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  1. Louise Cummings (2014). Informal Fallacies as Cognitive Heuristics in Public Health Reasoning. Informal Logic 34 (1):1-37.
    The public must make assessments of a range of health-related issues. However, these assessments require scientific know-ledge which is often lacking or ineffectively utilized by the public. Lay people must use whatever cognitive resources are at their disposal to come to judgement on these issues. It will be contended that a group of arguments—so-called informal fallacies—are a valuable cognitive resource in this regard. These arguments serve as cognitive heuristics which facilitate reasoning when knowledge is limited or beyond the grasp of (...)
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  2. Louise Cummings (2012). Scaring the Public: Fear Appeal Arguments in Public Health Reasoning. Informal Logic 32 (1):25-50.
    The study of threat and fear appeal arguments has given rise to a sizeable literature. Even within a public health context, much is now known about how these arguments work to gain the public’s compliance with health recommendations. Notwithstanding this level of interest in, and examination of, these arguments, there is one aspect of these arguments that still remains unexplored. That aspect concerns the heuristic function of these arguments within our thinking about public health problems. Specifically, it is argued that (...)
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  3. Louise Cummings (2012). Theorising Context. In Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg Meibauer & Petra Schumacher (eds.), What is a Context?: Linguistic Approaches and Challenges. John Benjamins Pub. Co.. 196--55.
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  4. Louise Cummings (2011). Pragmatic Disorders and Their Social Impact. Pragmatics and Society 2 (1):17-36.
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  5. Louise Cummings (2009). Emerging Infectious Diseases: Coping with Uncertainty. [REVIEW] Argumentation 23 (2):171-188.
    The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework (...)
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  6. Louise Cummings (2005). Giving Science a Bad Name: Politically and Commercially Motivated Fallacies in BSE Inquiry. Argumentation 19 (2):123-143.
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  7. Louise Cummings (2005). Pragmatics: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. L. Erlbaum Associates.
    The first truly multidisciplinary text of its kind, this book offers an original analysis of the current state of linguistic pragmatics. Cummings argues that no study of pragmatics can reasonably neglect the historical and contemporary influences on this.
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  8. Louise Cummings (2005). Interpreting Putnam's Dialectical Method in Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):476-489.
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  9. Louise Cummings (2004). Analogical Reasoning as a Tool of Epidemiological Investigation. Argumentation 18 (4):427-444.
    Few, if any, scientific inquiries are conducted against a background of complete knowledge, a background in which inquirers are in possession of the ‘full facts’ that relate to a particular question or issue. More often than not, scientists are compelled to conduct their deliberations in contexts of epistemic uncertainty, in which partial knowledge or even a total absence of knowledge characterise inquiry. Nowhere is this epistemic uncertainty more evident, or indeed more successfully controlled, than in the branch of scientific inquiry (...)
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  10. Louise Cummings (2004). Argument as Cognition: A Putnamian Criticism of Dale Hample's Cognitive Conception of Argument. Argumentation 18 (3):191-209.
    The study of argument has never before been so wide-ranging. The evidence for this claim is to be found in a growing number of different conceptions of argument, each of which purports to describe some component of argument that is effectively over-looked by other conceptions of this notion. Just this same sense that a vital component of argument is being overlooked by current conceptions of this notion is what motivates Dale Hample to pursue a specifically cognitive conception of argument. However, (...)
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  11. Louise Cummings (2004). Rejecting the Urge to Theorise in Fallacy Inquiry. Argumentation 18 (1):61-94.
    In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of (...)
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  12. Louise Cummings (2003). Formal Dialectic in Fallacy Inquiry: An Unintelligible Circumscription of Argumentative Rationality? [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (2):161-183.
    Since its inception in the work on fallacies of Charles Hamblin, formal dialectic has been the object of an unparalleled level of optimism concerning the potential of its analytical contribution to fallacy inquiry. This optimism has taken the form of a rapid proliferation of formal dialectical studies of arguments in general and fallacious arguments in particular under the auspices of theorists such as Jim Mackenzie and John Woods and Douglas Walton, to name but a few. Notwithstanding the interest in, and (...)
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  13. Louise Cummings (2002). Hilary Putnam's Dialectical Thinking: An Application to Fallacy Theory. [REVIEW] Argumentation 16 (2):197-229.
    In recent and not so recent years, fallacy theory has sustained numerous challenges, challenges which have seen the theory charged with lack of systematicity as well as failure to deliver significant insights into its subject matter. In the following discussion, I argue that these criticisms are subordinate to a more fundamental criticism of fallacy theory, a criticism pertaining to the lack of intelligibility of this theory. The charge of unintelligibility against fallacy theory derives from a similar charge against philosophical theories (...)
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  14. Louise Cummings (2002). Justifying Practical Reason: What Chaïm Perelman's New Rhetoric Can Learn From Frege's Attack on Psychologism. Philosophy and Rhetoric 35 (1):50-76.
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  15. Louise Cummings (2002). Rejecting Theorizing in Philosophy: The Urgency of Putnamian Dialectic. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (2):117-141.
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  16. Louise Cummings (2002). Reasoning Under Uncertainty: The Role of Two Informal Fallacies in an Emerging Scientific Inquiry. Informal Logic 22 (2).
    lt is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or nonfallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific (...)
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  17. Louise Cummings (2001). Self-Refutations and Much More: The Dialectical Thinking of Hilary Putnam. Theoria 16 (2):237-268.
    In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s (1981) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it (...)
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  18. Louise Cummings (2001). Why We Need to Avoid Theorizing About Rationality: A Putnamian Criticism of Habermas's Epistemology. Social Epistemology 16 (2):117 – 131.
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  19. Louise Cummings (2000). Mind and Body, Form and Content: How Not to Do Petitio Principii Analysis. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):73-105.
    Abstract Few theoretical insights have emerged from the extensive literature discussions of petitio principii argument. In particular, the pattern of petitio analysis has largely been one of movement between the two sides of a dichotomy, that of form and content. In this paper, I trace the basis of this dichotomy to a dualist conception of mind and world. I argue for the rejection of the form/content dichotomy on the ground that its dualist presuppositions generate a reductionist analysis of certain concepts (...)
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