time, barely a generation ago, when most college fund raising was a placid, back-porch operation... That pattern, like so much in higher education, began to change dramatically... On the heels of all this change comes this splendid volume by Deni Elliot. The new fund-raising environment raises a host of ethical questions that were largely unknown or unrecognized by earlier generations of fund raisers... The great value of this book is that it provides some clear-eyed guidance through the ethical thicket that is modern higher education fund raising. The great charm of the book is that it provides this important service with such eloquence and good taste... Anyone involved in modern fund raising will find something of value in this book." -- G. Calvin MacKenzie, Academe "This volume provides college and university development officers and administrators practical help with recognizing difficult ethical situations and discerning the correct ethical response. It can also serve as a guide for donors who wonder what's reasonable for them to expect from fund raisers." -- Resources in Education Contributors: Allen Buchanan, James A. Donahue, Marilyn Batt Dunn, Deni Elliott, Bernard Gert, Judith M. Gooch, Bruce R. Hopkins, Frank Logan, Mary Lou Siebert, Holly Smith, and Eric B. Wentworth. (shrink)
This paper claims that the edifice of philosophical practice bears prima facie resemblance to other counseling-dispensing professions—e.g. medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It defends virtues of professionalism in philosophical practice against accusations of sophism, and also rejects social constructivism as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie resemblance to other counseling professions, philosophical practice is foundationally distinct from them. When elaborated, this distinction complicates the notion of inculcating virtue in philosophical practice.
This paper examines a social contractarian model in which an actor cooperates by mimicry; that is, cooperates just in case there is majority cooperation in his orher vicinity. A computer simulation is developed to study the relation between initial and final proportions of such cooperators, as wel l as to chart the population dynamics themselves. The model turns out to be non-linear; item bodies a quintessentially chaotic threshold. The simulation also yields other unforeseen results, revealing a "geometry of delection" that (...) unites delecting cells into robust molecular formations which persist with in overall cooperative domains, or which under certain conditions undermine cooperativeness entirely. The model thus sheds so me light on the structura l dimension of mimicry that underlies social communication, conflict and its resolution. (shrink)
Notwithstanding recent successes of philosophical counseling, which appear to be leading to its legitimization as a professional practice in America and abroad, many forces concen to condition its emergent structure and function. This paper briefly elucidates some of the influences to which philosophical counseling is subject, that lie beyond its unilateral control. These include its portayal by the media to the public, its scope of practice, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, its foreseeable effects in particular cases, and its perception (...) by (and of) analytical philosophy. (shrink)
Há uma espécie de drama de consciência no interior do pensamento iluminista em relaçáo à Revoluçáo Francesa: de um lado, aceita, de bom grado, fazer da queda do Antigo Regime um de seus mais belos e significativos frutos; de outro, recusa, por vezes enojado, os meios violentos utilizados para tanto e náo aceita, ou custa a aceitar, filiaçáo ideológica com eles. Esta violência “excessiva” seria exclusivamente obra da massa, segundo o elitismo iluminista. O percurso realizado neste artigo procura explicitar, (...) no contexto da Revoluçáo Francesa em geral e do pensamento e da açáo de Saint-Just em específico, a relaçáo entre pensamento e açáo revolucionária, de modo que se possa identificar o potencial de violência presente no próprio ideal que atravessa o pensamento revolucionário francês, sintetizado pela idéia de Virtude, e que culminará na política do Terror. (shrink)
Un uomo in cappa e cilindro di fronte a voi promette: “muoverò la materia con la sola forza del pensiero”. Scettici aspettate la prova. Ed ecco che, mirabilmente, egli alza un braccio. Un braccio, il suo braccio! Un pezzo di materia, dotato di massa, carica elettrica, proprietà magnetiche e quant’altro, si è mosso solo grazie alla sua volontà di alzarlo. Con la sola forza del pensiero il braccio si è sollevato! Per quanti sforzi retorici faccia, nessuno riterrà particolarmente sorprendente (...) l’esperimento. Il fatto è che diamo per scontato che la materia possa essere mossa con la sola forza del pensiero se quella materia siamo noi. I viaggi nel tempo, o il trasferimento istantaneo di informazioni, quelli sì sarebbero davvero una sorpresa. Eppure, mentre per questi si sono in un certo senso raggiunti risultati teorici o sperimentali interessanti, ed esistono teorie che spiegano in base a quali leggi fisiche questi fenomeni possano avvenire, per quanto riguarda la nostra capacità di agire intenzionalmente ci troviamo ancora sommersi da difficoltà teoriche enormi, e il terreno rimane ancora pieno di difficoltà concettuali. Uno dei problemi più cruciali è che entrambe le opzioni metafisiche generali, il monismo e il dualismo, sono radicate nel senso comune come nella nostra tradizione culturale, e talvolta in modi davvero curiosi. Possiamo trovare richiami teologici al monismo, mentre sarebbe ragionevole pensare a una adesione esclusivo a una forma di dualismo, e derive dualiste nelle indagini di neurofisiologi contemporanei. Come esempio del primo caso voglio menzionare la procedura di pesatura delle anime che si può veder raffigurata in alcune chiese (la Cattedrale di Torcello e San Pietro a Spoleto) e che si basa sull’idea che le proprietà etiche degli individui siano riscontrabili nelle proprietà fisiche, il peso delle loro anime. Certo, si può pensare che le bilance per anime siano in effetti sensibili a proprietà non fisiche, nondimeno esse parteciperebbero di una struttura nomologica tipica delle scienze fisiche, di contro a quanto solitamente segna il confine tra regno della natura – nomologico - e regno della mente - normativo. Di contro, un recente numero di Nature (luglio 2006) apriva con un richiamo a caratteri cubitali in copertina: Trasformare il pensiero in azione [Turning thought into action]. L’uso del verbo “trasformare” dà adito all’idea che le proprietà di un dominio siano state cambiate e modificate così da divenire proprietà di un dominio diverso. Ma come notavo in apertura, non c’è nulla di sorprendente nell’idea che i nostri pensieri diventino azioni, e dobbiamo pensarla proprio così se vogliamo giustificare l’idea che le nostre azioni siano nostre, ossia risultato dei nostri atti deliberativi. In questo lavoro cercherò di offrire una risposta al problema della causalità mentale, ossia a come la nostra mente possa interagire con gli eventi del mondo fisico e da essi esserne modificata. Un problema classico, quindi assai vasto, sia per ciò che attiene la letteratura sia per quanto riguarda le questioni da affrontare. La bussola adottata è stata la seguente: se il problema è il rapporto del mentale con il mondo fisico allora va tenuto nel massimo rispetto il modo in cui il problema generale della causalità è stato affrontato entro il mondo fisico. La mia impressione è che nella letteratura filosofica non venga dedicata una sufficiente attenzione a questo aspetto, e uno degli intenti che perseguirò sarà porvi rimedio. Il libro è diviso in quattro capitoli. Nel primo si evidenziano le radici del problema mente corpo da un punto di vista più concettuale che storico. I due domini sono sempre stati tratteggiati tramite proprietà all’apparenza differenti, così da rinforzare la ragionevolezza di un approccio più o meno dualista. Emerge già qui che il problema, nella specifica declinazione causale nella quale viene qui considerato, diventa tale solo se si assume un modello di causalità adeguato alle discipline fisiche, anche se assai più controverso negli altri casi. Questo modello era nelle pagine di Leibniz, e costituiva la sua schiacciante obiezione a Descartes. Tuttavia, nell’attuale dibattito non sempre ha giocato un ruolo altrettanto cruciale. Penso sia il tempo di rimetterlo al centro della scena. Sosterrò quindi che in effetti il problema della causalità mentale e del generale rapporto tra mente e corpo è una conseguenza, piuttosto che il punto d’avvio, di un modello generale di causalità. Tale modello è da identificarsi nella teoria secondo la quale tra causa ed effetto c’è un trasferimento di una quantità conservata, una teoria sulla quale si è acceso un intenso dibattito. Nel capitolo successivo il modello di causalità fisica del trasferimento viene combinato col più generale approccio fisicalista che in questi anni si sta diffondendo. Ci sono modi assai diversi per caratterizzare il fisicalismo, che comportano conseguenze molto divergenti tra loro. Analizzerò diverse varietà di fisicalismo e la loro compatibilità sia con il modello della causalità come trasferimento, cui si faceva riferimento, sia con il dominio del mentale. Sosterrò che il principio metafisico della chiusura causale del mondo fisico può essere integrato con la visione della causalità difesa nel primo capitolo, il tutto accettando l’idea che la causalità sia una relazione tra eventi. L’ipotesi è che sussista uno spazio di manovra per la causalità mentale a condizione che le proprietà mentali, elementi cardine della relazione causale, siano identificate con le proprietà fisiche, una teoria oggi non più di gran moda. Il terzo capitolo è dedicato alla difesa della teoria dell’identità dei tipi dalle due note obiezioni: la teoria delle identità necessarie di Kripke e l’argomento della realizzabilità multipla nelle sue diverse varianti. La strada per rispondere alle obiezioni e difendere la teoria dell’identità passa attraverso una teoria delle sensazioni che metta in luce il carattere intrinsecamente causale e, in certa misura, esternistico di questi stati, combattendo così l’intuizione che le sensazioni si risolvano nelle proprietà fenomeniche di tipo qualitativo, nel cosa si prova ad averle. A supporto di questa visione verranno schierate anche un certo numero di prove empiriche, facenti capo alla letteratura medica. Nondimeno, la tesi di identità richiede che essa sia condizionata, ossia che venga vincolata a condizioni locali, un tema perseguito nell’ultimo capitolo. Il quarto capitolo è dedicato a mostrare che non c’è un’enorme distanza tra la teoria dell’identità e il funzionalismo nella sua versione di primo ordine. In questo contesto giocano un ruolo chiave i generi naturali, che soddisfano i requisiti per una teoria dell’identità senza per questo condurla nelle maglie delle critiche che l’hanno condannata. Così costruita, la teoria dell’identità è il portato dell’incontro tra analisi concettuale e ricerca empirica e un simile connubio ha tra le sue conseguenze l’abbandono dell’immagine per cui la realtà è costituita da diversi strati ontologici di complessità crescente. Di contro, l’incontro tra il piano concettuale e quello empirico che porta all’identità consente di accordare pieni poteri causali alle proprietà mentali, un desiderata al quale non è possibile rinunciare. Solo che esse vanno individuate nel mondo fisico, senza che ciò comporti la rinuncia alla forza epistemica ed esplicativa delle medesime. Alcuni possono vedere in questa posizione un’abdicazione della filosofia alla scienza. Non credo che sia compito della filosofia avocarsi regioni del sapere. Se è la scienza a dovere risolvere il problema della causalità mentale, la filosofia non può mettersi di traverso. A quest’ultima spetterà il compito di mostrare che la distanza tra le nostre intuizioni, per quanto fallimentari e confuse siano, e le descrizioni scientifiche è colmabile da una ricerca comprensibile e razionale. Frutto comunque delle nostre intuizioni. (shrink)
