I examine three major antireligious arguments that are often proposed in various forms by cognitive and evolutionary scientists, and indicate possible responses to them. A fundamental problem with the entire debate arises because the term "religion" is too vague. So I reformulate the debate in terms of a less vague central concept: faith. Referring mainly to Aquinas on faith, I proceed by evaluating how the previously mentioned cognitive and evolutionary arguments fare when dealing with faith. The results show that some (...) aspects of the concept of faith are in principle beyond the range of evolutionary explanation and some other aspects are not. Nevertheless, an evolutionary account merges smoothly with faith’s theological dimensions. (shrink)
The role of empirical evidence in scientific and in religious discourse has been revisited in a recent paper by John Worrall, who argues for the overlap between these two types of discourse and for the superiority of the former. His main thesis is that the epistemic attitude of natural science is superior because it is essentially related to evidence and falsifiability, whereby the search for counter-evidence is taken as the primary driving force for research. The epistemic attitude of religion, on (...) the contrary, is essentially related to faith, whereby the effects of counter-evidence are always minimized or neutralized. In this paper, I question Worrall’s analysis of the role of evidence in the two kinds of discourse. I argue that the debate has systematically neglected the question of holism of meaning. When such holism is taken into consideration, the very idea of a purely given experience becomes questionable. I argue that this neglected area is as pivotal in our understanding of religious discourse as it has been acknowledged to be in philosophy of science. I then propose a refined account of religious language, illustrating thereby that between the role of evidence in science and its roles in religion there is a lot in common. (shrink)
In its first section, dedicated to the topic science and relativism, the article argues against those who hold that science is absolutist while ethics is relativist. The point made is that the two disciplines are not all that different. There is an element of objectivity and an element of relativity in both. The article insists that there are two plausible ways in which these elements may be appreciated in both disciplines. The first way involves an analysis of precedents; the second (...) way an analysis of secondaryprecepts. Then, in its second section, dedicated to science and utilitarianism, the article focuses on the problem of abstraction. The author argues that the crucial issue is the way both scientists and utilitarian philosophers choose the relevant parameters for their theorising. When the choice of parameters is not correct, deformation results. Like economics, utilitarianism tends to present itself as an exact science that guarantees a complete explanation. However, the article shows how and why this attitude can be deeply problematic. /// Na sua primeira secção, dedicada ao tema da relaçãdo entre ciência e relativismo, o artigo argumenta essencialmente contra aqueles que defendem que a ciência é absolutista enquanto que a ética seria relativista. O ponto é que as duas disciplinas não são assim tão diferentes. Existe um elemento de objectividade e um elemento de relatividade em ambas. Sugere-se, assim, a existência de dois modos plausíveis em que estes elementos podem ser apreciados em ambas as disciplinas. O primeiro modo involve uma análise de precedentes; o segundo uma análise de preceitos secundários. Depois, na segunda secção do artigo, dedicada à relação entre ciência e utilitarismo, o artigo concentra-se na questão da abstracção. O autor defende que a questão crucial é o modo em que tanto os cientistas como os filósofos utilitaristas escolhem os parâmetros relevantes para a sua teorização. Constata-se que sempre que a escolha dos parâmetros não é a correcta se dá uma deformação dos resultados. Tal como a economia, o utilitarismo tende a apresentar-se como sendo uma ciência exacta que garante uma completa explicação. O artigo, porém, mostra de que modo essa atitude pode set profundamente problemática. (shrink)
Max Jammer has recently proposed a model of God's eternity based on the special theory of relativity, offering it as an example of how theologians should take into account what physicists say about the world. I start evaluating this proposal by a quick look at the classic Boethius-Aquinas model of divine eternity. The major objection I advance against Jammer refers to Einstein's subtle kind of realism. I offer various reasons to show that Einstein's realism was minimal. Moreover, even this minimal (...) realism has been undermined by recent experimental work. If Jammer is suggesting that theologians should take Einstein's physics seriously because it describes the world, his argument is unconvincing because it doesn't address the crucial question of Einstein's realism, which makes all the difference. /// O artigo toma em consideração o modelo acerca da eternidade de Deus baseado na teoria especial da relatividade de Einstein recentemente proposto por Max Jammer, autor que considera ser este um exemplo de como os teólogos deveriam tomar em consideração aquilo que os físicos dizem acerca do mundo. O autor do artigo começa por fazer uma avaliação desta proposta mediante uma breve referência ao modelo clássico de Boécio e S. Tomás acerca da eternidade divina. A principal objecção levantada pelo artigo contra Jammer tem a ver com a forma subtil de realismo de Einstein. Segundo o autor do artigo, o realismo de Einstein era mínimo. Mais ainda, mesmo este realismo mínimo foi minado por trabalhos experimentais mais recentes. Com efeito, se Jammer sugere que os teólogos devem tomar a sério a física de Einstein baseados na presunção de que esta descreve o mundo, então o seu argumento, diz o autor do artigo, não convence na medida em que não trata da questão crucial acerca do realismo de Einstein, questão esta que sem dúvida faz toda a diferença. (shrink)
This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment Edited by Roger S. Gottlieb Routledge, 1996. Pp. 673. ISBN 0-415-91233-4. 45.00 (hbk) 16.99 (pbk) Moderate Realism and its Logic By D.W. Mertz Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi + 310. ISBN 0-300-06561-2. 27.50 (hbk) William James Remembered Edited by Linda Simon University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp. 275. ISBN 0-8032-4248-4. 28.50 (hbk). Cybermonde: La politique du pire. Entretien avec Philippe Petit. By Paul Virilio Les ditions Textuel, 1996.pp. 110. ISBN 2-909317-21-8. FF 79 (pbk).