Retrospective rule-making has few supporters and many opponents. Defenders of retrospective laws generally do so on the basis that they are a necessary evil in specific or limited circumstances, for example to close tax loopholes, to deal with terrorists or to prosecute fallen tyrants. Yet the reality of retrospective rule making is far more widespread than this, and ranges from ’corrective’ legislation to ’interpretive regulations’ to judicial decision making. The search for a rational justification for retrospective rule-making necessitates a (...) reconsideration of the very nature of the rule of law and the kind of law that can rule, and will provide new insights into the nature of law and the parameters of societal order. This book examines the various ways in which laws may be seen as retrospective and analyses the problems in defining retrospectivity. In his analysis Dr Charles Sampford asserts that the definitive argument against retrospective rule-making is the expectation of individuals that, if their actions today are considered by a future court, the applicable law was discoverable at the time the action was performed. The book goes on to suggest that although the strength of this ’rule of law’ argument should prevail in general, exceptions are sometimes necessary, and that there may even be occasions when analysis of the rule of law may provide the foundation for the application of retrospective laws. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Preface (Trevor H.J. Marchand, School of Oriental and African Studies). -- Introduction: Making knowledge: explorations of the indissoluble relation between minds, bodies, and environment (Trevor H.J. Marchand, School of Oriental and African Studies). -- 1. 'Practice without theory': a neuroanthropological perspective on embodied learning (Greg Downey, Macquarie University). -- 2. Learning to listen: auscultation and the transmission of auditory knowledge (Tom Rice, University of Exeter). -- 3. The craft of skilful learning: Kazakh women's everyday craft practices (...) in western Mongolia (Anna Odland Portisch, School of Oriental and African Studies). -- 4. 'Something to talk about': notation and knowledge-making among Central Slovak lace-makers (Nicolette Makovicky, Wolfson College, Oxford). -- 5. Embodied cognition and communication: studies with British fine woodworkers (Trevor H.J. Marchand, School of Oriental and African Studies). -- 6. Footprints through the weather-world: walking, breathing, knowing (Tim Ingold, University of Aberdeen). -- 7. Unconscious culture and conscious nature: exploring East Javanese conceptions of the person through Bourdieu's lens (Konstantinos Retsikas, School of Oriental and African Studies). -- 8. Learning to weave; weaving to learn ... what? (Soumhya Venkatesan, University of Manchester). -- 9. Reflections on knowledge practices and the problem of ignorance (Roy Dilley, University of St Andrews). -- 10. Anthropology of knowledge (Emma Cohen, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology and Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics). -- Index. (shrink)
Abstract Previous research has shown that children and adolescents can progress in the stages of moral judgment. However, in the case of adults, Kohlberg (1973) suggested there might be crystallization after the age of 25. The purpose of this study was to establish whether the structure of moral judgment of adults could be systematically encouraged toward change. Thirty?six adults (three groups) enrolled in an adult sexology course were assessed to determine stage level at the beginning of the course, and post?tested (...) at the completion of the course. Four dilemmas were used: two for general moral judgment, and two for sexual moral judgment. During the 45?hour course, subjects were systematically introduced to arguments of a higher stage, and discussions focused on the axiological aspects of the adults? sexual life. Results show that there was a significant increase in the scores at the post?test, both in general and in sexual moral judgments; subjects over 25 also increased their scores, thus indicating that the structure of moral judgment is not crystallized after that age. The existence of a differential between general and sexual moral judgments was also corroborated. Implications with regard to the use of the ?+1 stage? technique for adult education, and more particularly for adult sexual education, are discussed. 1Based upon an experimental study conducted by Louise Marchand?Jodoin and Michel Rainville. (shrink)
Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only (...) be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality. (shrink)
This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to (...) be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction. (shrink)
In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must (...) argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict. (shrink)
The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or (...) intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. (shrink)
The problem of extreme demands is one of the most intractable in contemporary moral theory. On the one hand, it seems that a failure to prevent great suffering at little cost to ourselves is morally wrong; given the amount of suffering in the world and the comparatively trivial nature of the requisite sacrifices, this intuition demands that we give up quite a lot. On the other hand, it doesn’t seem to us that we act wrongly in living lives characterised by (...) only moderate sacrifice, in which our time and resources are disproportionately used to benefit ourselves and those close to us. These two intuitions are extremely difficult to reconcile within any moral theory that recognises a duty to promote the general good. In this paper, however, I will suggest one possible way of doing so. My suggestion requires taking a closer look at the way in which the demand to the promote the good is derived: specifically, at the way our option set is characterised and the information that we take into account in weighing these options. I will suggest that there are certain assumptions it is plausible to make regarding the relevance of information about our own and other agents’ actions, and that once these assumptions are made, we can see how permissions may be derived within the framework of good-promotion. (shrink)
Patients with a life-threatening illness can be confronted with various types of loneliness, one of which is existential loneliness (EL). Since the experience of EL is extremely disruptive, the issue of EL is relevant for the practice of end-of-life care. Still, the literature on EL has generated little discussion and empirical substantiation and has never been systematically reviewed. In order to systematically review the literature, we (1) identified the existential loneliness literature; (2) established an organising framework for the review; (3) (...) conducted a conceptual analysis of existential loneliness; and (4) discussed its relevance for end-of-life care. We found that the EL concept is profoundly unclear. Distinguishing between three dimensions of EL—as a condition, as an experience, and as a process of inner growth—leads to some conceptual clarification. Analysis of these dimensions on the basis of their respective key notions—everpresent, feeling, defence; death, awareness, difficult communication; and inner growth, giving meaning, authenticity—further clarifies the concept. Although none of the key notions are unambiguous, they may function as a starting point for the development of care strategies on EL at the end of life. (shrink)
Louise Barrett, beyond the brain: how body and environment shape animal and human minds Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9247-6 Authors Mirko Farina, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Institute of Human Cognition and Brain Science (IHCBS), Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology" Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.
Cet article traite de la norme de disponibilité induite par une temporalité marchande et des résistances des employés à une flexibilité maximale. Il s’appuie sur une enquête dans des réseaux de boutiques en France et en Belgique. Nous étudions les principes d’organisation marchande au travers des pratiques managériales d’adaptation au flux marchand et de mise en subordination des salariés par les durées d’emploi. Les enseignes de mode (prêt-à-porter) façonnent un temps marchand dont la rentabilité provient de la concordance entre temps (...) de travail et temps de consommation. L’organisation productive de ces enseignes conduit à placer les managers responsables de ces boutiques dans une fonction de maximisation de la rentabilité des points de vente et à exiger du personnel une disponibilité temporelle flexible. Il en résulte de fortes pressions sur une temporalité personnelle de moins en moins autonome (désarticulations temporelles) mais aussi une opposition à une dépendance permanente au temps imprévisible de la boutique. Cette variabilité du temps de travail entraîne des conduites d’indisponibilité et de défense d’une autonomie temporelle contre le temps marchand. Les résistances ont lieu lors de changements arbitraires des jours de travail ou des horaires ; elles peuvent conduire au refus d’heures supplémentaires ou de passer à temps complet certains mois de l’année. (shrink)
The philosopher of religion and critic of idealism, Ludwig Feuerbach had a far-reaching impact on German radicalism around the time of the Revolution of 1848. This intellectual history explores how Feuerbach’s critique of religion served as a rallying point for radicals, and how they paradoxically sought to create a new, post-religious form of religiosity as part of the revolutionary aim. At issue for the Feuerbachian radicals was the emergence of a humanity emancipated from the constraints of mere institutions, able to (...) express itself freely and harmoniously. Caldwell also touches on Moses Hess, Louise Dittmar, and Richard Wagner in his discussion of the time. This book reconstructs the nature of Feuerbach’s radicalism and shows how it influenced early works of socialism, feminism, and musical modernism. (shrink)
Ever since Freud, psychoanalysts have explored the connections between psychoanalysis and literature and psychoanalysis and philosophy, while literary criticism, social science and philosophy have all reflected on and made use of ideas from psychoanalytic theory. The Academic Face of Psychoanalysis presents contributions from these fields and gives the reader an insight into different understandings and applications of psychoanalytic theory. This book comprises twelve contributions from experts in their fields covering philosophy, psychoanalysis, sociology and literary theory. The chapters are divided into (...) three distinct sections: Psychoanalysis Philosophy Social science and literary theory Louise Braddock and Michael Lacewing successfully bring these contributions together with an in-depth introduction that allows the reader to explore the connections between the different disciplines. The multi-disciplinary approach to this book is rare; it will appeal to academics and students, from the subject areas of psychoanalysis, humanities and social science. (shrink)
This book offers a critical feminist perspective on the widely debated topic of transitional justice and forgiveness. Louise Du Toit examines the phenomenon of rape with a feminist philosophical discourse concerning women’s or ‘feminine’ subjectivity and selfhood. She demonstrates how the hierarchical dichotomy of male active versus female passive sexuality – which obscures the true nature of rape – is embedded in the dominant western symbolic frame. Through a Hegelian and phenomenological reading of first-person accounts by rape victims, she (...) excavates an understanding of rape that also starts to open up a way out of the denial and destruction of female sexual subjectivity. (shrink)
In her latest book, Dr. Louise Kaplan, author of the groundbreaking Female Perversions, explores the fetishism strategy, a psychological defense that aims to tame, subdue, and if necessary, murder human vitalities. Through an exploration of such cultural phenomena as footbinding, reality television, and the construction of robots, Kaplan demonstrates how, in a technology-driven world, an understanding of the fetishism strategy can help to preserve the human dialogue that is the basis of all human relationships. Kaplan writes from the heart (...) as well as from the intellect. (shrink)
L'objet de cet article est de mettre au jour l'évolution historique et la logique ayant présidé au nihilisme affectant l'art contemporain. Comment la valeur marchande des oeuvres d'art a-t-elle été conduite à supplanter leur valeur esthétique ? En grande partie à cause de la disparition de toute forme de critique artistique fondée sur des normes académiques idéales à partir desquelles il est possible de juger de l'excellence d'une oeuvre comme objet esthétique : « au plaisir de l'aisthésis a succédé le (...) plaisir tout intellectuel de la reconnaissance et de l'identification ». En proposant un rapide historique de l'évolution des systèmes d'organisation de la vie artistique du Moyen-âge à l'avènement du marché de l'art à la fin du XIXe siècle, l'auteur met au jour la logique et les mécanismes ayant conduit à une radicalisation de l'hétérogénéité de la valeur artistique et de la valeur marchande des oeuvres d'art dans l'art contemporain. (shrink)
Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...) scientists propose to draw the distinction between veridical experience and illusion in terms of the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of “hidden assumptions” deployed in the course of normal perceptual inference, I argue for a different approach. I contend that there are, in a sense, no illusions – illusions are as “open” as veridical experiences. Percepts lack the kinds of intentional content that would be needed for perceptual misrepresntation. My view gives a satisfying solution to a philosophical problem for disjunctivism about the good case/bad case distinction: with respect to illusions, every "bad case" of seeing an X can be equally well construed as a "good case" of seeing some Y (different from X). -/- . (shrink)
In this compelling volume, ten distinguished thinkers – William G. Lycan, Jeffrey Poland, Galen Strawson, Frances Egan, Georges Rey, Peter Ludlow, Paul ...
Abstract: In this paper I offer an account of a particular variety of perception of absence, namely, visual perception of empty space. In so doing, I aim to make explicit the role that seeing empty space has, implicitly, in Mike Martin's account of the visual field. I suggest we should make sense of the claim that vision has a field—in Martin's sense—in terms of our being aware of its limitations or boundaries. I argue that the limits of the visual field (...) are our own sensory limitations, and that we are aware of them as such. Seeing empty space, I argue, involves a structural feature of experience that constitutes our awareness of our visual sensory limitations, and thus, in virtue of which vision has a field. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that olfactory experience, like visual experience, is exteroceptive: it seems to one that odours, when one smells them, are external to the body, as it seems to one that objects are external to the body when one sees them. Where the sense of smell has been discussed by philosophers, it has often been supposed to be non-exteroceptive. The strangeness of this philosophical orthodoxy makes it natural to ask what would lead to its widespread acceptance. I (...) argue that philosophers have been misled by a visuocentric model of what exteroceptivity involves. Since olfaction lacks the spatial features that make vision exteroceptive the conclusion that olfaction is nonexteroceptive can appear quite compelling, particularly in the absence of an alternative model of exteroceptivity appropriate to olfaction. I offer a model according to which odours seem to be external to the body because they seem to be brought into the nose from without by sniffing and breathing through the nostrils. I argue that some natural-seeming objections to this model rely on substantive assumptions about how the senses are distinguished from one another, and how perceptual experience is put together out of its modality-specific parts, that require defence. (shrink)
This paper explores how Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical concepts extend and elaborate discursive and psychoanalytic interpretations of qualitative research findings. Analyzing data from a UK research project exploring young people's engagements with Social Networking Sites (SNSs), Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalytic method is drawn upon to consider complex desire-flows in the social. In particular the notion of ‘affective assemblages’ is developed to explore the relationships between school and online spaces and subjective interfacing with these spaces. The paper suggests online space is (...) heterosexually striated and SNSs create new intensified gendered and sexualized identities and affective relations between young people. Investigating the case study of a teen girl, Louise, who is socially rejected through the affective assemblage of the SNS, then pathologized at school for violently retaliating against being called a ‘fat slag’ online, the paper suggests a Deleuzoguattarian analysis offers new theoretical tools for thinking about discursive subjectification but also for mapping complex desire-flows and micro movements through and against discursive/symbolic norms. (shrink)
Color adjectives have played a central role in work on language typology and variation, but there has been relatively little investigation of their meanings by researchers in formal semantics. This is surprising given the fact that color terms have been at the center of debates in the philosophy of language over foundational questions, in particular whether the idea of a compositional, truth-conditional theory of natural language semantics is even coherent. The challenge presented by color terms is articulated in detail in (...) the work of Charles Travis. Travis argues that structurally isomorphic sentences containing color adjectives can shift truth value from context to context depending on how they are used and in the absence of effects of vagueness or ambiguity/polysemy, and concludes that a deterministic mapping from structures to truth conditions is impossible. The goal of this paper is to provide a linguistic perspective on this issue, which we believe defuses Travis’ challenge. We provide empirical arguments that color adjectives are in fact ambiguous between gradable and nongradable interpretations, and that this simple ambiguity, together with independently motivated options concerning scalar dimension within the gradable reading accounts for the Travis facts in a simpler, more constrained, and thus ultimately more successful fashion than recent contextualist analyses such as those in Szabó (Perspectives on semantics, pragmatics and discourse: A festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer, 2001) or Rothschild and Segal (Mind Lang, 2009). (shrink)
Samuel C. Rickless [To appear in Ancient Philosophy] Abstract: Plato’s Sophist is puzzling inasmuch as it presents us with seven completely different definitions of sophistry. Though not all seven definitions could be accurate, Plato never explicitly indicates which of the definitions is mistaken. Recently, Kenneth Sayre, Mary Louise Gill, and Noburu Notomi have proposed a clever solution to this puzzle. In this paper I explain why the Sayre-Gill-Notomi solution is mistaken, and suggest a better solution.
