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Profile: Louis C Charland (University of Western Ontario)
  1. Louis C. Charland, Letters to the Editor.
    Sir—Mattick et al.’s (2003) recent article presents the results of the world’s largest comparative trial of buprenorphine and methadone maintenance [1]. However, the report is disappointing. There are problems with the analyses and their presentation and, most importantly, the discussion appears to undermine the finding that retention was significantly better in methadone maintenance.
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  2. Louis C. Charland, Validity, Value, and Emotion.
    How does one scientifically verify a psychometric instrument designed to assess the mental competence of medical patients who are asked to consent to medical treatment? Aside from satisfying technical requirements like statistical reliability, results yielded by such a test must conform to at least some accepted pretheoretical desiderata; for example, determinations of competence, as measured by the test, must capture a minimal core of accepted basic intuitions about what competence means and what a theory of competence is supposed to do. (...)
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  3. Louis C. Charland (2013). Why Psychiatry Should Fear Medicalisation. In K. W. M. Fulford, Davies M., Gipps R., Graham G., Sadler J., Stanghellini G. & Thornton T. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. 159-175.
    Medicalization in contemporary psychopharmacology is increasingly dominated by commercial interests that threaten the scientific and ethical integrity of psychiatry. At the same time, the proliferation of new social media has altered the manner in which the social groups and institutions that have stakes in medicalization interact. Consumers are at once more powerful than ever before, but also more vulnerable. The upshot of all these developments is that medicalization is no longer simply the professed enemy of anti-psychiatry and its supporters. It (...)
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  4. Louis C. Charland, Tony Hope, Anne Stewart & Jacinta Tan (2013). Anorexia Nervosa as a Passion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4):353-365.
  5. Louis C. Charland, Tony Hope, Anne Stewart & Jacinta Tan (2013). The Hypothesis That Anorexia Nervosa Is a Passion: Clarifications and Elaborations. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4):375-379.
  6. Louis C. Charland (2012). Benevolence and Discipline: The Concept of Recovery in Early Nineteenth-Century Moral Treatment. In Abraham Rudnick (ed.), Recovery of People with Mental Illness: Philosophical and Related Perspectives. Oup Oxford. 65.
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  7. Louis C. Charland (2011). Moral Undertow and the Passions: Two Challenges for Contemporary Emotion Regulation. Emotion Review 3 (1):83-91.
    The history and philosophy of affective terms and concepts contains important challenges for contemporary scientific accounts of emotion regulation. First, there is the problem of moral undertow. This arises because stipulating the ends of emotion regulation requires normative assumptions that ultimately derive from values and morals. Some historical precedents are considered to help explain and address this problem. Second, there is the problem of organization. This arises because multiple emotions are often organized and oriented in very particular ways over the (...)
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  8. Louis C. Charland (2010). Medical or Moral Kinds? Moving Beyond a False Dichotomy. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):119-125.
    I am delighted that Zachar and Potter have chosen to refer to my work on the DSM-IV cluster B personality disorders in their very interesting and ambitious target article. Their suggestion that we turn to virtue ethics rather than traditional moral theory to understand the relation between moral and nonmoral factors in personality disorders is certainly original and worth pursuing. Yet, in the final instance, I am not entirely sure about the exact scope of their proposed analysis. I also worry (...)
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  9. Louis C. Charland (2009). Consent or Coercion? Treatment Referrals to Alcoholics Anonymous, Commentary on Michael Clinton's:" Should Mental Health Professionals Refer Clients with Substance Use Disorders to 12-Step Programs?". Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 2 (1):6.
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  10. Louis C. Charland (2009). Reinstating the Passions: Arguments From History of Psychopathology. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oup Oxford.
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  11. Louis C. Charland (2009). Technological Reason and the Regulation of Emotion. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Louis C. Charland (2008). Cognitive Modularity of Emotion. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 213-228.
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  13. Louis C. Charland (2008). Technological Reason and Regulation of Emotion. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oup Oxford.
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  14. Louis C. Charland (2007). Affective Neuroscience and Addiction. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):20 – 21.
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author states that brain and neurochemical systems are involved in addiction. He also suggests that neuroscience can link the diseased brain processes in addiction to the moral struggles of the addicts. Accession Number: 24077919; Authors: Charland, Louis C. 1; Email Address: charland@uwo.ca; Affiliations: 1: University of Western (...)
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  15. Louis C. Charland (2007). Anorexia and the MacCAT-T Test for Mental Competence: Validity, Value, and Emotion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (4):283-287.
  16. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, JCW Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
     
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  17. Louis C. Charland (2006). How Not to Walk Away From The Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):17-19.
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  18. Louis C. Charland (2006). La psychopathologie et le statut d'espèce naturelle de l'émotion. Philosophiques 33 (1):217-230.
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  19. Louis C. Charland (2005). Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. 231-254.
  20. Louis C. Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
  21. Louis C. Charland (2004). Personality Disorders. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. 64.
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  22. Louis C. Charland (2004). As Autonomy Heads Into Harm's Way. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):361-363.
  23. Louis C. Charland (2004). A Madness for Identity: Psychiatric Labels, Consumer Autonomy, and the Perils of the Internet. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):335-349.
  24. Louis C. Charland (2003). Are There Answers? American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):1 – 2.
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  25. Louis C. Charland (2003). Tuke's Healing Discipline. Commentary on 'Progress and Power: Exploring the Disciplinary Connections Between Moral Treatment and Psychiatric Rehabilitation', by Erica-Lilleleht. Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology 9 (2):183-186.
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  26. Louis C. Charland (2002). Cynthia's Dilemma: Consenting to Heroin Prescription. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):37 – 47.
    Heroin prescription involves the medical provision of heroin in the treatment of heroin addiction. Rudimentary clinical trials on that treatment modality have been carried out and others are currently underway or in development. However, it is questionable whether subjects considered for such trials are mentally competent to consent to them. The problem has not been sufficiently appreciated in ethical and clinical discussions of the topic. The challenges involved throw new light on the role of value and accountability in contemporary discussions (...)
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  27. Louis C. Charland (2002). Review of 'What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories', by Paul E. Griffiths. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):318-324.
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  28. Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
    It has been argued recently that some basic emotions should be considered natural kinds. This is different from the question whether as a class emotions form a natural kind; that is, whether emotion is a natural kind. The consensus on that issue appears to be negative. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted and that there are in fact good reasons for entertaining the hypothesis that emotion is a natural kind. I interpret this to mean that there exists a distinct (...)
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  29. Louis C. Charland (2002). Tuke's Healing Discipline: Commentary on Erica Lilleleht's "Progress and Power: Exploring the Disciplinary Connections Between Moral Treatment and Psychiatric Rehabilitation&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2):183-186.
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  30. Louis C. Charland (2001). In Defence of Emotion: Critical Notice of Paul E. Griffiths's What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
     
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  31. Louis C. Charland (2001). In Defence of “Emotion” Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):113-154.
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  32. Louis C. Charland (2001). In Defence of “Emotion”. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
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  33. Louis C. Charland (2001). Review: In Defence of "Emotion". [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133 - 154.
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  34. Louis C. Charland (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems and Emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):612-613.
    In his target article, Barsalou cites current work on emotion theory but does not explore its relevance for this project. The connection is worth pursuing, since there is a plausible case to be made that emotions form a distinct symbolic information processing system of their own. On some views, that system is argued to be perceptual: a direct connection with Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory. Also relevant is the hypothesis that there may be different modular subsystems within emotion and the (...)
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  35. Angela Campbell, Kathleen Cranley Glass & Louis C. Charland (1998). Describing Our “Humanness”: Can Genetic Science Alter What It Means to Be “Human”? Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (4):413-426.
    Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This (...)
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  36. Louis C. Charland (1998). Appreciation and Emotion: Theoretical Reflections on the Macarthur Treatment Competence Study. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8 (4):359-376.
  37. Louis C. Charland (1998). Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent? Competence to Consent and Emotion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (1):67-81.
  38. Louis C. Charland (1998). Response to the Commentaries. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (1):93-95.
  39. Louis C. Charland (1997). Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.
    The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical (...)
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  40. Louis C. Charland (1996). Review of Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions by Richard and Bernice Lazarus. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):401-404.
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  41. Louis C. Charland (1996). Review of Richard S. Lazarus & Bernice N. Lazarus'-Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 9:401-403.
     
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  42. Louis C. Charland (1995). Emotion as a Natural Kind: Towards a Computational Foundation for Emotion Theory. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):59-84.
    In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation-governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour (...)
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  43. Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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